D. Roderick Kiewiet – författare
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Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others—internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication—usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely. In The Logic of Delegation, however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated. In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American politics: the "autonomy" of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations.
278 kr
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Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others—internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication—usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely. In The Logic of Delegation, however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated. In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American politics: the "autonomy" of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations.
407 kr
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Although a great deal is known about the United States Congress, the differences and similarities between it and the legislatures and parliaments of other countries have not been extensively studied. This book--by a distinguished group of legislative specialists from ten countries--fills this gap by presenting legislative research from a comparative, cross-national perspective.Consisting of fourteen essays, this volume incorporates major areas of legislative research, including studies of recruitment of legislators and an overview of their careers, the evolution of legislatures, and the electoral systems by which legislatures are chosen. Each contributor reviews the principal research findings and emphasizes those concepts and methods that facilitate comparative research. The book assesses the state of knowledge in regard to U.S., European, Asian, and Latin American legislatures. The introductory chapter by the editors identifies how to comparatively test research findings while taking into account data availability and questions of conceptual equivalence. Each chapter provides an extensive bibliography, making the book an excellent guide to literature on legislative research. The contributors are David T. Canon, John M. Carey, Gary W. Cox, Frantisek Formanek, John R. Hibbing, Ewa Karpowicz, Junko Kato, Sadafumi Kawato, Michael Laver, Gary F. Moncrief, Chan Wook Park, Werner J. Patzelt, Bjorn Erik Rasch, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Steven S. Smith, and Rick K. Wilson.This book is designed for faculty and graduate students in political science and will also be of interest to members of legislative research staffs in this country and overseas, and to specialists on legislatures in history and law.Gerhard Loewenberg is University of Iowa Foundation Distinguished Professor of Political Science. D. Roderick Kiewiet is Dean of Graduate Studies and Professor of Political Science, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena. Peverill Squire is Professor of Political Science, University of Iowa.