Bernd Kaussler – författare

This book analyzes the civil war in Yemen and how intervening external actors have shaped the trajectory of the conflict.

The work examines the conflict in Yemen as a testing ground for expectations about the autonomy and control of proxies by external patrons and the direct consequences for civilian victimization and duration of war. Like other proxy wars, the international dimensions of the war made the conflict in Yemen subject to the geopolitical interests of intervening powers. The longstanding power rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran over Middle East supremacy resulted in a competitive intervention in Yemen, where the initial belligerents of the civil war—the Houthi and the Hadi regime—were used as proxies by Tehran and the Gulf coalition led by Riyadh, respectively. Their intervention ultimately translated into a prolonged and destructive conflict. The often contradictory and self-interested patronage strategies by the coalition’s two central patrons, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, undermined their broader goal of containing Iran. However, Iran’s support for the Houthis enabled them to bait and bleed the Gulf coalition. Lastly, in an effort to balance against Iran, the United States underwrote the military campaign of the Gulf states with military hardware and personnel, thereby further prolonging the conflict and humanitarian disaster. This book concludes that intervention by external patrons both protracted the civil war and made it far more destructive for the civilian population.

This book will be of much interest to students of proxy wars, Middle Eastern conflict, and security studies in general.

This book analyzes the civil war in Yemen and how intervening external actors have shaped the trajectory of the conflict.

The work examines the conflict in Yemen as a testing ground for expectations about the autonomy and control of proxies by external patrons and the direct consequences for civilian victimization and duration of war. Like other proxy wars, the international dimensions of the war made the conflict in Yemen subject to the geopolitical interests of intervening powers. The longstanding power rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran over Middle East supremacy resulted in a competitive intervention in Yemen, where the initial belligerents of the civil war—the Houthi and the Hadi regime—were used as proxies by Tehran and the Gulf coalition led by Riyadh, respectively. Their intervention ultimately translated into a prolonged and destructive conflict. The often contradictory and self-interested patronage strategies by the coalition’s two central patrons, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, undermined their broader goal of containing Iran. However, Iran’s support for the Houthis enabled them to bait and bleed the Gulf coalition. Lastly, in an effort to balance against Iran, the United States underwrote the military campaign of the Gulf states with military hardware and personnel, thereby further prolonging the conflict and humanitarian disaster. This book concludes that intervention by external patrons both protracted the civil war and made it far more destructive for the civilian population.

This book will be of much interest to students of proxy wars, Middle Eastern conflict, and security studies in general.

This book examines the dynamics of relations and the substance of the negotiations between the international community and Iran over the latter''s nuclear programme.

Iran’s nuclear programme and the alleged threat to international peace and security remains one of the most important issues in the United States, as well as in European foreign affairs. In the US, Iran has dominated the political discourse for over three decades and Europe has spent considerable political capital in finding a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. While relations between both states remain subject to mutual hostility, the EU remains a channel of communication and since 2003 has maintained a multilateral negotiation framework.

By and large, the narrative on nuclear negotiations is dominated by constructivist and realist literature, portraying relations between the US and Iran in ideological terms as a prolonged struggle for regional influence. Embedded within conflict resolution and diplomatic theory, this work attempts to bridge this gap. Drawing upon primary documents and interviews, the text examines negotiation behaviour, and strategies and tools of statecraft, as well as analysing technical aspects of initiatives concerning the nuclear programme.

This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, international diplomacy, Middle Eastern politics, security studies and IR in general.

This book examines the dynamics of relations and the substance of the negotiations between the international community and Iran over the latter''s nuclear programme.

Iran’s nuclear programme and the alleged threat to international peace and security remains one of the most important issues in the United States, as well as in European foreign affairs. In the US, Iran has dominated the political discourse for over three decades and Europe has spent considerable political capital in finding a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. While relations between both states remain subject to mutual hostility, the EU remains a channel of communication and since 2003 has maintained a multilateral negotiation framework.

By and large, the narrative on nuclear negotiations is dominated by constructivist and realist literature, portraying relations between the US and Iran in ideological terms as a prolonged struggle for regional influence. Embedded within conflict resolution and diplomatic theory, this work attempts to bridge this gap. Drawing upon primary documents and interviews, the text examines negotiation behaviour, and strategies and tools of statecraft, as well as analysing technical aspects of initiatives concerning the nuclear programme.

This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, international diplomacy, Middle Eastern politics, security studies and IR in general.

This book offers a realist critique of US foreign policy towards the Middle East in the past decade.

It critically examines four core foundations of contemporary US Middle East policy: US relations with Saudi Arabia after the Arab Spring; US diplomacy towards Iran and the Obama administration’s policy of engagement; the road to, and aftermath of, the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq; and US policy towards nuclear-armed Israel. Because of a closely guarded bipartisan consensus, these four core foundations of contemporary US Middle East policy have largely evaded public criticism and scrutiny. This book argues that US strategy towards the Middle East has rarely been guided by order, stability and the national interest. Rather, successive administrations have created a house of cards built on a series of deceptions and constructed perceptions or myths. Combined, these four aspects of US Middle East policy have ushered in a decade of political violence, instability, sectarian divisions and an imbalance of power which has culminated in the territorial disintegration of Iraq and countries in the Levant as well as the rise of ISIS. Moving forward requires a rational pursuit of the national interest based on realist principles.

This book will be of much interest to students of US foreign policy, Middle Eastern politics, security studies and IR in general.

This book offers a realist critique of US foreign policy towards the Middle East in the past decade.

It critically examines four core foundations of contemporary US Middle East policy: US relations with Saudi Arabia after the Arab Spring; US diplomacy towards Iran and the Obama administration’s policy of engagement; the road to, and aftermath of, the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq; and US policy towards nuclear-armed Israel. Because of a closely guarded bipartisan consensus, these four core foundations of contemporary US Middle East policy have largely evaded public criticism and scrutiny. This book argues that US strategy towards the Middle East has rarely been guided by order, stability and the national interest. Rather, successive administrations have created a house of cards built on a series of deceptions and constructed perceptions or myths. Combined, these four aspects of US Middle East policy have ushered in a decade of political violence, instability, sectarian divisions and an imbalance of power which has culminated in the territorial disintegration of Iraq and countries in the Levant as well as the rise of ISIS. Moving forward requires a rational pursuit of the national interest based on realist principles.

This book will be of much interest to students of US foreign policy, Middle Eastern politics, security studies and IR in general.