Howard Jones – författare

On the early morning of March 16, 1968, American soldiers from three platoons of Charlie Company (1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 11th Brigade, 23rd Infantry Division), entered a group of hamlets located in the Son Tinh district of South Vietnam, located near the Demilitarized Zone and known as "Pinkville" because of the high level of Vietcong infiltration. The soldiers, many still teenagers who had been in the country for three months, were on a "search and destroy" mission. The Tet Offensive had occurred only weeks earlier and in the same area and had made them jittery; so had mounting losses from booby traps and a seemingly invisible enemy. Three hours after the GIs entered the hamlets, more than five hundred unarmed villagers lay dead, killed in cold blood. The atrocity took its name from one of the hamlets, known by the Americans as My Lai 4. Military authorities attempted to suppress the news of My Lai, until some who had been there, in particular a helicopter pilot named Hugh Thompson and a door gunner named Lawrence Colburn, spoke up about what they had seen. The official line was that the villagers had been killed by artillery and gunship fire rather than by small arms. That line soon began to fray. Lieutenant William Calley, one of the platoon leaders, admitted to shooting the villagers but insisted that he had acted upon orders. An exposé of the massacre and cover-up by journalist Seymour Hersh, followed by graphic photographs, incited international outrage, and Congressional and U.S. Army inquiries began. Calley and nearly thirty other officers were charged with war crimes, though Calley alone was convicted and would serve three and a half years under house arrest before being paroled in 1974.My Lai polarized American sentiment. Many saw Calley as a scapegoat, the victim of a doomed strategy in an unwinnable war. Others saw a war criminal. President Nixon was poised to offer a presidential pardon. The atrocity intensified opposition to the war, devastating any pretense of American moral superiority. Its effect on military morale and policy was profound and enduring. The Army implemented reforms and began enforcing adherence to the Hague and Geneva conventions. Before launching an offensive during Desert Storm in 1991, one general warned his brigade commanders, "No My Lais in this division--do you hear me?"Compelling, comprehensive, and haunting, based on both exhaustive archival research and extensive interviews, Howard Jones's My Lai will stand as the definitive book on one of the most devastating events in American military history.

On the early morning of March 16, 1968, American soldiers from three platoons of Charlie Company (1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 11th Brigade, 23rd Infantry Division), entered a group of hamlets located in the Son Tinh district of South Vietnam, located near the Demilitarized Zone and known as "Pinkville" because of the high level of Vietcong infiltration. The soldiers, many still teenagers who had been in the country for three months, were on a "search and destroy" mission. The Tet Offensive had occurred only weeks earlier and in the same area and had made them jittery; so had mounting losses from booby traps and a seemingly invisible enemy. Three hours after the GIs entered the hamlets, more than five hundred unarmed villagers lay dead, killed in cold blood. The atrocity took its name from one of the hamlets, known by the Americans as My Lai 4. Military authorities attempted to suppress the news of My Lai, until some who had been there, in particular a helicopter pilot named Hugh Thompson and a door gunner named Lawrence Colburn, spoke up about what they had seen. The official line was that the villagers had been killed by artillery and gunship fire rather than by small arms. That line soon began to fray. Lieutenant William Calley, one of the platoon leaders, admitted to shooting the villagers but insisted that he had acted upon orders. An exposé of the massacre and cover-up by journalist Seymour Hersh, followed by graphic photographs, incited international outrage, and Congressional and U.S. Army inquiries began. Calley and nearly thirty other officers were charged with war crimes, though Calley alone was convicted and would serve three and a half years under house arrest before being paroled in 1974.My Lai polarized American sentiment. Many saw Calley as a scapegoat, the victim of a doomed strategy in an unwinnable war. Others saw a war criminal. President Nixon was poised to offer a presidential pardon. The atrocity intensified opposition to the war, devastating any pretense of American moral superiority. Its effect on military morale and policy was profound and enduring. The Army implemented reforms and began enforcing adherence to the Hague and Geneva conventions. Before launching an offensive during Desert Storm in 1991, one general warned his brigade commanders, "No My Lais in this division--do you hear me?"Compelling, comprehensive, and haunting, based on both exhaustive archival research and extensive interviews, Howard Jones''s My Lai will stand as the definitive book on one of the most devastating events in American military history.

