Claes Lernestedt – författare

I boken behandlas något både viktigt och problematiskt för dagens straffrätt: dess möte med vad som brukar refereras till som ”strukturella perspektiv”. Här sätts särskilt i fokus klass-, genus- och mångkulturella perspektiv. Bland övergripande frågeställningar finns hur förflyttningar bör genomföras mellan å ena sidan individen, å andra sidan gruppen eller strukturen som den menas vara en del av, liksom mellan å ena sidan straffrättens världsbild, å andra sidan det strukturella perspektivets. Detta slags konfrontation är nyttig av flera skäl. Bortsett från att många av de mer konkreta sakfrågor som boken berör är i behov av en mer tillfredsställande behandling, ger en konfrontation mellan straffrätt och strukturella perspektiv också ett viktigt mervärde: en ökad förståelse för straffrätten själv, dess (emellanåt outtalade) självbild, grundantaganden och utgångspunkter, dess syften och berättiganden, vad straffrätt är, vad den kan vara, och vad den borde vara. Bland de konkreta sakfrågor som diskuteras, i fråga om regleringens utformning och tillämpning i praxis, finns fridskränkningsbrott enligt BrB 4:4 a, könsstympning, fattigdom, människoexploatering, ”kvinnligt nödvärn”, hedersförtryck och provokation.

Principen om allas likhet inför lagen betraktas, såväl politiskt som rättsligt, som en viktig utgångspunkt för samhällslivet. Den ska exempelvis, enligt svensk grundlag, prägla alla sammanhang där offentlig makt utövas. Att likhet inför lagen står för något viktigt är enkelt att vara överens om, men det är i ett nästa led betydligt svårare att enas om vad som faktiskt ska följa ur begreppet, vad det ska innebära. Bland annat begreppets starka känslomässiga kraft har medfört att det anses ha politisk sprängkraft, varför lagstiftarens hållning till det har varit och kanske fortfarande är ambivalent. Begreppet är också så öppet att det kan ges många betydelser och användningar. Därför har också i boktiteln försiktigtvis smugits in ett (o). Diskussioner i termer av likhet inför lagen glider gärna in i större frågor och en ständigt pågående debatt om vad som ska anses vara godtagbar likhet och rättvisa i samhället.

Denna lärobok ger en överskådlig introduktion till frågor om likhet inför lagen med såväl rättsfilosofiska som praktiska ingångar. Bokens exempel är till stor del hämtade från den offentliga rätten i bred bemärkelse, med tonvikt på allmän förvaltningsrätt, socialrätt och straffrätt. Begreppets varierande innebörder följs genom olika historiska faser och rättsområden. Även det närliggande begreppet diskriminering behandlas, liksom det ökande antal rättighetskonventioner som anknyter till likhetsrelaterade frågor.

The idea of a cultural defense in criminal law is often ridiculed as "multiculturalism run amok ". To allow someone charged with a crime to say "this is my culture " as an excuse for their action seems to open the door to cultural relativism, to jeopardize the protection of fundamental rights, and to undermine norms of individual responsibility. Many scholars, however, insist that cultural evidence is appropriate, indeed essential, for the fair operation of the criminal law. The criminal law is society''s most powerful tool for regulating behaviour, and just for that reason we apply strong safeguards to ensure that criminal sanctions are applied in a fair way. When it comes to individuals, we want our rules for judging responsibility and punishment to track the actual blameworthiness of the specific individual being prosecuted for a specific action in the past. Cultural evidence may help improve our judgements of individual blameworthiness and desert; indeed, cultural evidence might even be necessary if the practice of punishing individuals is to be legitimate and equitable. According to its proponents, the use of cultural evidence when judging individual blameworthiness is a natural extension of the logic of existing criminal law doctrines regarding defences, and of the logic of current philosophical theories of responsibility and agency. This volume brings together scholars of both criminal law and philosophy to rigorously assess these ideas. Each of the chapters addresses a different dimension of the issue, from a range of perspectives, with varying degrees of sympathy or scepticism regarding cultural defences. The result is an important and original contribution to the literature. It explores why cultural diversity raises distinctive challenges in the criminal law context, not found in other domains of the multiculturalism debate, while also exploring how this particular context raises fundamental issues of agency and responsibility that are at the heart of broader debates in legal, social and political philosophy.

