David V. Budescu – författare

A social dilemma is a situation in which the interests of the collective and its individual members clash. In these situations individuals typically are tempted to take actions that favor (sometimes even maximize) their short-term egocentric interests. However if all group members adopt such behaviors, the group suffers since all its members are worse off than they could be by endorsing alternative pro-social actions that favor (sometimes even maximize) the collective interest. This book provides an overview and summary of the state of social psychological research on social dilemmas. It is organized around four core issues: individual differences which determine people's preferences for outcomes that promote either their own or their group's well-being; the study of dynamic processes based on simulations of artificial societies; social dilemmas that emerge in inter-group conflicts; and the effect of various types and sources of uncertainty on behavior in social dilemma situations.

A social dilemma is a situation in which the interests of the collective and its individual members clash. In these situations individuals typically are tempted to take actions that favor (sometimes even maximize) their short-term egocentric interests. However if all group members adopt such behaviors, the group suffers since all its members are worse off than they could be by endorsing alternative pro-social actions that favor (sometimes even maximize) the collective interest. This book provides an overview and summary of the state of social psychological research on social dilemmas. It is organized around four core issues: individual differences which determine people's preferences for outcomes that promote either their own or their group's well-being; the study of dynamic processes based on simulations of artificial societies; social dilemmas that emerge in inter-group conflicts; and the effect of various types and sources of uncertainty on behavior in social dilemma situations.

Human behavior often violates the predictions of rational choice theory. This realization has caused many social psychologists and experimental economists to attempt to develop an experimentally-based variant of game theory as an alternative descriptive model. The impetus for this book is the interest in the development of such a theory that combines elements from both disciplines and appeals to both. The editors have brought together leading researchers in the fields of experimental economics, behavioral game theory, and social dilemmas to engage in constructive dialogue across disciplinary boundaries. This book offers a comprehensive overview of the new insights into the motivation of human behavior under a variety of naturally or artificially induced incentive structures that are emerging from their work. Amnon Rapoport--a pioneer and leader in experimental study and quantitative modeling of human decisions in social and interactive contexts--is honored.