On the early morning of March 16, 1968, American soldiers from three platoons of Charlie Company (1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 11th Brigade, 23rd Infantry Division), entered a group of hamlets located in the Son Tinh district of South Vietnam, located near the Demilitarized Zone and known as "Pinkville" because of the high level of Vietcong infiltration. The soldiers, many still teenagers who had been in the country for three months, were on a "search and destroy" mission. The Tet Offensive had occurred only weeks earlier and in the same area and had made them jittery; so had mounting losses from booby traps and a seemingly invisible enemy. Three hours after the GIs entered the hamlets, more than five hundred unarmed villagers lay dead, killed in cold blood. The atrocity took its name from one of the hamlets, known by the Americans as My Lai 4. Military authorities attempted to suppress the news of My Lai, until some who had been there, in particular a helicopter pilot named Hugh Thompson and a door gunner named Lawrence Colburn, spoke up about what they had seen. The official line was that the villagers had been killed by artillery and gunship fire rather than by small arms. That line soon began to fray. Lieutenant William Calley, one of the platoon leaders, admitted to shooting the villagers but insisted that he had acted upon orders. An exposé of the massacre and cover-up by journalist Seymour Hersh, followed by graphic photographs, incited international outrage, and Congressional and U.S. Army inquiries began. Calley and nearly thirty other officers were charged with war crimes, though Calley alone was convicted and would serve three and a half years under house arrest before being paroled in 1974.My Lai polarized American sentiment. Many saw Calley as a scapegoat, the victim of a doomed strategy in an unwinnable war. Others saw a war criminal. President Nixon was poised to offer a presidential pardon. The atrocity intensified opposition to the war, devastating any pretense of American moral superiority. Its effect on military morale and policy was profound and enduring. The Army implemented reforms and began enforcing adherence to the Hague and Geneva conventions. Before launching an offensive during Desert Storm in 1991, one general warned his brigade commanders, "No My Lais in this division--do you hear me?"Compelling, comprehensive, and haunting, based on both exhaustive archival research and extensive interviews, Howard Jones''s My Lai will stand as the definitive book on one of the most devastating events in American military history.

This volume presents the first full-scale treatment of the only instance in history where African blacks, seized by slave dealers, won their freedom and returned home. Jones describes how, in 1839, Joseph Cinqué led a revolt on the Spanish slave ship, the Amistad, in the Caribbean. The seizure of the ship by an American naval vessel near Montauk, Long Island, the arrest of the Africans in Connecticut, and the Spanish protest against the violation of their property rights created an international controversy. The Amistad affair united Lewis Tappan and other abolitionists who put the "law of nature" on trial in the United States by their refusal to accept a legal system that claimed to dispense justice while permitting artificial distinctions based on race or color. The mutiny resulted in a trial before the U.S. Supreme Court that pitted former President John Quincy Adams against the federal government. Jones vividly recaptures this compelling drama--the most famous slavery case before Dred Scott--that climaxed in the court''s ruling to free the captives and allow them to return to Africa.

The Oxford Guide to Middle High German is the most comprehensive self-contained treatment of Middle High German available in English. It covers the language, literature, history, and culture of German in the period from 1050 to 1350 and is designed for entry-level readers, advanced study, teaching, and reference. The book includes a large sample of texts, not only from Classical works such as Erec, the Nibelungenlied, Parzival, and Tristan, but also from mystical writing, chronicles, and legal documents; the selection represents all major dialects and the full time span of the period. The volume begins with an introduction that defines Middle High German linguistically, geographically, and chronologically. Chapter 2 then provides a detailed exploration of the grammar, covering sounds and spelling, inflectional morphology, syntax, and lexis. Each section in this chapter begins with a summary of the main points, followed by detailed paragraphs for in-depth study and reference. Chapter 3 deals with versification, discussing metre, rhyme, lines of verse in context, and verse forms, and includes practical tips for scansion. Chapter 4 offers an account of the political and social structures of Medieval Germany and a survey of the principal types of texts that originated in the period. The final chapter of the book comprises over forty texts, each placed in context and provided with explanatory footnotes; the first two texts, to be taken together with the introductory grammar sections, are aimed at newcomers. A glossary provides full coverage of the vocabulary appearing in the texts and throughout the book.

