Bhumitra Chakma – författare

Pakistan is a vitally important country in the contemporary global political system. It is a de facto nuclear state, and a pivotal country in the War on Terror. This book provides a comprehensive study of a nuclear-armed Pakistan, investigating the implications of its emergence as a nuclear weapons state. Setting out the historical background of Pakistani nuclear development, the book examines the lessons for proliferation that can be drawn from the Pakistan case. It explains the changes and continuities of Pakistan’s nuclear policy, assessing its emerging force posture and the implications for Pakistani, South Asian and global security. It also considers the extent to which Pakistan can be said to have a nuclear doctrine, the Pakistani nuclear command and control system, and the relationship between Pakistan and the Non-Proliferation regime. Addressing the issue of whether Pakistan should be viewed as a proliferator, and the implications of a nuclear Pakistan for global terrorism, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons is an important study of all the major issues surrounding Pakistan’s emergence as a nuclear power.

South Asia is often viewed as a potential nuclear flashpoint and a probable source of nuclear terrorism. But, how valid are such perceptions? This book seeks to address this question and assesses the region’s nuclear security from two principal standpoints. First, it evaluates the robustness of the Indo-Pakistani mutual deterrence by analysing the strength and weaknesses of the competing arguments regarding the issue. It also analyses the causes and consequences of nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, the nature of deterrence structure in the region and the challenges of confidence building and arms control between the two countries in order to assess the robustness of South Asia’s nuclear deterrence. Second, it assesses the safety and security of the nuclear assets and nuclear infrastructure of India and Pakistan. The author holds that the debate on South Asia’s nuclear security is largely misplaced because the optimists tend to overemphasise the stabilising effects of nuclear weapons and the pessimists are too alarmists. It is argued that while the risks of nuclear weapons are significant, it is unlikely that India and Pakistan will give up their nuclear arsenals in the foreseeable future. Therefore, what needs to happen is that while nuclear elimination should be the long-term goal, in the interim years the two countries need to pursue minimum deterrence policies to reduce the likelihood of deterrence failure and the possibility of obtaining fissile materials by non-state actors.

Pakistan is a vitally important country in the contemporary global political system. It is a de facto nuclear state, and a pivotal country in the War on Terror. This book provides a comprehensive study of a nuclear-armed Pakistan, investigating the implications of its emergence as a nuclear weapons state. Setting out the historical background of Pakistani nuclear development, the book examines the lessons for proliferation that can be drawn from the Pakistan case. It explains the changes and continuities of Pakistan’s nuclear policy, assessing its emerging force posture and the implications for Pakistani, South Asian and global security. It also considers the extent to which Pakistan can be said to have a nuclear doctrine, the Pakistani nuclear command and control system, and the relationship between Pakistan and the Non-Proliferation regime. Addressing the issue of whether Pakistan should be viewed as a proliferator, and the implications of a nuclear Pakistan for global terrorism, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons is an important study of all the major issues surrounding Pakistan’s emergence as a nuclear power.

South Asia is often viewed as a potential nuclear flashpoint and a probable source of nuclear terrorism. But, how valid are such perceptions? This book seeks to address this question and assesses the region’s nuclear security from two principal standpoints. First, it evaluates the robustness of the Indo-Pakistani mutual deterrence by analysing the strength and weaknesses of the competing arguments regarding the issue. It also analyses the causes and consequences of nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, the nature of deterrence structure in the region and the challenges of confidence building and arms control between the two countries in order to assess the robustness of South Asia’s nuclear deterrence. Second, it assesses the safety and security of the nuclear assets and nuclear infrastructure of India and Pakistan. The author holds that the debate on South Asia’s nuclear security is largely misplaced because the optimists tend to overemphasise the stabilising effects of nuclear weapons and the pessimists are too alarmists. It is argued that while the risks of nuclear weapons are significant, it is unlikely that India and Pakistan will give up their nuclear arsenals in the foreseeable future. Therefore, what needs to happen is that while nuclear elimination should be the long-term goal, in the interim years the two countries need to pursue minimum deterrence policies to reduce the likelihood of deterrence failure and the possibility of obtaining fissile materials by non-state actors.

An important and critical re-evaluation of South Asia's post-tests nuclear politics, in contrast to other books, this volume emphasises the political dimension of South Asia's nuclear weapons, explains how the bombs are used as politico-strategic assets rather than pure battlefield weapons and how India and Pakistan utilise them for politico-strategic purposes in an extremely complex and competitive South Asian strategic landscape. Written by a group of perceptive observers of South Asia, this volume evaluates the current state of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrents, the challenges that the two countries confront in building their nuclear forces, the post-test nuclear doctrines of the two strategic rivals, the implications of Indo-Pakistani politics for regional cooperation, the role of two systemic actors (USA and China) in the region's nuclear politics and the critical issues of confidence-building and nuclear arms control.

An important and critical re-evaluation of South Asia's post-tests nuclear politics, in contrast to other books, this volume emphasises the political dimension of South Asia's nuclear weapons, explains how the bombs are used as politico-strategic assets rather than pure battlefield weapons and how India and Pakistan utilise them for politico-strategic purposes in an extremely complex and competitive South Asian strategic landscape. Written by a group of perceptive observers of South Asia, this volume evaluates the current state of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrents, the challenges that the two countries confront in building their nuclear forces, the post-test nuclear doctrines of the two strategic rivals, the implications of Indo-Pakistani politics for regional cooperation, the role of two systemic actors (USA and China) in the region's nuclear politics and the critical issues of confidence-building and nuclear arms control.

Leading South Asia expert Bhumitra Chakma explains the politics of regionalism in South Asia and traces the origins and evolution of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) from its inception to the present day. He takes an International Relations perspective and engages three major IR theoretical approaches – neorealism, institutionalism and constructivism – to explain the complex dynamics of South Asian regionalism.Using comparative perspectives based on the experiences of similar regional organizations, the author provides an in-depth analysis of the challenges of cooperation in the region and explores how progress might be made in the future.

This volume analyses New Delhi’s reaction to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the rise of politics of connectivity and infrastructure building which has heightened Sino-Indian rivalry in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).