Erhard Geissler - Böcker

The participants of the Second Review Conference of the parties to the Biological Weapons Convention agreed on instituting voluntary confidence-building measures (CBMs) to strengthen the Convention. For this book SIPRI has gathered together experts in the fields of disarmament, epidemiology, molecular genetics, and virology. They evaluate the extent to which these CBMs contribute to preventing or reducing the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts, and suspicions which might be raised about compliance with the BW convention, and how CBMs contribute to improving international co-operation in the field of peaceful biological activities.

The Vaccines for Peace (VFP) programme is designed to counter reservations about the military misuse of research into vaccines. It focuses on vaccines developed to combat those pathogens and toxins which can be used as weapon agents. In Control of Dual-Threat Agents a range of experts from fields as diverse as biotechnology, vaccinology, international law, and diplomacy discuss the VFP programme.

This interdisciplinary book analyses the origins of biological warfare planning and preparation up to the end of World War II. In the period between World War I and World War II, growing understanding of the propagation of disease lead to the fear that potential enemies might be developing biological weapons. Ultimately, several counries developed major biological warfare programmes during World War II. The relevance of these programmes to contemporary concerns is addressed. The World War II experiences related to biological weapons reinforce the arguments for adoption of a verification protocol to strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

The development, production, stockpiling and use in war of biological and toxin weapons (BTW) are prohibited by international law. However, conversion of BTW facilities has not been dealt with in the existing, open literature on conversion. This is partly due to the fact that BTW programmes to a large degree involve dual-use activities and it is thus difficult to differentiate them form defensive and civilian activities involving pathogenic biological agent and toxins. It is thus also difficult to assess whether or not a BTW facility has actually been converted. This text discuss general aspects of conversion and describe the conversion of former facilities in Germany, the UK, USA, Russia, and Kazakhstan.

The development, production, stockpiling and use in war of biological and toxin weapons (BTW) are prohibited by international law. However, conversion of BTW facilities has not been dealt with in the existing, open literature on conversion. This is partly due to the fact that BTW programmes to a large degree involve dual-use activities and it is thus difficult to differentiate them form defensive and civilian activities involving pathogenic biological agent and toxins. It is thus also difficult to assess whether or not a BTW facility has actually been converted. This text discuss general aspects of conversion and describe the conversion of former facilities in Germany, the UK, USA, Russia, and Kazakhstan.