Dennis C. Mueller – författare

Constitutional Democracy systematically examines how the basic constitutional structure of governments affects what they can accomplish. This relationship is especially important at a time when Americans are increasingly disillusioned about government's fundamental ability to reach solutions for domestic problems, and when countries in the former Soviet bloc and around the world are rewriting their constitutions.Political economist Mueller illuminates the links between the structure of democratic government and the outcomes it achieves by drawing comparisons between the American system and other government systems around the world. Working from the "public choice" perspective in political science, the book analyses electoral rules, voting rules, federalism, bicameralism, citizenship, and separation of powers.

The evocation of narrative as a way to understand the content of consciousness, including memory, autobiography, self, and imagination, has sparked truly interdisciplinary work among psychologists, philosophers, and literary critics. Even neuroscientists have taken an interest in the stories people create to understand themselves, their past, and the world around them. The research presented in this volume should appeal to researchers enmeshed in these problems, as well as the general reader with an interest in the philosophical problem of what consciousness is and how it functions in the everyday world.

Constitutional Democracy systematically examines how the basic constitutional structure of governments affects what they can accomplish. This relationship is especially important at a time when Americans are increasingly disillusioned about government's fundamental ability to reach solutions for domestic problems, and when countries in the former Soviet block and around the world are rewriting their constitutions. Political economist Mueller illuminates the links between the structure of democratic government and the outcomes it achieves by drawing comparisons between the American system and other government systems around the world. Working from the "public choice" perspective in political science, the book analyzes electoral rules, voting rules, federalism, bicameralism, citizenship, and separation of powers. It will be of great interest to students and scholars of political economy.

The financial crisis that began in 2008 and its lingering aftermath have caused many intellectuals and politicians to question the virtues of capitalist systems. The 19 original essays in this handbook, written by leading scholars from Asia, North America, and Europe, analyze both the strengths and weaknesses of capitalist systems. The volume opens with essays on the historical and legal origins of capitalism. These are followed by chapters describing the nature, institutions, and advantages of capitalism: entrepreneurship, innovation, property rights, contracts, capital markets, and the modern corporation. The next set of chapters discusses the problems that can arise in capitalist systems including monopoly, principal agent problems, financial bubbles, excessive managerial compensation, and empire building through wealth-destroying mergers. Two subsequent essays examine in detail the properties of the "Asian model" of capitalism as exemplified by Japan and South Korea, and capitalist systems where ownership and control are largely separated as in the United States and United Kingdom. The handbook concludes with an essay on capitalism in the 21st century by Nobel Prize winner Edmund Phelps.

Constitutional Democracy systematically examines how the basic constitutional structure of governments affects what they can accomplish. This relationship is especially important at a time when Americans are increasingly disillusioned about government''s fundamental ability to reach solutions for domestic problems, and when countries in the former Soviet block and around the world are rewriting their constitutions. Political economist Mueller illuminates the links between the structure of democratic government and the outcomes it achieves by drawing comparisons between the American system and other government systems around the world. Working from the "public choice" perspective in political science, the book analyzes electoral rules, voting rules, federalism, bicameralism, citizenship, and separation of powers. It will be of great interest to students and scholars of political economy.

The financial crisis that began in 2008 and its lingering aftermath have caused many intellectuals and politicians to question the virtues of capitalist systems. The 19 original essays in this Handbook, written by leading scholars from Asia, North America, and Europe, analyze both the strengths and weaknesses of capitalist systems. The volume opens with essays on the historical and legal origins of capitalism. These are followed by chapters describing the nature, institutions, and advantages of capitalism: entrepreneurship, innovation, property rights, contracts, capital markets, and the modern corporation. The next set of chapters discusses the problems that can arise in capitalist systems including monopoly, principal agent problems, financial bubbles, excessive managerial compensation, and empire building through wealth-destroying mergers. Two subsequent essays examine in detail the properties of the "Asian model" of capitalism as exemplified by Japan and South Korea, and capitalist systems where ownership and control are largely separated as in the United States and United Kingdom. The handbook concludes with an essay on capitalism in the 21st century by Nobel Prize winner Edmund Phelps.

The financial crisis that began in 2008 and its lingering aftermath have caused many intellectuals and politicians to question the virtues of capitalist systems. The 19 original essays in this Handbook, written by leading scholars from Asia, North America, and Europe, analyze both the strengths and weaknesses of capitalist systems. The volume opens with essays on the historical and legal origins of capitalism. These are followed by chapters describing the nature, institutions, and advantages of capitalism: entrepreneurship, innovation, property rights, contracts, capital markets, and the modern corporation. The next set of chapters discusses the problems that can arise in capitalist systems including monopoly, principal agent problems, financial bubbles, excessive managerial compensation, and empire building through wealth-destroying mergers. Two subsequent essays examine in detail the properties of the "Asian model" of capitalism as exemplified by Japan and South Korea, and capitalist systems where ownership and control are largely separated as in the United States and United Kingdom. The handbook concludes with an essay on capitalism in the 21st century by Nobel Prize winner Edmund Phelps.

