Ulrike Heuer - Böcker

The Roots of Normativity concerns one of the most basic philosophical questions: how to explain normativity in its many guises. Over many decades, Joseph Raz has sought to develop an answer to this question, according to which understanding normativity is understanding the roles and structures of normative reasons which, when they are reasons for action, are based on values. This volume collects twelve chapters which succinctly lay out his view, and determine its contours through some of its applications. The chapters also aim to clarify the ways in which normative reasons are made for rational beings like us. Raz's value-based account of normativity is brought to bear on many aspects of the lives of rational beings and their agency, and in particular, their ability to form and maintain relationships, and to live their lives as social beings with a sense of their identity.

The Roots of Normativity concerns one of the most basic philosophical questions: how to explain normativity in its many guises. Over many decades, Joseph Raz has sought to develop an answer to this question, according to which understanding normativity is understanding the roles and structures of normative reasons which, when they are reasons for action, are based on values. This volume comprises twelve chapters which succinctly lay out his view, and determine its contours through some of its applications. The chapters also aim to clarify the ways in which normative reasons are made for rational beings like us. Raz's value-based account of normativity is brought to bear on many aspects of the lives of rational beings and their agency, and in particular, their ability to form and maintain relationships, and to live their lives as social beings with a sense of their identity.

Luck, Value, and Commitment comprises eleven new essays which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929-2003). Various themes of Williams's work are explored and taken in new directions.In their essays, Brad Hooker, Philip Pettit, and Susan Wolf are all concerned with Williams's work on the viability or wisdom of systematic moral theory, and his criticism, in particular, of moral theory's preoccupation with impartiality. David Enoch, Joseph Raz, and R. Jay Wallace address Williams's work on moral luck, and his insistence that moral appraisals bear a disquieting sensitivity to various kinds of luck. Wallace makes further connections between moral luck and the 'non-identity problem' in reproductive ethics.Michael Smith and Ulrike Heuer investigate Williams's defence of 'internalism' about reasons for action, which makes our reasons for action a function of our desires, projects, and psychological dispositions. Smith attempts to plug a gap in Williams's theory which is created by Williams's deference to imagination, while Heuer connects these issues to Williams's accommodation of 'thick' ethical concepts as a source of knowledge and action-guidingness. John Broome examines Williams's less-known work on the other central normative concept, 'ought'.Jonathan Dancy takes a look at Williams's work on moral epistemology and intuitionism, comparing and contrasting his work with that of John McDowell, and Gerald Lang explores Williams's work on equality, discrimination, and interspecies relations in order to reach the conclusion, similar to Williams's, that 'speciesism' is very unlike racism or sexism.