Francisco Cabrillo – författare

This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics within the public choice and constitutional political economy tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work across the field.The expert contributions are underpinned by the notion of moving economic thinking away from the analysis of the logic of a situation given a set of well-established and well-enforced 'rules of the game', towards a deeper analysis of the logic behind the selection of the rules of the game themselves. Within this context, the theme of choice between rules (as well as the more conventional analysis within rules) across historical time and place, and in various thought experiments and conceptual situations, is explored in detail. Extensive case studies back theory with empirical evidence, and topics discussed include: the foundations of constitutional economics; constitutional political economy; political competition and voting; public choice and public policy; and extensions to public choice theory.This stimulating book will prove a thought-provoking read for academics and both under- and post-graduate students in the fields of economics (particularly public choice and Austrian economics), public policy and political science.Contributors: P. Bernholz, V.K. Borooah, G. Brennan, G. Brosio, J.M. Buchanan, F. Cabrillo, R.D. Congleton, G. Eusepi, S. Fedeli, M. Ferrero, S. Fitzpatrick, F. Forte, B.S. Frey, J. Helin, M.J. Holler, J.D. Montoro-Pons, S. Neckermann, H. Nurmi, M. Paldam, M.A. Puchades-Navarro, G.C. Romagnoli, P. Salmon, V.J. Vanberg, B.-A. Wickström

Dissatisfaction with the working of courts is ubiquitous. Legal inertia and maladministration are the norm in many countries and have significant social and economic repercussions. No longer a theme relegated to the peripheries of economic analysis, the administration of justice is now recognised by most economists as being of fundamental importance for economic development, a factor increasingly being acknowledged by policymakers at all levels. The departure point for this book is the authors' belief in the need for a systematic analysis of the incentive structures facing key players in the courts and litigation process. They focus not only on structures pertaining to the common law tradition, but offer analysis of issues not normally found in the North-American literature, such as the Latin notary and the selection and values of judges in civil law systems. They further propose an ample list of considerations for a reform agenda.Offering a comprehensive look at the incentives facing many key players in the administration of justice, this book should be of great interest to law and economics scholars, civil law professors, legal reformers, international development institutions and law students mindful of the need to improve the functioning of courts.

This comprehensive and authoritative book offers a global approach to the modern economics of the family, family law and family policy. Beginning with the division of labour in the family, this book deals with the economics of marriage, the demand for children, inter-generational relationships, and the economics of inheritance. The family is analysed using the theory of utility maximisation assuming that individuals wish to achieve the greatest possible satisfaction with limited resources and imperfect knowledge. The family is examined from both long and short term perspectives, and it is assumed that the family is cooperative with incentives for altruistic behaviour greater than in any other social group. Francisco Cabrillo then develops the analysis to include a discussion of the economics of family policy, an area not widely discussed in the existing literature, with special reference to the European Union. He makes use of simple and clear analytical models, such as neoclassical optimization and game theory, to explain the rationality of individual behaviour in the family and the responses to the incentives created by public policies.The Economics of the Family and Family Policy will be essential reading for economists interested in the family, public policy as well as sociologists and policymakers.

Did you know that Bach invested in mines? That Rossini improved his income by running casinos in the opera houses which on weekends performed his operas? Or that Puccini composed shorter arias to make them fit the length of gramophone disks as they reported him huge revenues? Or who was, in financial terms, the most successful classical composer in history? This book —the first of its kind— studies and compares the finances of twenty classical composers in their historical and economical context. Each chapter details and quantifies the sources of income of these musicians (wages, royalties, subsidies, percentages over the number of performances, arrangements, investments in the musical sector, etc), thus allowing to estimate the income they obtained due to their artistic — primarily compositional, but also related— activities. In addition, it also estimates the composer’s expenditures, thus drawing a relatively complete image of their personal finances. This not only allows to concludeto create a ranking of composers according to their economic success, but —more importantly— for the first time gives an accurate image of the financial situation of a broad set of composers. This allows to correct many false believes while also giving new insights on the relation between economics and music history.

Did you know that Bach invested in mines? That Rossini improved his income by running casinos in the opera houses which on weekends performed his operas? Or that Puccini composed shorter arias to make them fit the length of gramophone disks as they reported him huge revenues? Or who was, in financial terms, the most successful classical composer in history? This book —the first of its kind— studies and compares the finances of twenty classical composers in their historical and economical context. Each chapter details and quantifies the sources of income of these musicians (wages, royalties, subsidies, percentages over the number of performances, arrangements, investments in the musical sector, etc), thus allowing to estimate the income they obtained due to their artistic — primarily compositional, but also related— activities. In addition, it also estimates the composer’s expenditures, thus drawing a relatively complete image of their personal finances. This not only allows to concludeto create a ranking of composers according to their economic success, but —more importantly— for the first time gives an accurate image of the financial situation of a broad set of composers. This allows to correct many false believes while also giving new insights on the relation between economics and music history.