Why have modern corporations grown to such unprecedented sizes? This volume explores this crucial question, emphasising the roles of diversification and mergers.

Why have modern corporations grown to such unprecedented sizes? This volume explores this crucial question, emphasising the roles of diversification and mergers.

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in public choice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined including a normative analysis of the simple majority rule, Bergson–Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibility theorems, Rawls''s social contract theory and the constitutional political economy of Buchanan and Tullock.

Do company profits eventually converge on a common, competitive level? How long does the convergence process take? This book seeks to answer these questions through a comparison of company profitability using time-series data compiled at the firm level and at the industry level in Canada, France, Japan, Sweden, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The emphasis is on long-run, dynamic processes, and the perspective is that of Joseph Schumpeter, with profits converging, if at all, to competitive levels only in the long run. The basic methodology of the book is presented in one chapter, with the subsequent chapters focusing on results for individual countries. A summary chapter presenting major resolutions and their implications concludes the book.

Profits in the Long Run asks two questions: Are there persistent differences in profitability across firms? If so, what accounts for them? This book answers these questions using data for the 1000 largest US manufacturing firms in 1950 and 1972. It finds that there are persistent differences in profitability and market power across large US companies. Companies with persistently high profits are found to have high market shares and sell differentiated products. Mergers do not result in synergistic increases in profitability, but they do have an averaging effect. Companies with above normal profits have their profits lowered by mergers. Companies with initially below normal profits have them raised. In addition, the influence of other variables on long-run profitability, including risk, sales, diversification, growth and managerial control, is explored. The implications of antitrust policy are likewise addressed.

This book also emphasizes the difference between religion and science as means for understanding causal relationships, but it focuses much more heavily on the challenge religious extremism poses for liberal democratic institutions. The treatment contains a discussion of human psychology, describes the salient characteristics of all religions, and contrasts religion and science as systems of thought. Historical sketches are used to establish a link between modernity and the use of the human capacity for reasoning to advance human welfare. The book describes the conditions under which democratic institutions can advance human welfare, and the nature of constitutional rights as protectors of individual freedoms. Extremist religions are shown to pose a threat to liberal democracy, a threat that has implications for immigration and education policies and the definition of citizenship.

Profits in the Long Run asks two questions: Are there persistent differences in profitability across firms? If so, what accounts for them? This book answers these questions using data for the 1000 largest US manufacturing firms in 1950 and 1972. It finds that there are persistent differences in profitability and market power across large US companies. Companies with persistently high profits are found to have high market shares and sell differentiated products. Mergers do not result in synergistic increases in profitability, but they do have an averaging effect. Companies with above normal profits have their profits lowered by mergers. Companies with initially below normal profits have them raised. In addition, the influence of other variables on long-run profitability, including risk, sales, diversification, growth and managerial control, is explored. The implications of antitrust policy are likewise addressed.

Do company profits eventually converge on a common, competitive level? How long does the convergence process take? This book seeks to answer these questions through a comparison of company profitability using time-series data compiled at the firm level and at the industry level in Canada, France, Japan, Sweden, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The emphasis is on long-run, dynamic processes, and the perspective is that of Joseph Schumpeter, with profits converging, if at all, to competitive levels only in the long run. The basic methodology of the book is presented in one chapter, with the subsequent chapters focusing on results for individual countries. A summary chapter presenting major resolutions and their implications concludes the book.

Public choice or rational politics differs from other approaches to the study of political behavior in that it builds on models in which rational individuals seek to advance their own interests. This five-part volume surveys the main ideas and contributions of the field. It contains twenty-five essays written by thirty scholars, both economists and political scientists, from North America and Europe. Part I discusses the nature and justification for the existence of government and various forms it can take, including mixed, private, and public institutions, international organizations, federalisms, and constitutional governments. Part II examines the properties of different voting rules and preference aggregation procedures. Part III explores multiparty systems, interest groups, logrolling and political business cycles. The individual decisionmaker is the focus of Part IV, with surveys of the experimental literature on individual behavior, and why people vote as they do. The final section applies public-choice reasoning to bureaucracy, taxation, and the size of government.