The idea of a cultural defense in criminal law is often ridiculed as "multiculturalism run amok ". To allow someone charged with a crime to say "this is my culture " as an excuse for their action seems to open the door to cultural relativism, to jeopardize the protection of fundamental rights, and to undermine norms of individual responsibility. Many scholars, however, insist that cultural evidence is appropriate, indeed essential, for the fair operation of the criminal law. The criminal law is society's most powerful tool for regulating behaviour, and just for that reason we apply strong safeguards to ensure that criminal sanctions are applied in a fair way. When it comes to individuals, we want our rules for judging responsibility and punishment to track the actual blameworthiness of the specific individual being prosecuted for a specific action in the past. Cultural evidence may help improve our judgements of individual blameworthiness and desert; indeed, cultural evidence might even be necessary if the practice of punishing individuals is to be legitimate and equitable. According to its proponents, the use of cultural evidence when judging individual blameworthiness is a natural extension of the logic of existing criminal law doctrines regarding defences, and of the logic of current philosophical theories of responsibility and agency. This volume brings together scholars of both criminal law and philosophy to rigorously assess these ideas. Each of the chapters addresses a different dimension of the issue, from a range of perspectives, with varying degrees of sympathy or scepticism regarding cultural defences. The result is an important and original contribution to the literature. It explores why cultural diversity raises distinctive challenges in the criminal law context, not found in other domains of the multiculturalism debate, while also exploring how this particular context raises fundamental issues of agency and responsibility that are at the heart of broader debates in legal, social and political philosophy.

The overarching objective of this volume is to discuss and critique the legal regulation of human trafficking in national and transnational context. Specifically, discussion is needed not only with regard to the historical and philosophical points of departure for any criminalisation of trafficking, but also, regarding the societal and social framework, the empirical dimension such as existing statistics in the area, and the need for more data. The book combines descriptive and normative analyses of the crime of trafficking in human beings from a cross-legal perspective. Notwithstanding the enhanced interest for human trafficking in politics, the public and the media, a critical perspective such as the one pursued herewith has so far been largely absent. Against this background, this approach allows for theoretical findings to be addressed by pointing out and elaborating different, interdisciplinary conflicts and inconsistencies in the regulation of human trafficking. The book discusses the phenomenon of human trafficking critically from various angles, giving it ‘shape’ and showing how it comes to life in the legal regulation.

The overarching objective of this volume is to discuss and critique the legal regulation of human trafficking in national and transnational context. Specifically, discussion is needed not only with regard to the historical and philosophical points of departure for any criminalisation of trafficking, but also, regarding the societal and social framework, the empirical dimension such as existing statistics in the area, and the need for more data. The book combines descriptive and normative analyses of the crime of trafficking in human beings from a cross-legal perspective. Notwithstanding the enhanced interest for human trafficking in politics, the public and the media, a critical perspective such as the one pursued herewith has so far been largely absent. Against this background, this approach allows for theoretical findings to be addressed by pointing out and elaborating different, interdisciplinary conflicts and inconsistencies in the regulation of human trafficking. The book discusses the phenomenon of human trafficking critically from various angles, giving it ''shape'' and showing how it comes to life in the legal regulation.

The overarching objective of this volume is to discuss and critique the legal regulation of human trafficking in national and transnational context. Specifically, discussion is needed not only with regard to the historical and philosophical points of departure for any criminalisation of trafficking, but also, regarding the societal and social framework, the empirical dimension such as existing statistics in the area, and the need for more data. The book combines descriptive and normative analyses of the crime of trafficking in human beings from a cross-legal perspective. Notwithstanding the enhanced interest for human trafficking in politics, the public and the media, a critical perspective such as the one pursued herewith has so far been largely absent. Against this background, this approach allows for theoretical findings to be addressed by pointing out and elaborating different, interdisciplinary conflicts and inconsistencies in the regulation of human trafficking. The book discusses the phenomenon of human trafficking critically from various angles, giving it ''shape'' and showing how it comes to life in the legal regulation.

The state’s use of the threat, and imposition, of punishments to regulate conduct is thought (or at least said) by many to be legitimised by the idea that the criminal law’s burdens only fall on those who are blameworthy for their conduct. However, the formal concept of ‘blameworthiness’ needs to be made substantive. This puts various ideas regarding the criminal law’s person at the heart of debates about blame, guilt, and responsibility. How is the criminal law’s person constructed, by whom, and with what disciplinary norms? How is it threatened by new ‘knowledge’, and how do those threats play out amongst the various stakeholders who claim the criminal law’s person as ‘theirs’? To address these and cognate questions, this volume brings together an international group of academics to engage with the criminal law’s person from a range of disciplinary perspectives.