Published for the first time in the UK to coincide with Steven Spielberg's forthcoming movie Amistad, Mutiny on the Amistad presents the first full-scale treatment of the only instance in history where African blacks, seized by slave dealers, won their freedom and returned home. Howard Jones describes how, in 1839, Joseph Cinqué led a revolt on the Spanish slave ship, the Amistad, in the Caribbean. Allowing only the captain and first mate to live in order to steer the ship back to Sierra Leone, the Africans were tricked and taken to New York. The seizure of the ship by an American naval vessel near Montauk, Long Island, the arrest of the Africans in Connecticut, and the Spanish protest against the violation of their property rights created an international controversy.The Amistad affair united Lewis Tappan and other abolitionists who put the `law of nature' on trial in the United States by their refusal to accept a legal system that claimed to dispense justice while permitting artificial distinctions based on race or colour. The mutiny resulted in a trial before the U.S. Supreme Court that pitted former President John Quincy Adams against the federal government. Jones vividly recaptures this compelling drama--the most famous slavery case before Dred Scott--that climaxed in the court's ruling to free the captives and allow them to return to Africa.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, civil war erupted in Greece between Western-orientated government forces and Communist rebels. The Truman administration subsequently became heavily involved in the internal conflict, including the establishment of an American military presence on Greek soil and regular arms shipments. This early containment policy, focusing on Greece as a crucial outpost in the Mediterranean arena, was symbolic of "America's Commitment to Free World Principles", and her fear that the Soviet's ultimate goal was world domination.

When John F. Kennedy was shot, millions were left to wonder how America, and the world, would have been different had he lived to fulfill the enormous promise of his presidency. For many historians and political observers, what Kennedy would and would not have done in Vietnam has been a source of enduring controversy. Now, based on convincing new evidence--including a startling revelation about the Kennedy administration's involvement in the assassination of Premier Diem--Howard Jones argues that Kennedy intended to withdraw the great bulk of American soldiers and pursue a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Vietnam. Drawing upon recently declassified hearings by the Church Committee on the U.S. role in assassinations, newly released tapes of Kennedy White House discussions, and interviews with John Kenneth Galbraith, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and others from the president's inner circle, Jones shows that Kennedy firmly believed that the outcome of the war depended on the South Vietnamese. In the spring of 1962, he instructed Secretary of Defense McNamara to draft a withdrawal plan aimed at having all special military forces home by the end of 1965. The "Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam" was ready for approval in early May 1963, but then the Buddhist revolt erupted and postponed the program. Convinced that the war was not winnable under Diem's leadership, President Kennedy made his most critical mistake--promoting a coup as a means for facilitating a U.S. withdrawal. In the cruelest of ironies, the coup resulted in Diem's death followed by a state of turmoil in Vietnam that further obstructed disengagement. Still, these events only confirmed Kennedy's view about South Vietnam's inability to win the war and therefore did not lessen his resolve to reduce the U.S. commitment. By the end of November, however, the president was dead and Lyndon Johnson began his campaign of escalation. Jones argues forcefully that if Kennedy had not been assassinated, his withdrawal plan would have spared the lives of 58,000 Americans and countless Vietnamese.Written with vivid immediacy, supported with authoritative research, Death of a Generation answers one of the most profoundly important questions left hanging in the aftermath of John F. Kennedy's death.

America''s experience in Greece has often been cited as a model by those later policymakers in Washington who regard the involvement as a "victory" for American foreign policy. Indeed, President Johnson and others referred to Greece as the model for America''s deepening involvement in Vietnam during the mid-1960''s. Greece became the battlefield for a new kind of war--one that included the use of guerrilla warfare, propaganda, war in the shadows, terror tactics and victory based on outlasting the enemy. It was also a test before the world of America''s resolve to protect the principle of self-determination. Jones argues that American policy towards Greece was the focal point in the development of a global strategy designed to combat totalitarianism. He also argues that had the White House and others drawn the real "lessons" from the intervention in Greece, the decisions regarding Vietnam might have been more carefully thought out.