Public choice or rational politics differs from other approaches to the study of political behavior in that it builds on models in which rational individuals seek to advance their own interests. This five-part volume surveys the main ideas and contributions of the field. It contains twenty-five essays written by thirty scholars, both economists and political scientists, from North America and Europe. Part I discusses the nature and justification for the existence of government and various forms it can take, including mixed, private, and public institutions, international organizations, federalisms, and constitutional governments. Part II examines the properties of different voting rules and preference aggregation procedures. Part III explores multiparty systems, interest groups, logrolling and political business cycles. The individual decisionmaker is the focus of Part IV, with surveys of the experimental literature on individual behavior, and why people vote as they do. The final section applies public-choice reasoning to bureaucracy, taxation, and the size of government.

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in public choice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined including a normative analysis of the simple majority rule, Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibility theorems, Rawls's social contract theory and the constitutional political economy of Buchanan and Tullock.

This text contains a collection of papers in honour of Manfred Neumann. This collection was prepared as a tribute to a teacher and scholar. The magnitude of his interests is reflected in the breadth of topics covered in this volume: industrial economics, competition policy and related topics. However, if one unifying principle runs through Manfred Neumann's work, it is the belief in the power of competition. Born on May 16, 1933, Manfred Neumann studied economics at the University of Cologne. He graduated in 1960. In 1969 Manfred Neumann was appointed Professor of Economics at Nurnberg University. He was Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences of the University of Erlangen-Nurnberg, President of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) and Chairman of Industrial Organization Study Group of the Verein fur Socialpolitik. Most of his professional career has been spent at Nurnberg, where he has helped to make the Economic Institute one of the leading research centers in Industrial Organization. He has also been involved in various advisory activities. The volume contains 18 essays.The first twelve are grouped into four categories: Innovation and R&D (Part I), Cartels (Part II), Mergers and Merger Policy (Part III), and Methodological Issues in Industrial Organization (Part IV). These papers fall within the bounds of industrial economics, which has been Manfred Neumann's primary research interest throughout his career. Part V includes two papers on theories of international trade, which has been a recurring topic of interest for Manfred Neumann through the years. The last three papers look at broader policy and macroeconomic issues. Contributors to this volume include Karl Aiginger, David B. Audretsch, Paul A. Geroski, Stephen Martin and Dennis Mueller.

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). Six new chapters have been added, and several chapters from the previous edition have been extensively revised. The discussion of empirical work in public choice has been greatly expanded. As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined including a normative analysis of the simple majority rule, Bergson–Samuelson social welfare functions, the Arrow and Sen impossibility theorems, Rawls''s social contract theory and the constitutional political economy of Buchanan and Tullock.

Why have modern corporations grown to such unprecedented sizes? This volume explores this crucial question, emphasising the roles of diversification and mergers.

Why have modern corporations grown to such unprecedented sizes? This volume explores this crucial question, emphasising the roles of diversification and mergers.

Competition, Efficiency and Welfare contains a collection of papers in honor of Manfred Neumann. This collection was prepared as a tribute to a teacher and scholar, whose accomplishments have enriched various fields of economics. The magnitude of his interests is reflected in the breadth of topics covered in this volume: industrial economics, competition policy and related topics. However, if one unifying principle runs through Manfred Neumann's work, it is the belief in the power of competition. Born on May 16, 1933, Manfred Neumann studied economics at the University of Cologne. He graduated in 1960. In 1969 Manfred Neumann was appointed Professor of Economics at Nürnberg University. He was Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences of the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, President of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) and Chairman of Industrial Organization Study Group of the Verein für Sozialpolitik. Most of his professional career has been spent at Nürnberg, where he has helped to make the Economic Institute one of the leading research centers in Industrial Organization. He has also been involved in various advisory activities. The volume contains 18 essays. The first twelve are grouped into four categories: Innovation and R&D (Part I), Cartels (Part II), Mergers and Merger Policy (Part III), and Methodological Issues in Industrial Organization (Part IV). These papers fall within the bounds of industrial economics, which has been Manfred Neumann's primary research interest throughout his career. Part V includes two papers on theories of international trade, which has been a recurring topic of interest for Manfred Neumann through the years. The last three papers look at broader policy and macroeconomic issues. Contributors to this volume include Karl Aiginger, David B. Audretsch, Paul A. Geroski, Stephen Martin and Dennis Mueller.

