Elaine Landry - Böcker

Often people have wondered why there is no introductory text on category theory aimed at philosophers working in related areas. The answer is simple: what makes categories interesting and significant is their specific use for specific purposes. These uses and purposes, however, vary over many areas, both "pure", e.g., mathematical, foundational and logical, and "applied", e.g., applied to physics, biology and the nature and structure of mathematical models.Borrowing from the title of Saunders Mac Lane's seminal work "Categories for the Working Mathematician", this book aims to bring the concepts of category theory to philosophers working in areas ranging from mathematics to proof theory to computer science to ontology, from to physics to biology to cognition, from mathematical modeling to the structure of scientific theories to the structure of the world.Moreover, it aims to do this in a way that is accessible to non-specialists. Each chapter is written by either a category-theorist or a philosopher working in one of the represented areas, and in a way that builds on the concepts that are already familiar to philosophers working in these areas.

Often people have wondered why there is no introductory text on category theory aimed at philosophers working in related areas. The answer is simple: what makes categories interesting and significant is their specific use for specific purposes. These uses and purposes, however, vary over many areas, both "pure", e.g., mathematical, foundational and logical, and "applied", e.g., applied to physics, biology and the nature and structure of mathematical models.Borrowing from the title of Saunders Mac Lane's seminal work "Categories for the Working Mathematician", this book aims to bring the concepts of category theory to philosophers working in areas ranging from mathematics to proof theory to computer science to ontology, from to physics to biology to cognition, from mathematical modeling to the structure of scientific theories to the structure of the world.Moreover, it aims to do this in a way that is accessible to non-specialists. Each chapter is written by either a category-theorist or a philosopher working in one of the represented areas, and in a way that builds on the concepts that are already familiar to philosophers working in these areas.

This Element shows that Plato keeps a clear distinction between mathematical and metaphysical realism and the knife he uses to slice the difference is method. The philosopher's dialectical method requires that we tether the truth of hypotheses to existing metaphysical objects. The mathematician's hypothetical method, by contrast, takes hypotheses as if they were first principles, so no metaphysical account of their truth is needed. Thus, we come to Plato's methodological as-if realism: in mathematics, we treat our hypotheses as if they were first principles, and, consequently, our objects as if they existed, and we do this for the purpose of solving problems. Taking the road suggested by Plato's Republic, this Element shows that methodological commitments to mathematical objects are made in light of mathematical practice; foundational considerations; and, mathematical applicability. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

Structural realism has rapidly gained in popularity in recent years, but it has splintered into many distinct denominations, often underpinned by diverse motivations. There is, no monolithic position known as ‘structural realism,’ but there is a general convergence on the idea that a central role is to be played by relational aspects over object-based aspects of ontology. What becomes of causality in a world without fundamental objects? In this book, the foremost authorities on structural realism attempt to answer this and related questions: ‘what is structure?’ and ‘what is an object?’ Also featured are the most recent advances in structural realism, including the intersection of mathematical structuralism and structural realism, and the latest treatments of laws and modality in the context of structural realism. The book will be of interest to philosophers of science, philosophers of physics, metaphysicians, and those interested in foundational aspects of science.