On the early morning of March 16, 1968, American soldiers from three platoons of Charlie Company (1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 11th Brigade, 23rd Infantry Division), entered a group of hamlets located in the Son Tinh district of South Vietnam, located near the Demilitarized Zone and known as "Pinkville" because of the high level of Vietcong infiltration. The soldiers, many still teenagers who had been in the country for three months, were on a "search and destroy" mission. The Tet Offensive had occurred only weeks earlier and in the same area and had made them jittery; so had mounting losses from booby traps and a seemingly invisible enemy. Three hours after the GIs entered the hamlets, more than five hundred unarmed villagers lay dead, killed in cold blood. The atrocity took its name from one of the hamlets, known by the Americans as My Lai 4. Military authorities attempted to suppress the news of My Lai, until some who had been there, in particular a helicopter pilot named Hugh Thompson and a door gunner named Lawrence Colburn, spoke up about what they had seen. The official line was that the villagers had been killed by artillery and gunship fire rather than by small arms. That line soon began to fray. Lieutenant William Calley, one of the platoon leaders, admitted to shooting the villagers but insisted that he had acted upon orders. An exposé of the massacre and cover-up by journalist Seymour Hersh, followed by graphic photographs, incited international outrage, and Congressional and U.S. Army inquiries began. Calley and nearly thirty other officers were charged with war crimes, though Calley alone was convicted and would serve three and a half years under house arrest before being paroled in 1974. My Lai polarized American sentiment. Many saw Calley as a scapegoat, the victim of a doomed strategy in an unwinnable war. Others saw a war criminal. President Nixon was poised to offer a presidential pardon. The atrocity intensified opposition to the war, devastating any pretense of American moral superiority. Its effect on military morale and policy was profound and enduring. The Army implemented reforms and began enforcing adherence to the Hague and Geneva conventions. Before launching an offensive during Desert Storm in 1991, one general warned his brigade commanders, "No My Lais in this division--do you hear me?" Compelling, comprehensive, and haunting, based on both exhaustive archival research and extensive interviews, Howard Jones's My Lai will stand as the definitive book on one of the most devastating events in American military history.

This volume presents the first full-scale treatment of the only instance in history where African blacks, seized by slave dealers, won their freedom and returned home. Jones describes how, in 1839, Joseph Cinqué led a revolt on the Spanish slave ship, the Amistad, in the Caribbean. The seizure of the ship by an American naval vessel near Montauk, Long Island, the arrest of the Africans in Connecticut, and the Spanish protest against the violation of their property rights created an international controversy. The Amistad affair united Lewis Tappan and other abolitionists who put the "law of nature" on trial in the United States by their refusal to accept a legal system that claimed to dispense justice while permitting artificial distinctions based on race or color. The mutiny resulted in a trial before the U.S. Supreme Court that pitted former President John Quincy Adams against the federal government. Jones vividly recaptures this compelling drama--the most famous slavery case before Dred Scott--that climaxed in the court''s ruling to free the captives and allow them to return to Africa.