Competition, Efficiency and Welfare contains a collection of papers in honor of Manfred Neumann. This collection was prepared as a tribute to a teacher and scholar, whose accomplishments have enriched various fields of economics. The magnitude of his interests is reflected in the breadth of topics covered in this volume: industrial economics, competition policy and related topics. However, if one unifying principle runs through Manfred Neumann''s work, it is the belief in the power of competition. Born on May 16, 1933, Manfred Neumann studied economics at the University of Cologne. He graduated in 1960. In 1969 Manfred Neumann was appointed Professor of Economics at Nürnberg University. He was Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences of the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, President of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) and Chairman of Industrial Organization Study Group of the Verein für Sozialpolitik. Most of his professional career has been spent at Nürnberg, where he has helped to make the Economic Institute one of the leading research centers in Industrial Organization. He has also been involved in various advisory activities. The volume contains 18 essays. The first twelve are grouped into four categories: Innovation and R&D (Part I), Cartels (Part II), Mergers and Merger Policy (Part III), and Methodological Issues in Industrial Organization (Part IV). These papers fall within the bounds of industrial economics, which has been Manfred Neumann''s primary research interest throughout his career. Part V includes two papers on theories of international trade, which has been a recurring topic of interest for Manfred Neumann through the years. The last three papers look at broader policy and macroeconomic issues. Contributors to this volume include Karl Aiginger, David B. Audretsch, Paul A. Geroski, Stephen Martin and Dennis Mueller.

This two-volume anthology contains many of the classic articles from the public choice/rational politics field and includes a new introduction prepared by the editor.Volume I is divided into four parts: The Nature of Democratic Government, Majority Rule, Other Voting Rules and Clubs and Local Politics. Volume II is divided into the following four parts: Representative Democracy, Bureaucracy, Political Business Cycles, and Democratic Dilemmas. Included are excerpts from such classic pieces as Buchanan and Tullock's Calculus of Consent, Downs's Economic Theory of Democracy, Olson's Logic of Collective Action and Niskanen's Bureaucracy and Representative Government, as well as articles by Coase, May, Black, McKelvey, Groves, Ledyard, Vernon Smith, Tiebout, Breton, Stigler, Romer, Rosenthal, Arrow, Sen, Satterthwaite, Gibbard and many more.

This distinguished collection of Dennis Mueller's papers discusses the economic challenges faced as a result of events in the latter third of the twentieth century; the formation of the European Union, the collapse of Communism in East Europe, and the deregulation and privatization movement that spread from North America to Europe and then across the rest of the world. The book explores the design of political institutions and the functioning of economies, and goes on to prescribe the types of fiscal and competition policies that are required as we enter the twenty-first century, posing questions such as:What should a new democracy's constitution comprise?Should the European Union be organized as a federal system?What should a global competition policy consist of?Academics specializing in public choice theory, political economy, and industrial organization will warmly welcome this outstanding volume, as will those with an interest in globalization and the European Union.

This book explores the revolutionary development of the theory of the firm over the past 35 years. Despite rapid progress in the field, new developments in the microeconomic and industrial organization literature have been relatively scant. This book attempts to redress the balance by providing a comprehensive overview of the theory of the firm before moving on to explore firms and the organization of their economic activities. The contributors investigate the impact of ownership structure and board composition on firm performance, and examine how the institutional framework of an economy affects investment decisions. More specifically, detailed studies of topics including contracts, authority, competence blocs, institutional impacts and corporate governance mechanisms are presented. This unique blend of financial economics and industrial organization perspectives on the corporate firm will prove a stimulating read for scholars and researchers of economics, business administration and law.

This book explores the revolutionary development of the theory of the firm over the past 35 years. Despite rapid progress in the field, new developments in the microeconomic and industrial organization literature have been relatively scant. This book attempts to redress the balance by providing a comprehensive overview of the theory of the firm before moving on to explore firms and the organization of their economic activities.

The contributors investigate the impact of ownership structure and board composition on firm performance, and examine how the institutional framework of an economy affects investment decisions. More specifically, detailed studies of topics including contracts, authority, competence blocs, institutional impacts and corporate governance mechanisms are presented.

This unique blend of financial economics and industrial organization perspectives on the corporate firm will prove a stimulating read for scholars and researchers of economics, business administration and law.

The Public Choice Approach to Politics presents some of Dennis Mueller's most important contributions to public choice and public economics. Employing the contractarian-constitutional methodology of public choice, Professor Mueller examines the properties of several voting methods and representation systems as well as questions of equity and justice. Constitutional issues, such as the nature of constitutional rights and the elements for an ideal constitution, are also addressed. The essays in this collection include discussions of Pareto optimal redistribution, the redistribution over time of the benefits from collective action, Rawls's social contract, the social discount rate, and the relationship between contractarianism and different concepts of morality. The volume also includes chapters on the methodology of public choice, the work of James Buchanan and the Virginia School and a survey of the public choice literature.This book brings together in one place Dennis Mueller's key articles and papers on public choice, making it of interest to all economists and political scientists working in this area, as well as to sociologists, philosophers and lawyers.