Harald Müller – författare

This book presents different views on nuclear disarmament and arms control and a brief history of nuclear non-proliferation policy and the nuclear test ban issue. It describes the preparations for and results of the 1990 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and the 1991 Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference. With a view to 1995, it assesses the chances for consensus or dissension regarding regarding nuclear proliferation and the test ban, and the prospects for an extension of NPT. It concludes by examining the future and the threat of a new North-South divide over these issues.

Great-power conflict and great-power war are still the most dangerous risks the international community is facing today. This edited volume investigates the feasibility of a modern day concert of powers as a way for managing the risk of great power conflicts in the 21st century. The volume takes its inspiration from history. The 19th century European Concert was not only able to ensure a period of exceptional peacefulness among the European great powers, it also limited the scope and duration of the few wars that did break out. The chapter authors discuss the achievements and limits of the historical concert, define the requirements that a new concert would have to meet, critically evaluate obstacles and risks of the approach and indicate how a 21st century concert of powers could complement, and fit into, the present legal and institutional setting of global politics. This volume offers a systematic examination of the norms and tools of the historical template and scrutinizes these tools for their utility in our time. It will be of great interest to a wide range of scholars and students in areas such as International Relations, History and International Law.

It has become generally accepted wisdom that democracies do not go to war against each other. However, there are significant differences between democratic states in terms of their approach to war and security policy in general.This edited book offers a broad examination of how democratic preferences and norms are relevant to security policy beyond the decision of whether to go to war. It therefore offers a fresh understanding of state behaviour in the security realm. The contributors discuss such issues as defence policy, air war, cluster bombs, non-lethal weapons, weapons of mass destruction, democratic and non-democratic nuclear weapon states’ transparency, and the political and ideological background of the ongoing ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’. It has become generally accepted wisdom that democracies do not go to war against each other. However, there are significant differences between democratic states in terms of their approach to war and security policy in general.

It has become generally accepted wisdom that democracies do not go to war against each other. However, there are significant differences between democratic states in terms of their approach to war and security policy in general.This edited book offers a broad examination of how democratic preferences and norms are relevant to security policy beyond the decision of whether to go to war. It therefore offers a fresh understanding of state behaviour in the security realm. The contributors discuss such issues as defence policy, air war, cluster bombs, non-lethal weapons, weapons of mass destruction, democratic and non-democratic nuclear weapon states’ transparency, and the political and ideological background of the ongoing ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’. It has become generally accepted wisdom that democracies do not go to war against each other. However, there are significant differences between democratic states in terms of their approach to war and security policy in general.

This volume comprehensively covers a range of issues related to dynamic norm change in the current major international arms control regimes related to nuclear, biological,and chemical weapons; small arms and light weapons; cluster munitions; and antipersonnel mines. Arms control policies of all of the key established and rising state actors are considered, as well as those of nonaligned countries, nongovernmental organizations, and international governing bodies.Recent studies on multilateral arms control tend to focus mostly on "structure," by which opportunities and constraints for action are created. This volume pays equal attention to "agency," through which opportunities and constraints to produce change or maintain the status quo are handled. In addition-and in greater depth than in recent studies-the volume acknowledges the force of moral and ethical impulses (alongside such factors as political, legal, and technological change) in the evolution of arms control norms.The volume begins with a look at the structure of regimes, at the conflicts residing in these structures, and at the dynamic processes in which these conflicts are worked out. The impact of extrinsic factors on norm dynamics is considered next, including technological change and shifts in attitudes and power structures. Essays on the role of agency in driving norm change conclude the volume, with a particular focus on norm entrepreneurship and the importance of acknowledging the competing justice claims surrounding norm-change efforts.Contributors: Una Becker-Jakob, Alexis Below, Marco Fey, Giorgio Franceschini, Andrea Hellmann, Gregor Hofmann, Friederike Klinke, Daniel Müller, Harald Müller, Franziska Plümmer, Carsten Rauch, Judith Reuter, Elvira Rosert, Annette Schaper, Hans-Joachim Schmidt, Tabea Seidler-Diekmann, Simone Wisotzki, Carmen Wunderlich.

Great-power conflict and great-power war are still the most dangerous risks the international community is facing today. This edited volume investigates the feasibility of a modern day concert of powers as a way for managing the risk of great power conflicts in the 21st century. The volume takes its inspiration from history. The 19th century European Concert was not only able to ensure a period of exceptional peacefulness among the European great powers, it also limited the scope and duration of the few wars that did break out. The chapter authors discuss the achievements and limits of the historical concert, define the requirements that a new concert would have to meet, critically evaluate obstacles and risks of the approach and indicate how a 21st century concert of powers could complement, and fit into, the present legal and institutional setting of global politics. This volume offers a systematic examination of the norms and tools of the historical template and scrutinizes these tools for their utility in our time. It will be of great interest to a wide range of scholars and students in areas such as International Relations, History and International Law.

The Middle East is a hot spot of proliferation. It contains one state assumed to possess nuclear weapons, several states that tried and failed to develop a military nuclear capability, one state under suspicion of trying to do so, and it is the world region that witnessed the most frequent and severe employment of chemical weapons since the end of World War I. Notwithstanding, not a single arms control regime concerning weapons of mass destruction (WMD) covers the region as a whole. Instead we have seen several proliferation-related military operations which have rather contributed to destabilization than served non-proliferation. This volume, written under the auspices of the EU Consortium for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament determines the current state of diplomatic efforts to establish a WMD free zone in the Middle East. In doing so, it provides insights into central actors’ conflicting political positions, thereby explaining the stalemate of efforts to negotiate a WMD-free zone. Chapters written by renowned experts from academia and policy-oriented think tanks, as well as by next-generation Middle East and arms control experts, introduce the subject to the reader, give background information about arms control initiatives, provide technical expertise, and endeavour to make proposals for arms control measures in support of the creation of a Middle East WMD-free zone.