When John F. Kennedy was shot, millions were left to wonder how America, and the world, would have been different had he lived to fulfill the enormous promise of his presidency. For many historians and political observers, what Kennedy would and would not have done in Vietnam has been a source of enduring controversy. Now, based on convincing new evidence--including a startling revelation about the Kennedy administration''s involvement in the assassination of Premier Diem--Howard Jones argues that Kennedy intended to withdraw the great bulk of American soldiers and pursue a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Vietnam. Drawing upon recently declassified hearings by the Church Committee on the U.S. role in assassinations, newly released tapes of Kennedy White House discussions, and interviews with John Kenneth Galbraith, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and others from the president''s inner circle, Jones shows that Kennedy firmly believed that the outcome of the war depended on the South Vietnamese. In the spring of 1962, he instructed Secretary of Defense McNamara to draft a withdrawal plan aimed at having all special military forces home by the end of 1965. The "Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam" was ready for approval in early May 1963, but then the Buddhist revolt erupted and postponed the program. Convinced that the war was not winnable under Diem''s leadership, President Kennedy made his most critical mistake--promoting a coup as a means for facilitating a U.S. withdrawal. In the cruelest of ironies, the coup resulted in Diem''s death followed by a state of turmoil in Vietnam that further obstructed disengagement. Still, these events only confirmed Kennedy''s view about South Vietnam''s inability to win the war and therefore did not lessen his resolve to reduce the U.S. commitment. By the end of November, however, the president was dead and Lyndon Johnson began his campaign of escalation. Jones argues forcefully that if Kennedy had not been assassinated, his withdrawal plan would have spared the lives of 58,000 Americans and countless Vietnamese. Written with vivid immediacy, supported with authoritative research, Death of a Generation answers one of the most profoundly important questions left hanging in the aftermath of John F. Kennedy''s death. Death of a Generation was a CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title for 2003.

An Introduction to Middle High German is a dedicated student edition of The Oxford Guide to Middle High German (Jones & Jones; OUP, 2019) designed for taught courses and self-study. It offers a detailed account of the language and literature of German in the period 1050-1350, including an introductory-level grammar and a wide selection of texts with extensive explanatory material.Following an initial chapter that defines Middle High German linguistically, geographically, and chronologically, the grammar and lexis chapters offer a self-contained introduction to the language. The user-friendly and accessible grammatical descriptions and explanations will allow entry-level students to gain sufficient knowledge of the language to read and understand a range of Middle High German texts. Chapter 4 comprises thirty textual passages, each placed in context and with extensive explanatory footnotes to facilitate their use in teaching and class discussion. The volume also offers two essential glossaries, the first covering linguistic terms, and the second offering definitions of the Middle High German vocabulary that appears throughout the book.

An Introduction to Middle High German is a dedicated student edition of The Oxford Guide to Middle High German (Jones & Jones; OUP, 2019) designed for taught courses and self-study. It offers a detailed account of the language and literature of German in the period 1050-1350, including an introductory-level grammar and a wide selection of texts with extensive explanatory material.Following an initial chapter that defines Middle High German linguistically, geographically, and chronologically, the grammar and lexis chapters offer a self-contained introduction to the language. The user-friendly and accessible grammatical descriptions and explanations will allow entry-level students to gain sufficient knowledge of the language to read and understand a range of Middle High German texts. Chapter 4 comprises thirty textual passages, each placed in context and with extensive explanatory footnotes to facilitate their use in teaching and class discussion. The volume also offers two essential glossaries, the first covering linguistic terms, and the second offering definitions of the Middle High German vocabulary that appears throughout the book.

The Oxford Guide to Middle High German is the most comprehensive self-contained treatment of Middle High German available in English. It covers the language, literature, history, and culture of German in the period from 1050 to 1350 and is designed for entry-level readers, advanced study, teaching, and reference. The book includes a large sample of texts, not only from Classical works such as Erec, the Nibelungenlied, Parzival, and Tristan, but also from mystical writing, chronicles, and legal documents; the selection represents all major dialects and the full time span of the period. The volume begins with an introduction that defines Middle High German linguistically, geographically, and chronologically. Chapter 2 then provides a detailed exploration of the grammar, covering sounds and spelling, inflectional morphology, syntax, and lexis. Each section in this chapter begins with a summary of the main points, followed by detailed paragraphs for in-depth study and reference. Chapter 3 deals with versification, discussing metre, rhyme, lines of verse in context, and verse forms, and includes practical tips for scansion. Chapter 4 offers an account of the political and social structures of Medieval Germany and a survey of the principal types of texts that originated in the period. The final chapter of the book comprises over forty texts, each placed in context and provided with explanatory footnotes; the first two texts, to be taken together with the introductory grammar sections, are aimed at newcomers. A glossary provides full coverage of the vocabulary appearing in the texts and throughout the book.

