Eva Schmidt - Böcker

This volume celebrates the work of Hans-Johann Glock, a philosopher renowned for both his exegesis of Wittgenstein and his many contributions to debates in contemporary philosophy. It brings together 16 new essays by up-and-coming and distinguished philosophers engaging with Glock’s work, and it concludes with a "Reflections and Replies" chapter in which Glock responds to his interlocutors.Glock’s distinctive philosophical voice features a rare combination of a Wittgenstein-inspired approach with a willingness to break away from Wittgenstein to tackle problems in an open-minded way. The broad selection of essays included in this volume reflects Glock’s wide-ranging philosophical interests and demonstrates the potential of applying Wittgensteinian insights to advance current systematic debates in philosophy. The chapters discuss Wittgenstein’s philosophy, metaphilosophy, truth and language, animal minds and agency, and reasons and normativity.Wittgenstein and Beyond will appeal to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein, metaphilosophy, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.

This volume celebrates the work of Hans-Johann Glock, a philosopher renowned for both his exegesis of Wittgenstein and his many contributions to debates in contemporary philosophy. It brings together 16 new essays by up-and-coming and distinguished philosophers engaging with Glock’s work, and it concludes with a "Reflections and Replies" chapter in which Glock responds to his interlocutors.Glock’s distinctive philosophical voice features a rare combination of a Wittgenstein-inspired approach with a willingness to break away from Wittgenstein to tackle problems in an open-minded way. The broad selection of essays included in this volume reflects Glock’s wide-ranging philosophical interests and demonstrates the potential of applying Wittgensteinian insights to advance current systematic debates in philosophy. The chapters discuss Wittgenstein’s philosophy, metaphilosophy, truth and language, animal minds and agency, and reasons and normativity.Wittgenstein and Beyond will appeal to scholars and advanced students working on Wittgenstein, metaphilosophy, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.

This book contains twelve original contributions from leading epistemologists, which connect the debate over epistemic dilemmas with fundamental issues in contemporary epistemology.In an epistemic dilemma, any doxastic response of an agent will violate an epistemic requirement. Recently, there has been a surge of interest in epistemic dilemmas. However, few attempts have been made to systematically connect epistemic dilemmas to a wider range of issues in epistemology and normative theorizing. The present volume begins to fill this lacuna. Some of its contributions explore new responses to epistemic dilemmas and others present novel epistemic dilemmas, which connect in interesting ways to other areas of epistemology. Several contributions discuss links between epistemic dilemmas and the nature of epistemic and practical reasons, investigate the nature of evidence or of doxastic attitudes, or explore dilemmas arising in collective or oppressive contexts.Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Normativity will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in epistemology, ethics, and social philosophy.

The author defends nonconceptualism, the claim that perceptual experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. Continuing the heated and complex debate surrounding this topic over the past two decades, she offers a sustained defense of a novel version of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism, and provides a systematic overview of some of the central controversies in the debate.An explication of the notion of nonconceptual content and a distinction between nonconceptualist views of different strengths starts off the volume, then the author goes on to defend participants in the debate over nonconceptual content against the allegation that their failure to distinguish between a state view and a content view of (non)conceptualism leads to fatal problems for their views. Next, she makes a case for nonconceptualism by refining some of the central arguments for the view, such as the arguments from fineness of grain, from contradictory contents, from animal and infant perception, and from concept acquisition. Then, two central objections against nonconceptualism are rebutted in a novel way: the epistemological objection and the objection from objectivity.Modest Nonconceptualism allows for perceptual experiences to involve some conceptual elements. It emphasizes the relevance of concept employment for an understanding of conceptual and nonconceptual mental states and identifies the nonconceptual content of experience with scenario content. It insists on the possibility of genuine content-bearing perceptual experience without concept possession and is thus in line with the Autonomy Thesis. Finally, it includes an account of perceptual justification that relies on the external contents of experience and belief, yet is compatible with epistemological internalism.

The author defends nonconceptualism, the claim that perceptual experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. Continuing the heated and complex debate surrounding this topic over the past two decades, she offers a sustained defense of a novel version of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism, and provides a systematic overview of some of the central controversies in the debate.An explication of the notion of nonconceptual content and a distinction between nonconceptualist views of different strengths starts off the volume, then the author goes on to defend participants in the debate over nonconceptual content against the allegation that their failure to distinguish between a state view and a content view of (non)conceptualism leads to fatal problems for their views. Next, she makes a case for nonconceptualism by refining some of the central arguments for the view, such as the arguments from fineness of grain, from contradictory contents, from animal and infant perception, and from concept acquisition. Then, two central objections against nonconceptualism are rebutted in a novel way: the epistemological objection and the objection from objectivity.Modest Nonconceptualism allows for perceptual experiences to involve some conceptual elements. It emphasizes the relevance of concept employment for an understanding of conceptual and nonconceptual mental states and identifies the nonconceptual content of experience with scenario content. It insists on the possibility of genuine content-bearing perceptual experience without concept possession and is thus in line with the Autonomy Thesis. Finally, it includes an account of perceptual justification that relies on the external contents of experience and belief, yet is compatible with epistemological internalism.

Eva Schmidt analyses how power relations, ideas, and institutions in Tunisian gender politics changed during the democratisation process 2011–2014. This book contributes a unique case study to political transitology and advances an original theoretical approach based on Bourdieu’s theory of the political field.