David D. Franks – författare

This volume focuses on theory and research which lends insight into how emotions are distributed, experienced and structured within five broadly conceived institutional areas. These are: medical and health care; family; work and leisure; education; and clinical/counselling. The text seeks to offer the student of social psychology, developmental psychology, cross-cultural psychology, and cognitive anthropology insight into the role that emotional experience plays in understanding society and culture at the close of the 20th century. The volumes in this series illustrate how social organization and private, emotional experience are different phases of the social process. They show the steps by which emotional experience is shaped by social structural, macro-level processes.

This series aims to illustrate how social organization and private, emotional experience are different phases of the social process. It shows the steps by which emotional experience is shaped by social structural process and how these processes are changed by individuals' emotional experience.

This series aims to illustrate how social organization and private, emotional experience are different phases of the social process. It shows the steps by which emotional experience is shaped by social structural process and how these processes are changed by individuals' emotional experience.

As a career sociologist I ?rst became interested in neurosociology around 1987 when a graduate student lent me Michael Gazzaniga’s The Social Brain. Ifthe biological human brain was really social, I thought sociologists and their students should be the ?rst, not the last, to know. As I read on I found little of the clumsy reductionism of the earlier biosociologists whom I had learned to see as the arch- emy of our ?eld. Clearly, reductionism does exist among many neuroscientists. But I also found some things that were very social and quite relevant for sociology. After reading Descarte’s Error by Antonio Damasio, I learned how some types of emotion were necessary for rational thought – a very radical innovation for the long-honored “objective rationalist. ” I started inserting some things about split-brain research into my classes, mispronouncing terms like amygdala and being corrected by my s- dents. That instruction helped me realize how much we professors needed to catch up with our students. I also wrote a review of Leslie Brothers’ Fridays Footprint: How Society Shapes the Human Mind. I thought if she could write so well about social processes maybe I could attempt to do something similar in connection with my ?eld. For several years I found her an e-mail partner with a wonderful sense of humor. She even retrieved copies of her book for the use of my graduate students when I had assigned it for a seminar.

As a career sociologist I ?rst became interested in neurosociology around 1987 when a graduate student lent me Michael Gazzaniga’s The Social Brain. Ifthe biological human brain was really social, I thought sociologists and their students should be the ?rst, not the last, to know. As I read on I found little of the clumsy reductionism of the earlier biosociologists whom I had learned to see as the arch- emy of our ?eld. Clearly, reductionism does exist among many neuroscientists. But I also found some things that were very social and quite relevant for sociology. After reading Descarte’s Error by Antonio Damasio, I learned how some types of emotion were necessary for rational thought – a very radical innovation for the long-honored “objective rationalist. ” I started inserting some things about split-brain research into my classes, mispronouncing terms like amygdala and being corrected by my s- dents. That instruction helped me realize how much we professors needed to catch up with our students. I also wrote a review of Leslie Brothers’ Fridays Footprint: How Society Shapes the Human Mind. I thought if she could write so well about social processes maybe I could attempt to do something similar in connection with my ?eld. For several years I found her an e-mail partner with a wonderful sense of humor. She even retrieved copies of her book for the use of my graduate students when I had assigned it for a seminar.

As a career sociologist I ?rst became interested in neurosociology around 1987 when a graduate student lent me Michael Gazzaniga’s The Social Brain. Ifthe biological human brain was really social, I thought sociologists and their students should be the ?rst, not the last, to know. As I read on I found little of the clumsy reductionism of the earlier biosociologists whom I had learned to see as the arch- emy of our ?eld. Clearly, reductionism does exist among many neuroscientists. But I also found some things that were very social and quite relevant for sociology. After reading Descarte’s Error by Antonio Damasio, I learned how some types of emotion were necessary for rational thought – a very radical innovation for the long-honored “objective rationalist. ” I started inserting some things about split-brain research into my classes, mispronouncing terms like amygdala and being corrected by my s- dents. That instruction helped me realize how much we professors needed to catch up with our students. I also wrote a review of Leslie Brothers’ Fridays Footprint: How Society Shapes the Human Mind. I thought if she could write so well about social processes maybe I could attempt to do something similar in connection with my ?eld. For several years I found her an e-mail partner with a wonderful sense of humor. She even retrieved copies of her book for the use of my graduate students when I had assigned it for a seminar.

This series aims to illustrate how social organization and private, emotional experience are different phases of the social process. It shows the steps by which emotional experience is shaped by social structural process and how these processes are changed by individuals' emotional experience.

Until recently, a handbook on neurosociology would have been viewed with skepticism by sociologists, who have long been protective of their disciplinary domain against perceived encroachment by biology. But a number of developments in the last decade or so have made sociologists more receptive to biological factors in sociology and social psychology. Much of this has been encouraged by the coeditors of this volume, David Franks and Jonathan Turner. This new interest has been increased by the explosion of research in neuroscience on brain functioning and brain-environment interaction (via new MRI technologies), with implications for social and psychological functioning. This handbook emphasizes the integration of perspectives within sociology as well as between fields in social neuroscience. For example, Franks represents a social constructionist position following from G.H. Mead’s voluntaristic theory of the act while Turner is more social structural and positivistic. Furthermore, thishandbook not only contains contributions from sociologists, but leading figures from the psychological perspective of social neuroscience.

Until recently, a handbook on neurosociology would have been viewed with skepticism by sociologists, who have long been protective of their disciplinary domain against perceived encroachment by biology. But a number of developments in the last decade or so have made sociologists more receptive to biological factors in sociology and social psychology. Much of this has been encouraged by the coeditors of this volume, David Franks and Jonathan Turner. This new interest has been increased by the explosion of research in neuroscience on brain functioning and brain-environment interaction (via new MRI technologies), with implications for social and psychological functioning. This handbook emphasizes the integration of perspectives within sociology as well as between fields in social neuroscience. For example, Franks represents a social constructionist position following from G.H. Mead’s voluntaristic theory of the act while Turner is more social structural and positivistic. Furthermore, thishandbook not only contains contributions from sociologists, but leading figures from the psychological perspective of social neuroscience.

This book offers an introduction to the fundamentals of neurosociology and presents the newest issues and findings in the field. It describes the evolution of the brain and its social nature. It examines the concept of knowing and what can be known, as well as the subjective sensations we experience. Next, it explores the ubiquitousness of New Unconsciousness and the latest conclusions about mirror neurons. Additional themes and concepts described are sex differences in the brain, imitation, determinism and agency.The book brings together neuroscience and sociology, two fields that are very different in terms of method, theory, tradition and practice. It does so building on the following premise: If our brains have been forged evolutionarily over the many centuries for social life, sociologists should have the opportunity, if not the duty, to know about it whatever the reservations of some who think that any approach that includes biology must be reductionistic.