In The Bay of Pigs, Howard Jones provides a concise, incisive, and dramatic account of the disastrous attempt to overthrow Castro in April 1961. Drawing on recently declassified CIA documents, Jones deftly examines the train of missteps and self-deceptions that led to the invasion of U.S.-trained exiles at the Bay of Pigs. Ignoring warnings from the ambassador to Cuba, the Eisenhower administration put in motion an operation that proved nearly unstoppable even after the inauguration of John F. Kennedy. The CIA and Pentagon, meanwhile, both voiced confidence in the outcome of the invasion, especially after coordinating previous successful coups in Guatemala and Iran. And so the Kennedy administration launched the exile force toward its doom in Cochinos Bay on April 17, 1961. Jones gives a riveting account of the battle--and the confusion in the White House--before moving on to explore its implications. The Bay of Pigs, he writes, set the course of Kennedy''s foreign policy. It was a humiliation for the administration that fueled fears of Communist domination and pushed Kennedy toward a hardline "cold warrior" stance. But at the same time, the failed attack left him deeply skeptical of CIA and military advisers and influenced his later actions during the Cuban missile crisis.

In The Bay of Pigs, Howard Jones provides a concise, incisive, and dramatic account of the disastrous attempt to overthrow Castro in April 1961. Drawing on recently declassified CIA documents, Jones deftly examines the train of missteps and self-deceptions that led to the invasion of U.S.-trained exiles at the Bay of Pigs. Ignoring warnings from the ambassador to Cuba, the Eisenhower administration put in motion an operation that proved nearly unstoppable even after the inauguration of John F. Kennedy. The CIA and Pentagon, meanwhile, both voiced confidence in the outcome of the invasion, especially after coordinating previous successful coups in Guatemala and Iran. And so the Kennedy administration launched the exile force toward its doom in Cochinos Bay on April 17, 1961. Jones gives a riveting account of the battle--and the confusion in the White House--before moving on to explore its implications. The Bay of Pigs, he writes, set the course of Kennedy''s foreign policy. It was a humiliation for the administration that fueled fears of Communist domination and pushed Kennedy toward a hardline "cold warrior" stance. But at the same time, the failed attack left him deeply skeptical of CIA and military advisers and influenced his later actions during the Cuban missile crisis.

In January 1959, as Fidel Castro entered Havana in triumph, Americans hailed the revolutionary as a hero. Then came Castro's increasingly anti-American talk, the rise in his regime of the openly Marxist Che Guevara and Raúl Castro, and seizures of American-owned assets. In little more than a year, President Dwight D. Eisenhower concluded that Castro must go.In The Bay of Pigs, Howard Jones provides a concise, incisive, and dramatic account of the disastrous attempt to overthrow Castro. He deftly examines the train of missteps and self-deceptions that led to the invasion of U.S.-trained exiles at the Bay of Pigs. Ignoring warnings from the ambassador to Cuba, the Eisenhower administration put in motion an operation that proved nearly unstoppable even after the inauguration of John F. Kennedy. Meanwhile, the CIA and Pentagon both voiced confidence in the outcome of the invasion, especially after coordinating previous successful coups in Guatemala and Iran. As a vital part of the Cuban effort, the CIA sought to incite a popular insurrection by recruiting the Mafia's help in engineering Castro's assassination on the eve of the invasion. And so the Kennedy administration launched the exile force toward its doom in Cochinos Bay on April 17, 1961. Jones gives a riveting account of the battle--and the confusion in the White House--before moving on to explore its implications. The Bay of Pigs, he writes, set the course of Kennedy's foreign policy. It was a humiliation for the administration that fueled fears of Communist domination and pushed Kennedy toward a hard-line "cold warrior" stance. But at the same time, the failed attack left him deeply skeptical of CIA and military advisers and influenced his later actions during the Cuban missile crisis.Richly researched, vividly written, The Bay of Pigs offers an engaging and thoughtful account of the turning point in Kennedy's foreign policy and indeed in foreign policy for decades to come.

