Guillermo Owen – författare

In the last years of the 20th century, publications on power indices and coalition formation have multiplied. The application of these concepts to political institutions, more specifically, to the analysis of the European Union and, as it seems, the election of the President of the United States, is getting more and more popular. There are, however, also theoretical instruments and perspectives that support these applications. Firstly, the probabilistic model of coalition formation which is made operational by the multilinear extension of the characteristic function form of coalition games. This instrument triggered off a re-interpretation of existing power indices and the formulation of new indices. This development is accompanied by an intensive discussion of the concept of power in general - what do we measure when we apply power measures? - and the properties that an adequate measure of power has to satisfy. Various concepts of monotonicity were proposed as litmus test. The discussion shows that the underlying theories of coalition formation play a decisive role.

This book describes highly applicable mathematics without using calculus or limits in general. The study agrees with the opinion that the traditional calculus/analysis is not necessarily the only proper grounding for academics who wish to apply mathematics. The choice of topics is based on a desire to present those facets of mathematics which will be useful to economists and social/behavioral scientists. The volume is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I presents a brief review of the solution of systems of linear equations by the use of matrices. Chapter III introduces the theory of probability. The rest of the book deals with new developments in mathematics such as linear and dynamic programming, the theory of networks and the theory of games. These developments are generally recognized as the most important field in the `new mathematics' and they also have specific applications in the management sciences.

This book provides an overview of the nascent field of “information pooling and group judgmental accuracy.” The contributors to this volume include mathematical psychologists, economists, social psychologists, political scientists, and statisticians. The book is organised around five review essays: one on information pooling from the perspective of models of individual judgment (Batchelder), one on information pooling and group judgment (Grofman and Owen), one on group judgment in applied settings (Hastie), and one on organisational design (Radner). Along with the review essays discussant comments are also provided which elaborate on points not covered in the essays. While the focus of these papers is largely theoretical and abstract, the subject of information pooling and optimal group judgment is clearly one of great practical importance and is directly relevant to issues of policy choice and organisational structure.

In recent years, publications on power indices and coalition formation have multiplied. Obviously, the application of these concepts to political institutions, more specifically, to the analysis of the European Union and, as it seems, the election of the President of the United States is getting more and more popular. There are, however, also new theoretical instruments and perspectives that support these applications: First of all, the probabilistic model of coalition formation has to be mentioned which is made operational by the multilinear extension of the characteristic function form of coalition games. This instrument triggered off a reinterpretation of existing power indices and the formulation of new indices. This development is accompanied by an intensive discussion of the concept of power in general - what do we measure when we apply power measures? - and the properties that an adequate measure of power has to satisfy. Various concepts of monotonicity were proposed as litmus test. The discussion shows that the underlying theories of coalition formation play a decisive role. New results will be discussed in this volume. Its contributions put flesh and blood on the theoretical innovations and their applications that led to a growing interest in power indices and coalition formation.

This book describes highly applicable mathematics without using calculus or limits in general. The study agrees with the opinion that the traditional calculus/analysis is not necessarily the only proper grounding for academics who wish to apply mathematics. The choice of topics is based on a desire to present those facets of mathematics which will be useful to economists and social/behavioral scientists. The volume is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I presents a brief review of the solution of systems of linear equations by the use of matrices. Chapter III introduces the theory of probability. The rest of the book deals with new developments in mathematics such as linear and dynamic programming, the theory of networks and the theory of games. These developments are generally recognized as the most important field in the `new mathematics' and they also have specific applications in the management sciences.

This book describes highly applicable mathematics without using calculus or limits in general. The study agrees with the opinion that the traditional calculus/analysis is not necessarily the only proper grounding for academics who wish to apply mathematics. The choice of topics is based on a desire to present those facets of mathematics which will be useful to economists and social/behavioral scientists. The volume is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I presents a brief review of the solution of systems of linear equations by the use of matrices. Chapter III introduces the theory of probability. The rest of the book deals with new developments in mathematics such as linear and dynamic programming, the theory of networks and the theory of games. These developments are generally recognized as the most important field in the `new mathematics'' and they also have specific applications in the management sciences.

In recent years, publications on power indices and coalition formation have multiplied. Obviously, the application of these concepts to political institutions, more specifically, to the analysis of the European Union and, as it seems, the election of the President of the United States is getting more and more popular. There are, however, also new theoretical instruments and perspectives that support these applications: First of all, the probabilistic model of coalition formation has to be mentioned which is made operational by the multilinear extension of the characteristic function form of coalition games. This instrument triggered off a reinterpretation of existing power indices and the formulation of new indices. This development is accompanied by an intensive discussion of the concept of power in general - what do we measure when we apply power measures? - and the properties that an adequate measure of power has to satisfy. Various concepts of monotonicity were proposed as litmus test. The discussion shows that the underlying theories of coalition formation play a decisive role. New results will be discussed in this volume. Its contributions put flesh and blood on the theoretical innovations and their applications that led to a growing interest in power indices and coalition formation.

Game Theory has served as a standard text for game theory courses since the publication of the First Edition in 1968. The Fourth Edition updates several recently developed subfields. It adds fresh chapters on subjects such as games with incomplete information and spatial games. Owen has expanded "Two-Person General-Sum Games" into two chapters, the second becoming "Two-Person Cooperative Games." There are new sections in the chapters "Two-Person Cooperative Games" and "Indices of Power," and there is new information throughout the book on non-cooperative games. "Game Theory" remains the only book to cover all salient aspects of this field that, having displaced Keynesian economics, is making inroads throughout the social sciences. The key features are: it explains work of 1994 Nobel Prize Winners; it provides full expansion of cooperative game theory sections; it covers games with incomplete information; it includes a spatial games section that features many illustrations; and, it includes an updated bibliography.