Francisco J. Varela - Böcker

The question of origins is inseparable from a web of hypotheses that both shape and explain us. Although origin invites examination, it always seems to elude our grasp. Notions have always been produced which seek to interpret the genesis of life, mind and the social order, and these notions have all been found to be unstable in the face of theoretical and empirical challenges. In any given period, the central ideas on origin have had a mutual resonance, frequently overlooked by specialists engaged in their particular fields. The main purpose of this interdisciplinary book is the drawing together of contributions from biology, the cognitive sciences and the humanities into a joint exploration of some of the main contemporary notions which deal with the understanding of origins in life, mind and society. The book consists of four central chapters (on social organization, symbols and money, life forms and perception) followed by acute and perceptive discussions. The book arose from an international meeting held at Stanford University.

How can science be brought to connect with experience? This book addresses two of the most challenging problems facing contemporary neurobiology and cognitive science: first, understanding how we unconsciously execute habitual actions as a result of neurological and cognitive processes that are not formal actions of conscious judgment but part of a habitual nexus of systematic self-organization; second, creating an ethics adequate to our present awareness that there is no such thing as a transcendental self, a stable subject, or a soul.In earlier modes of cognitive science, cognition was conceptualized according to a model of representation and abstract reasoning. In the realm of ethics, this corresponded to the philosophical tenet that to do what is ethical is to do what corresponds to an abstract set of rules. By contrast to this computationalism, the author places central emphasis on what he terms "enaction"—cognition as the ability to negotiate embodied, everyday living in a world that is inseparable from our sensory-motor capacities.Apart from his researches in cognitive science, the bodies of thought that enable Varela to make this link are phenomenology and two representatives of what he calls the "wisdom traditions": Confucian ethics and Buddhist epistemology. From the Confucian tradition, he draws upon the Mencius to propose an ethics of praxis, one in which ethical action is conceived as a project of being rather than as a system of judgment, less a matter of rules that are universally applicable than a goal of expertise, sagehood.The Buddhist contribution to his project encompasses "the embodiment of the void" and the "pragmatics of a virtual self." How does a belief system that does not posit a unitary self or subject conceive the living of an "I"? In summation, the author proposes an ethics founded on "savoir faire" that is a practice of transformation based on a constant recognition of the "virtual" nature of ourselves in the actual operations of our mental lives.

This ambitious work aims to shed new light on the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and the present-day efforts toward a scientific theory of cognition—with its complex structure of disciplines, levels of explanation, and conflicting hypotheses.The book's primary goal is not to present a new exegesis of Husserl's writings, although it does not dismiss the importance of such interpretive and critical work. Rather, the contributors assess the extent to which the kind of phenomenological investigation Husserl initiated favors the construction of a scientific theory of cognition, particularly in contributing to specific contemporary theories either by complementing or by questioning them. What clearly emerges is that Husserlian phenomenology cannot become instrumental in developing cognitive science without undergoing a substantial transformation. Therefore, the central concern of this book is not only the progress of contemporary theories of cognition but also the reorientation of Husserlian phenomenology.Because a single volume could never encompass the numerous facets of this dual aim, the contributors focus on the issue of naturalization. This perspective is far-reaching enough to allow for the coverage of a great variety of topics, ranging from general structures of intentionality, to the nature of the founding epistemological and ontological principles of cognitive science, to analyses of temporality and perception and the mathematical modeling of their phenomenological description.This book, then, is a collective reflection on the possibility of utilizing a naturalized Husserlian phenomenology to contribute to a scientific theory of cognition that fills the explanatory gap between the phenomenological mind and brain.

This ambitious work aims to shed new light on the relations between Husserlian phenomenology and the present-day efforts toward a scientific theory of cognition—with its complex structure of disciplines, levels of explanation, and conflicting hypotheses.The book's primary goal is not to present a new exegesis of Husserl's writings, although it does not dismiss the importance of such interpretive and critical work. Rather, the contributors assess the extent to which the kind of phenomenological investigation Husserl initiated favors the construction of a scientific theory of cognition, particularly in contributing to specific contemporary theories either by complementing or by questioning them. What clearly emerges is that Husserlian phenomenology cannot become instrumental in developing cognitive science without undergoing a substantial transformation. Therefore, the central concern of this book is not only the progress of contemporary theories of cognition but also the reorientation of Husserlian phenomenology.Because a single volume could never encompass the numerous facets of this dual aim, the contributors focus on the issue of naturalization. This perspective is far-reaching enough to allow for the coverage of a great variety of topics, ranging from general structures of intentionality, to the nature of the founding epistemological and ontological principles of cognitive science, to analyses of temporality and perception and the mathematical modeling of their phenomenological description.This book, then, is a collective reflection on the possibility of utilizing a naturalized Husserlian phenomenology to contribute to a scientific theory of cognition that fills the explanatory gap between the phenomenological mind and brain.