Martin Grajner – författare

This book contains twelve original contributions from leading epistemologists, which connect the debate over epistemic dilemmas with fundamental issues in contemporary epistemology.In an epistemic dilemma, any doxastic response of an agent will violate an epistemic requirement. Recently, there has been a surge of interest in epistemic dilemmas. However, few attempts have been made to systematically connect epistemic dilemmas to a wider range of issues in epistemology and normative theorizing. The present volume begins to fill this lacuna. Some of its contributions explore new responses to epistemic dilemmas and others present novel epistemic dilemmas, which connect in interesting ways to other areas of epistemology. Several contributions discuss links between epistemic dilemmas and the nature of epistemic and practical reasons, investigate the nature of evidence or of doxastic attitudes, or explore dilemmas arising in collective or oppressive contexts.Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Normativity will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in epistemology, ethics, and social philosophy.

In recent years, questions about epistemic reasons, norms and goals have seen an upsurge of interest. The present volume brings together eighteen essays by established and upcoming philosophers in the field. The contributions are arranged into four sections: (1) epistemic reasons, (2) epistemic norms, (3) epistemic consequentialism and (4) epistemic goals and values. The volume is key reading for researchers interested in epistemic normativity.

What are epistemic reasons? What are epistemic norms? What is our basic epistemic goal? In recent years, questions about epistemic reasons, norms, and goals have seen an upsurge of interest. Pursuing these questions has not only proven fertile for our understanding of key concepts and phenomena studied in epistemology, but also for a wide area of issues in philosophy of mind and action and in philosophy of language and meta-ethics. The present volume brings together eighteen essays, seventeen of them new, by established and upcoming philosophers in the field. The contributions are arranged into four sections: (1) epistemic reasons, (2) different aspects of epistemic norms, (3) epistemic consequentialism, and (4) epistemic goals and values. The volume is key reading for researchers and students of philosophy interested in epistemic normativity and beyond.