Eleanor Rosch – författare

This classic book, first published in 1991, was one of the first to propose the “embodied cognition” approach in cognitive science. It pioneered the connections between phenomenology and science and between Buddhist practices and science—claims that have since become highly influential. Through this cross-fertilization of disparate fields of study, The Embodied Mind introduced a new form of cognitive science called “enaction,” in which both the environment and first person experience are aspects of embodiment. However, enactive embodiment is not the grasping of an independent, outside world by a brain, a mind, or a self; rather it is the bringing forth of an interdependent world in and through embodied action. Although enacted cognition lacks an absolute foundation, the book shows how that does not lead to either experiential or philosophical nihilism. Above all, the book's arguments were powered by the conviction that the sciences of mind must encompass lived human experience and the possibilities for transformation inherent in human experience.

This revised edition includes substantive introductions by Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch that clarify central arguments of the work and discuss and evaluate subsequent research that has expanded on the themes of the book, including the renewed theoretical and practical interest in Buddhism and mindfulness. A preface by Jon Kabat-Zinn, the originator of the mindfulness-based stress reduction program, contextualizes the book and describes its influence on his life and work.

A new edition of a classic work that originated the “embodied cognition” movement and was one of the first to link science and Buddhist practices.

This classic book, first published in 1991, was one of the first to propose the “embodied cognition” approach in cognitive science. It pioneered the connections between phenomenology and science and between Buddhist practices and science—claims that have since become highly influential. Through this cross-fertilization of disparate fields of study, The Embodied Mind introduced a new form of cognitive science called “enaction,” in which both the environment and first person experience are aspects of embodiment. However, enactive embodiment is not the grasping of an independent, outside world by a brain, a mind, or a self; rather it is the bringing forth of an interdependent world in and through embodied action. Although enacted cognition lacks an absolute foundation, the book shows how that does not lead to either experiential or philosophical nihilism. Above all, the book''s arguments were powered by the conviction that the sciences of mind must encompass lived human experience and the possibilities for transformation inherent in human experience.

This revised edition includes substantive introductions by Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch that clarify central arguments of the work and discuss and evaluate subsequent research that has expanded on the themes of the book, including the renewed theoretical and practical interest in Buddhism and mindfulness. A preface by Jon Kabat-Zinn, the originator of the mindfulness-based stress reduction program, contextualizes the book and describes its influence on his life and work.

Originally published in 1978, the papers in this book derive from a 1976 meeting sponsored by the Social Science Research Council to discuss the nature and principles of category formation. It is organized in three sections: real-world categories, the cognitive processes underlying categorization, and the nature of representation. Part I examines different structural aspects of real-world categories: folk biological taxonomies, within and between category structures for material objects, and some categories in a language that codes the world in a visual–gestural mode. All three chapters in Part I assume category processors who are able to perform at least three cognitive functions: They can judge similarity between stimuli; they can perceive and process the attributes of a stimulus; and they can learn. Part II presents analyses of these three cognitive functions. All discussion of psychological structures and processes lead eventually to the issue of representation, and Part III examines representational assumptions underlying the earlier discussions. Today it can be read and enjoyed in its historical context.

Originally published in 1978, the papers in this book derive from a 1976 meeting sponsored by the Social Science Research Council to discuss the nature and principles of category formation. It is organized in three sections: real-world categories, the cognitive processes underlying categorization, and the nature of representation. Part I examines different structural aspects of real-world categories: folk biological taxonomies, within and between category structures for material objects, and some categories in a language that codes the world in a visual–gestural mode. All three chapters in Part I assume category processors who are able to perform at least three cognitive functions: They can judge similarity between stimuli; they can perceive and process the attributes of a stimulus; and they can learn. Part II presents analyses of these three cognitive functions. All discussion of psychological structures and processes lead eventually to the issue of representation, and Part III examines representational assumptions underlying the earlier discussions. Today it can be read and enjoyed in its historical context.