The last few years have seen major reforms to the delegation of powers and post-delegation supervision of the European Commission. In light of these reforms, Rulemaking by the European Commission: The New System for Delegation of Powers assesses whether the new system has really affected the old doctrine of delegation of powers, and if so, how? Specific questions answered include: have the objectives of the reform been achieved and what were theseobjectives? How does the new system affect the division of functions between the institutions of the EU and the institutional balance? Has this new system affected the relationship between the EU and its Member States, and if so, how does it concern its citizens?Presented by an interdisciplinary group of experts who have actively followed or participated in the process of reform, the book is structured in four parts: (1) the political and historical context in which the rule-making takes place, (2) the operation and functioning of the system before and after the reform, (3) the legal substance of a new framework for rule-making and the emerging case law from the Court of Justice of the EU, and (4) the procedural dimension, including the legalpreconditions for non-institutional actors to participate.

The last few years have seen major reforms to the delegation of powers and post-delegation supervision of the European Commission. In light of these reforms, Rulemaking by the European Commission: The New System for Delegation of Powers assesses whether the new system has really affected the old doctrine of delegation of powers, and if so, how? Specific questions answered include: have the objectives of the reform been achieved and what were theseobjectives? How does the new system affect the division of functions between the institutions of the EU and the institutional balance? Has this new system affected the relationship between the EU and its Member States, and if so, how does it concern its citizens?Presented by an interdisciplinary group of experts who have actively followed or participated in the process of reform, the book is structured in four parts: (1) the political and historical context in which the rule-making takes place, (2) the operation and functioning of the system before and after the reform, (3) the legal substance of a new framework for rule-making and the emerging case law from the Court of Justice of the EU, and (4) the procedural dimension, including the legalpreconditions for non-institutional actors to participate.

With each legislative issue, legislators have to decide whether to delegate decision-making to the executive and/or to expert bodies in order to flesh out the details of this legislation, or, alternatively, to spell out all aspects of this decision in legislation proper. The reasons why to delegate have been of prime interest to political science. The debate has concentrated on principal-agent theory to explain why politicians delegate decision-making to bureaucrats,to independent regulatory agencies, and to others actors and how to control these agents. By contrast, Changing Rules of Delegation focuses on these questions: Which actors are empowered by delegation? Are executive actors empowered over legislative actors? How do legislative actors react to theloss of power? What opportunities are there to change the institutional rules governing delegation in order to (re)gain institutional power and, with it influence over policy outcomes? The authors analyze the conditions and processes of change of the rules that delegate decision-making power to the Commission''s implementing powers under comitology. Focusing on the role of the European Parliament the authors explain why the Commission, the Council, and increasingly the Parliament, delegateddecision-making to the Commission. If they chose delegation, they still have to determine under which institutional rule comitology should operate. These rules, too, distribute power unequally among actors and therefore raise the question of how they came about in the first place and whether and how the"losers" of a rule change seek to alter the rules at a later point in time.

The last few years have seen major reforms to the delegation of powers and post-delegation supervision of the European Commission. In light of these reforms, Rulemaking by the European Commission: The New System for Delegation of Powers assesses whether the new system has really affected the old doctrine of delegation of powers, and if so, how? Specific questions answered include: have the objectives of the reform been achieved and what were theseobjectives? How does the new system affect the division of functions between the institutions of the EU and the institutional balance? Has this new system affected the relationship between the EU and its Member States, and if so, how does it concern its citizens?Presented by an interdisciplinary group of experts who have actively followed or participated in the process of reform, the book is structured in four parts: (1) the political and historical context in which the rule-making takes place, (2) the operation and functioning of the system before and after the reform, (3) the legal substance of a new framework for rule-making and the emerging case law from the Court of Justice of the EU, and (4) the procedural dimension, including the legalpreconditions for non-institutional actors to participate.

The last few years have seen major reforms to the delegation of powers and post-delegation supervision of the European Commission. In light of these reforms, Rulemaking by the European Commission: The New System for Delegation of Powers assesses whether the new system has really affected the old doctrine of delegation of powers, and if so, how? Specific questions answered include: have the objectives of the reform been achieved and what were theseobjectives? How does the new system affect the division of functions between the institutions of the EU and the institutional balance? Has this new system affected the relationship between the EU and its Member States, and if so, how does it concern its citizens?Presented by an interdisciplinary group of experts who have actively followed or participated in the process of reform, the book is structured in four parts: (1) the political and historical context in which the rule-making takes place, (2) the operation and functioning of the system before and after the reform, (3) the legal substance of a new framework for rule-making and the emerging case law from the Court of Justice of the EU, and (4) the procedural dimension, including the legalpreconditions for non-institutional actors to participate.

With each legislative issue, legislators have to decide whether to delegate decision-making to the executive and/or to expert bodies in order to flesh out the details of this legislation, or, alternatively, to spell out all aspects of this decision in legislation proper. The reasons why to delegate have been of prime interest to political science. The debate has concentrated on principal-agent theory to explain why politicians delegate decision-making to bureaucrats,to independent regulatory agencies, and to others actors and how to control these agents. By contrast, Changing Rules of Delegation focuses on these questions: Which actors are empowered by delegation? Are executive actors empowered over legislative actors? How do legislative actors react to theloss of power? What opportunities are there to change the institutional rules governing delegation in order to (re)gain institutional power and, with it influence over policy outcomes? The authors analyze the conditions and processes of change of the rules that delegate decision-making power to the Commission''s implementing powers under comitology. Focusing on the role of the European Parliament the authors explain why the Commission, the Council, and increasingly the Parliament, delegateddecision-making to the Commission. If they chose delegation, they still have to determine under which institutional rule comitology should operate. These rules, too, distribute power unequally among actors and therefore raise the question of how they came about in the first place and whether and how the"losers" of a rule change seek to alter the rules at a later point in time.