Conrado Hubner Mendes – författare

Contemporary democracies have granted an expansive amount of power to unelected judges that sit in constitutional or supreme courts. This power shift has never been easily squared with the institutional backbones through which democracy is popularly supposed to be structured. The best institutional translation of a ''government of the people, by the people and for the people'' is usually expressed through elections and electoral representation in parliaments.Judicial review of legislation has been challenged as bypassing that common sense conception of democratic rule. The alleged ''democratic deficit'' behind what courts are legally empowered to do has been met with a variety of justifications in favour of judicial review. One common justification claims that constitutional courts are, in comparison to elected parliaments, much better suited for impartial deliberation and public reason-giving. Fundamental rights would thus be better protected bythat insulated mode of decision-making. This justification has remained largely superficial and, sometimes, too easily embraced.This book analyses the argument that the legitimacy of courts arises from their deliberative capacity. It examines the theory of political deliberation and its implications for institutional design. Against this background, it turns to constitutional review and asks whether an argument can be made in support of judicial power on the basis of deliberative theory.

Contemporary democracies have granted an expansive amount of power to unelected judges that sit in constitutional or supreme courts. This power shift has never been easily squared with the institutional backbones through which democracy is popularly supposed to be structured. The best institutional translation of a ''government of the people, by the people and for the people'' is usually expressed through elections and electoral representation in parliaments.Judicial review of legislation has been challenged as bypassing that common sense conception of democratic rule. The alleged ''democratic deficit'' behind what courts are legally empowered to do has been met with a variety of justifications in favour of judicial review. One common justification claims that constitutional courts are, in comparison to elected parliaments, much better suited for impartial deliberation and public reason-giving. Fundamental rights would thus be better protected bythat insulated mode of decision-making. This justification has remained largely superficial and, sometimes, too easily embraced.This book analyses the argument that the legitimacy of courts arises from their deliberative capacity. It examines the theory of political deliberation and its implications for institutional design. Against this background, it turns to constitutional review and asks whether an argument can be made in support of judicial power on the basis of deliberative theory.

Contemporary democracies have granted an expansive amount of power to unelected judges that sit in constitutional or supreme courts. This power shift has never been easily squared with the institutional backbones through which democracy is popularly supposed to be structured. The best institutional translation of a 'government of the people, by the people and for the people' is usually expressed through elections and electoral representation in parliaments.Judicial review of legislation has been challenged as bypassing that common sense conception of democratic rule. The alleged 'democratic deficit' behind what courts are legally empowered to do has been met with a variety of justifications in favour of judicial review. One common justification claims that constitutional courts are, in comparison to elected parliaments, much better suited for impartial deliberation and public reason-giving. Fundamental rights would thus be better protected by that insulated mode of decision-making. This justification has remained largely superficial and, sometimes, too easily embraced.This book analyses the argument that the legitimacy of courts arises from their deliberative capacity. It examines the theory of political deliberation and its implications for institutional design. Against this background, it turns to constitutional review and asks whether an argument can be made in support of judicial power on the basis of deliberative theory.

Constitutional law in Latin America embodies a mosaic of national histories, political experiments, and institutional transitions. No matter how distinctive these histories and transitions might be, there are still commonalities that transcend the mere geographical contiguity of these countries. This Handbook depicts the constitutional landscape of Latin America by shedding light on its most important differences and affinities, qualities and drawbacks, and by assessing its overall standing in the global enterprise of democratic constitutionalism. It engages with substantive and methodological conundrums of comparative constitutional law in the region, drawing meaningful comparisons between constitutional traditions. The volume is divided into two main parts. Part I focuses on exploring the constitutions for seventeen jurisdictions, offering a comprehensive country-by-country critique of the historical foundations, institutional architecture, and rights-based substantive identity of each constitution. Part II presents comparative analyses on the most controversial constitutional topics of the region, exploring central concepts in institutions and rights.The Oxford Handbook of Constitutional Law in Latin America is an essential resource for scholars and students of comparative constitutional law, and Latin American politics and history Written by leading experts, it comprehensively examines constitutions, controversies, institutions, and constitutional rights in Latin America.