Gerald Lang – författare

How We Fight: Ethics in War presents a substantial body of new work by some of the leading philosophers of war. The ten essays cover a range of topics concerned with both jus ad bellum (the morality of going to war) and jus in bello (the morality of fighting in war). Alongside explorations of classic in bello topics, such as the principle of non-combatant immunity and the distribution of risk between combatants and non-combatants, the volume also addresses ad bellum topics, such as pacifism and punitive justifications for war, and explores the relationship between ad bellum and in bello topics, or how the fighting of a war may affect our judgments concerning whether that war meets the ad bellum conditions. The essays take a keen interest in the micro-foundations of just war theory, and uphold the general assumption that the rules of war must be supported, if they are going to be supported at all, by the liability and non-liability of the individuals who are encompassed by those rules. Relatedly, the volume also contains work which is relevant to the moral justification of several moral doctrines used, either explicitly or implicitly, in just war theory: in the doctrine of double effect, in the generation of liability in basic self-defensive cases, and in the relationship between liability and the conditions which are normally appended to permissible self-defensive violence: imminence, necessity, and proportionality. The volume breaks new ground in all these areas.

Luck, Value, and Commitment comprises eleven new essays which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929-2003). Various themes of Williams''s work are explored and taken in new directions.In their essays, Brad Hooker, Philip Pettit, and Susan Wolf are all concerned with Williams''s work on the viability or wisdom of systematic moral theory, and his criticism, in particular, of moral theory''s preoccupation with impartiality. David Enoch, Joseph Raz, and R. Jay Wallace address Williams''s work on moral luck, and his insistence that moral appraisals bear a disquieting sensitivity to various kinds of luck. Wallace makes further connections between moral luck and the ''non-identityproblem'' in reproductive ethics.Michael Smith and Ulrike Heuer investigate Williams''s defence of ''internalism'' about reasons for action, which makes our reasons for action a function of our desires, projects, and psychological dispositions. Smith attempts to plug a gap in Williams''s theory which is created by Williams''s deference to imagination, while Heuer connects these issues to Williams''s accommodation of ''thick'' ethical concepts as a source of knowledge and action-guidingness. John Broome examines Williams''s less-knownwork on the other central normative concept, ''ought''.Jonathan Dancy takes a look at Williams''s work on moral epistemology and intuitionism, comparing and contrasting his work with that of John McDowell, and Gerald Lang explores Williams''s work on equality, discrimination, and interspecies relations in order to reach the conclusion, similar to Williams''s, that ''speciesism'' is very unlike racism or sexism.

How We Fight: Ethics in War presents a substantial body of new work by some of the leading philosophers of war. The ten essays cover a range of topics concerned with both jus ad bellum (the morality of going to war) and jus in bello (the morality of fighting in war). Alongside explorations of classic in bello topics, such as the principle of non-combatant immunity and the distribution of risk between combatants and non-combatants, the volume also addresses ad bellum topics, such as pacifism and punitive justifications for war, and explores the relationship between ad bellum and in bello topics, or how the fighting of a war may affect our judgments concerning whether that war meets the ad bellum conditions. The essays take a keen interest in the micro-foundations of just war theory, and uphold the general assumption that the rules of war must be supported, if they are going to be supported at all, by the liability and non-liability of the individuals who are encompassed by those rules. Relatedly, the volume also contains work which is relevant to the moral justification of several moral doctrines used, either explicitly or implicitly, in just war theory: in the doctrine of double effect, in the generation of liability in basic self-defensive cases, and in the relationship between liability and the conditions which are normally appended to permissible self-defensive violence: imminence, necessity, and proportionality. The volume breaks new ground in all these areas.