The state''s use of the threat, and imposition, of punishments to regulate conduct is thought (or at least said) by many to be legitimised by the idea that the criminal law''s burdens only fall on those who are blameworthy for their conduct. However, the formal concept of ''blameworthiness'' needs to be made substantive. This puts various ideas regarding the criminal law''s person at the heart of debates about blame, guilt, and responsibility. How is the criminal law''s person constructed, by whom, and with what disciplinary norms? How is it threatened by new ''knowledge'', and how do those threats play out amongst the various stakeholders who claim the criminal law''s person as ''theirs''? To address these and cognate questions, this volume brings together an international group of academics to engage with the criminal law''s person from a range of disciplinary perspectives.

The state''s use of the threat, and imposition, of punishments to regulate conduct is thought (or at least said) by many to be legitimised by the idea that the criminal law''s burdens only fall on those who are blameworthy for their conduct. However, the formal concept of ''blameworthiness'' needs to be made substantive. This puts various ideas regarding the criminal law''s person at the heart of debates about blame, guilt, and responsibility. How is the criminal law''s person constructed, by whom, and with what disciplinary norms? How is it threatened by new ''knowledge'', and how do those threats play out amongst the various stakeholders who claim the criminal law''s person as ''theirs''? To address these and cognate questions, this volume brings together an international group of academics to engage with the criminal law''s person from a range of disciplinary perspectives.

The overarching objective of this volume is to discuss and critique the legal regulation of human trafficking in national and transnational context. Specifically, discussion is needed not only with regard to the historical and philosophical points of departure for any criminalisation of trafficking, but also, regarding the societal and social framework, the empirical dimension such as existing statistics in the area, and the need for more data. The book combines descriptive and normative analyses of the crime of trafficking in human beings from a cross-legal perspective. Notwithstanding the enhanced interest for human trafficking in politics, the public and the media, a critical perspective such as the one pursued herewith has so far been largely absent. Against this background, this approach allows for theoretical findings to be addressed by pointing out and elaborating different, interdisciplinary conflicts and inconsistencies in the regulation of human trafficking. The book discusses the phenomenon of human trafficking critically from various angles, giving it ‘shape’ and showing how it comes to life in the legal regulation.

The state’s use of the threat, and imposition, of punishments to regulate conduct is thought (or at least said) by many to be legitimised by the idea that the criminal law’s burdens only fall on those who are blameworthy for their conduct. However, the formal concept of ‘blameworthiness’ needs to be made substantive. This puts various ideas regarding the criminal law’s person at the heart of debates about blame, guilt, and responsibility. How is the criminal law’s person constructed, by whom, and with what disciplinary norms? How is it threatened by new ‘knowledge’, and how do those threats play out amongst the various stakeholders who claim the criminal law’s person as ‘theirs’? To address these and cognate questions, this volume brings together an international group of academics to engage with the criminal law’s person from a range of disciplinary perspectives.

Likhet inför lagen är ett slagord som ofta används i diskussioner av hur det goda samhället bör se ut. Intuitivt ger det positiva associationer: till något bra och alltigenom eftersträvansvärt. Samtidigt är det både rättsligt och filosofiskt svårt att ge begreppet ett innehåll, eller i vart fall ett innehåll. Ett syfte med denna lärobok är att diskutera olika möjliga innebörder av begreppet. Det går att konstruera en snäv och avgränsad kärnbetydelse som har att göra med rättstillämpningen. Diskussioner om likhet inför lagen glider dock också gärna över i större frågor än så: en samhällelig, ständigt pågående debatt om vad som skall anses vara godtagbar likhet och godtagbar rättvisa i ett samhälle. Denna lärobok ger en överskådlig introduktion till frågorna, och tillhandahåller ett diskussionsunderlag med bas i såväl snävare juridik som rättsfilosofi och politisk filosofi. Det redogörs för ett antal historiska faser, där argument med sin bas i likhet och likhet inför lagen har använts i olika gruppers strävanden efter en bättre situation i samhället. Det genomförs också en fiktiv omstart av samhället, med diskussion av vägval viktiga för frågor om likhet, rättvisa och motsatsen.