When John F. Kennedy was shot, millions were left to wonder how America, and the world, would have been different had he lived to fulfill the enormous promise of his presidency. For many historians and political observers, what Kennedy would and would not have done in Vietnam has been a source of enduring controversy. Now, based on convincing new evidence--including a startling revelation about the Kennedy administration''s involvement in the assassination of Premier Diem--Howard Jones argues that Kennedy intended to withdraw the great bulk of American soldiers and pursue a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Vietnam. Drawing upon recently declassified hearings by the Church Committee on the U.S. role in assassinations, newly released tapes of Kennedy White House discussions, and interviews with John Kenneth Galbraith, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and others from the president''s inner circle, Jones shows that Kennedy firmly believed that the outcome of the war depended on the South Vietnamese. In the spring of 1962, he instructed Secretary of Defense McNamara to draft a withdrawal plan aimed at having all special military forces home by the end of 1965. The "Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam" was ready for approval in early May 1963, but then the Buddhist revolt erupted and postponed the program. Convinced that the war was not winnable under Diem''s leadership, President Kennedy made his most critical mistake--promoting a coup as a means for facilitating a U.S. withdrawal. In the cruelest of ironies, the coup resulted in Diem''s death followed by a state of turmoil in Vietnam that further obstructed disengagement. Still, these events only confirmed Kennedy''s view about South Vietnam''s inability to win the war and therefore did not lessen his resolve to reduce the U.S. commitment. By the end of November, however, the president was dead and Lyndon Johnson began his campaign of escalation. Jones argues forcefully that if Kennedy had not been assassinated, his withdrawal plan would have spared the lives of 58,000 Americans and countless Vietnamese. Written with vivid immediacy, supported with authoritative research, Death of a Generation answers one of the most profoundly important questions left hanging in the aftermath of John F. Kennedy''s death. Death of a Generation was a CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title for 2003.

America''s experience in Greece has often been cited as a model by those later policymakers in Washington who regard the involvement as a "victory" for American foreign policy. Indeed, President Johnson and others referred to Greece as the model for America''s deepening involvement in Vietnam during the mid-1960''s. Greece became the battlefield for a new kind of war--one that included the use of guerrilla warfare, propaganda, war in the shadows, terror tactics and victory based on outlasting the enemy. It was also a test before the world of America''s resolve to protect the principle of self-determination. Jones argues that American policy towards Greece was the focal point in the development of a global strategy designed to combat totalitarianism. He also argues that had the White House and others drawn the real "lessons" from the intervention in Greece, the decisions regarding Vietnam might have been more carefully thought out.

First published in 1992. Epicureanism has had a long and complex history. This book is the first to chronicle this history, from its beginnings in Greece in the fourth century BC to its role in the development of philosophy and science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Divided equally between the classical and post-classical worlds, The Epicurean Tradition is a notable contribution to classical scholarship and to the history of ideas.

In this updated edition of Crucible of Power, Howard Jones draws on his remarkable breadth as a historian of U.S. foreign relations to produce a distinguished survey of America's growth from an emerging power in the 1890s to its present day position of global preeminence. Comprehensive, tempered, and highly accessible, Jones demonstrates the complexities facing U.S. policy makers and the limitations on their actions. The balanced and thoughtful approach to controversial issues and situations makes this book exceptional for classroom use. This new edition includes a number of revisions and additions aimed at making the volume more attractive to students, teachers, and general readers. A new final chapter brings the story of America's foreign relations as close to the present as possible by focusing on President George W. Bush and his dealing with 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Global War on Terrorism. Among other changes, new materials on the Bay of Pigs invasion reveal the CIA's collaboration with the Mafia in trying to assassinate Fidel Castro as the spark setting off a popular insurrection. Also new to this edition: Every chapter now has at least one excerpt from a key document of the period, thus allowing the reader to examine historical evidence firsthand in hopes of providing a feel for the period involved, promoting an understanding of history through the eyes of its participants, and showing how the historian determines the important facts relevant to reconstructing a meaningful narrative.

Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations to 1913 presents a straightforward, balanced, and comprehensive history of American international relations from the American Revolution to 1913. Howard Jones demonstrates the complexities of the decision-making process that led to the rise and decline of the United States (relative to the ascent of other nations) in world power status. Howard Jones focuses on the personalities, security interests, and expansionist tendencies behind the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy and highlights the intimate relationship between foreign and domestic policy. This updated edition includes revisions and additions aimed at making the book more attractive to students, teachers, and general readers.

In Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom, Howard Jones explores the relationship between President Lincoln's wartime diplomacy and his interrelated goals of forming a more perfect Union and abolishing slavery. From the outset of the Civil War, Lincoln's central purpose was to save the Union by defeating the South on the battlefield. No less important was his need to prevent a European intervention that would have facilitated the South's move for independence. Lincoln's goal of preserving the Union, however, soon evolved into an effort to form a more perfect Union, one that rested on the natural rights principles of the Declaration of Independence and thus necessitated emancipation.

Jones studies the crisis in Anglo-American relations during the Civil War and its impact on the South's attempt to win foreign support during the crucial years of 1861 and 1862. He argues that the central issue was the possibility that Britain would grant diplomatic recognition to the Confederacy, a move that would have legitimized secession and undermined the Constitution.Originally published in 1992. A UNC Press Enduring Edition - UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

Jones studies the crisis in Anglo-American relations during the Civil War and its impact on the South’s attempt to win foreign support during the crucial years of 1861 and 1862. He argues that the central issue was the possibility that Britain would grant diplomatic recognition to the Confederacy, a move that would have legitimized secession and undermined the Constitution.Originally published in 1992.A UNC Press Enduring Edition — UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

The Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, which led to the settlement of the Canadian boundary dispute, was instrumental in maintaining peace between Great Britain and the United States. Jones analyzes the events that aggravated relations to show the affect of America's states' rights policy, and he concludes that the two countries signed the treaty because they considered it the wisest alternative to war, not because of the often-claimed strategic distribution of money.A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

In this examination of Union and Confederate foreign relations during the Civil War from both European and American perspectives, Howard Jones demonstrates that the consequences of the conflict between North and South reached far beyond American soil.Jones explores a number of themes, including the international economic and political dimensions of the war, the North’s attempts to block the South from winning foreign recognition as a nation, Napoleon III’s meddling in the war and his attempt to restore French power in the New World, and the inability of Europeans to understand the interrelated nature of slavery and union, resulting in their tendency to interpret the war as a senseless struggle between a South too large and populous to have its independence denied and a North too obstinate to give up on the preservation of the Union. Most of all, Jones explores the horrible nature of a war that attracted outside involvement as much as it repelled it.Written in a narrative style that relates the story as its participants saw it play out around them, Blue and Gray Diplomacy depicts the complex set of problems faced by policy makers from Richmond and Washington to London, Paris, and St. Petersburg.

During the 1840s the United States and England were in conflict over two unsettled territories along the undefined Canadian-American border. This riveting account of the Maine and Oregon boundary treaties is brought to life masterfully by Professors Howard Jones and Donald Rakestraw. The events in this story paved the way for one of the most far-reaching developments in American history: the age of expansion. The United States gradually came to believe in manifest destiny, the irreversible expansion of the States across the continent. The country?s success with England in resolving the two territorial disputes marked the dawn of this new era. Complicating the U.S.-English situation in the 1840s was a border conflict brewing with Mexico. Failure to resolve the disputes with England might have led the United States to war with two nations at once. Careful negotiations led to settlements with England instead of war. But the United States went to war with Mexico from 1846 to 1848. Prologue to Manifest Destiny offers a rare, detailed look at the tense Anglo-American relationship during the 1840s and the two agreements reached regarding the land in the Northeast and the Northwest. Presidents John Tyler and James Polk and the robust master of diplomacy, Daniel Webster, were among the American actors who played center stage in the drama, as well as Britain?s Lord Ashburton, who worked closely with Webster to keep the turbulent conflict over the Northeast territory from escalating into war. This gripping frontier story will fascinate as it educates. Prologue to Manifest Destiny is perfect for courses in American history, international relations, and diplomatic history.