Strokes of Luck provides a detailed and wide-ranging examination of the role of luck in moral and political philosophy. The first part tackles debates in moral luck, which are concerned with the assignment of blameworthiness to individuals who are separated only by lucky differences. ''Anti-luckists'' think that one who, for example, attempts and succeeds in an assassination and one who attempts and fails are equally blameworthy. This book defends an anti-anti-luckist argument, according to which the successful assassin is more blameworthy than the unsuccessful one. Moreover, the successful assassin is, all things equal, a worse person than the unsuccessful one. The worldly outcomes of our acts can make an all-important difference, not only to how bad our acts can be deemed, but to how bad we are. The second part enters into debates about distributive justice. Lang argues that the attempt to neutralize luck in the distribution of advantages among individuals does not deserve its prominence in political philosophy: the ''luck egalitarian'' programme is flawed. A better way forward is to re-invest in John Rawls''s ''justice as fairness'', which demonstrates a superior way of taming the bad effects of luck and unchosen disadvantage.

Strokes of Luck provides a detailed and wide-ranging examination of the role of luck in moral and political philosophy. The first part tackles debates in moral luck, which are concerned with the assignment of blameworthiness to individuals who are separated only by lucky differences. ''Anti-luckists'' think that one who, for example, attempts and succeeds in an assassination and one who attempts and fails are equally blameworthy. This book defends an anti-anti-luckist argument, according to which the successful assassin is more blameworthy than the unsuccessful one. Moreover, the successful assassin is, all things equal, a worse person than the unsuccessful one. The worldly outcomes of our acts can make an all-important difference, not only to how bad our acts can be deemed, but to how bad we are. The second part enters into debates about distributive justice. Lang argues that the attempt to neutralize luck in the distribution of advantages among individuals does not deserve its prominence in political philosophy: the ''luck egalitarian'' programme is flawed. A better way forward is to re-invest in John Rawls''s ''justice as fairness'', which demonstrates a superior way of taming the bad effects of luck and unchosen disadvantage.

Strokes of Luck provides a detailed and wide-ranging examination of the role of luck in moral and political philosophy. The first part tackles debates in moral luck, which are concerned with the assignment of blameworthiness to individuals who are separated only by lucky differences. 'Anti-luckists' think that one who, for example, attempts and succeeds in an assassination and one who attempts and fails are equally blameworthy. This book defends an anti-anti-luckist argument, according to which the successful assassin is more blameworthy than the unsuccessful one. Moreover, the successful assassin is, all things equal, a worse person than the unsuccessful one. The worldly outcomes of our acts can make an all-important difference, not only to how bad our acts can be deemed, but to how bad we are. The second part enters into debates about distributive justice. Lang argues that the attempt to neutralize luck in the distribution of advantages among individuals does not deserve its prominence in political philosophy: the 'luck egalitarian' programme is flawed. A better way forward is to re-invest in John Rawls's 'justice as fairness', which demonstrates a superior way of taming the bad effects of luck and unchosen disadvantage.

Luck, Value, and Commitment comprises eleven new essays which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929-2003). Various themes of Williams's work are explored and taken in new directions.In their essays, Brad Hooker, Philip Pettit, and Susan Wolf are all concerned with Williams's work on the viability or wisdom of systematic moral theory, and his criticism, in particular, of moral theory's preoccupation with impartiality. David Enoch, Joseph Raz, and R. Jay Wallace address Williams's work on moral luck, and his insistence that moral appraisals bear a disquieting sensitivity to various kinds of luck. Wallace makes further connections between moral luck and the 'non-identity problem' in reproductive ethics.Michael Smith and Ulrike Heuer investigate Williams's defence of 'internalism' about reasons for action, which makes our reasons for action a function of our desires, projects, and psychological dispositions. Smith attempts to plug a gap in Williams's theory which is created by Williams's deference to imagination, while Heuer connects these issues to Williams's accommodation of 'thick' ethical concepts as a source of knowledge and action-guidingness. John Broome examines Williams's less-known work on the other central normative concept, 'ought'.Jonathan Dancy takes a look at Williams's work on moral epistemology and intuitionism, comparing and contrasting his work with that of John McDowell, and Gerald Lang explores Williams's work on equality, discrimination, and interspecies relations in order to reach the conclusion, similar to Williams's, that 'speciesism' is very unlike racism or sexism.