Jacob L. Goodson – författare

In Narrative Theology and the Hermeneutical Virtues: Humility, Patience, Prudence, Jacob L. Goodson offers a philosophical analysis of the arguments and tendencies of Hans Frei’s and Stanley Hauerwas’ narrative theologies. Narrative theology names a way of doing theology and thinking theologically that is part of a greater movement called “the return to Scripture.” The return to Scripture movement makes a case for Scripture as the proper object of study within Christian theology, philosophy of religion, and religious ethics. While thinkers within this movement agree that Scripture is the proper object of study within philosophy and religious studies, there is major disagreement over what the word “narrative” describes in narrative theology. The Yale theologian, Hans Frei, argues that because Scripture is the proper object of study within Christian theology and the philosophy of religion, Scripture must be the exclusive object of study. To think theologically means paying as close attention as possible to the details of the biblical narratives in their “literal sense.” Different from Frei’s contentions, the Christian ethicist at Duke University, Stanley Hauerwas claims: if Scripture is the proper object of study within Christian theology, then the category of narrative teaches us that we ought to give our scholarly attention to the interpretations and performances of Scripture. Hauerwas emphasizes the continuity between the biblical narratives and the traditions of the church. This disagreement is best described as a hermeneutical one: Frei thinks that the primary place where interpretation happens is in the text; Hauerwas thinks that the primary place where interpretation occurs is in the community of interpreters. In order to move beyond the dichotomy found between Frei’s and Hauerwas’ work, but to remain within the return to Scripture movement, Goodson constructs three hermeneutical virtues: humility, patience, and prudence. These virtues help professors and scholars within Christian theology, philosophy of religion, and religious ethics maintain objectivity in their fields of study.

Rorty and the Prophetic interrogates and provides a constructive assessment to the American neo-pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty’s critiques of Jewish ethics. Rorty dismisses the public applicability of Jewish moral reasoning, because it is based on “the will of God” through divine revelation. As a self-described secular philosopher, it comes as no surprise that Rorty does not find public applicability within a divinely-ordered Jewish ethic. Rorty also rejects the French Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics, which is based upon the notion of infinite responsibility to the Face of the Other. In Rorty’s judgment, Levinas’s ethics is “gawky, awkward, and unenlightening.” From a Rortyan perspective, it seems that Jewish ethics simply can’t win: either it is either too dependent on the will of God or over-emphasizes the human Other. The volume responds to Rorty’s criticisms of Jewish ethics in three different ways: first, demonstrating agreements between Rorty and Jewish thinkers; second, offering reflective responses to Rorty’s critiques of Judaism on the questions of Messianism, prophecy, and the relationship between politics and theology; third, taking on Rorty’s seemingly unfair judgment that Levinas’s ethics is “gawky, awkward, and unenlightening.” While Rorty does not engage the prophetic tradition of Jewish thought in his essay, “Glorious Hopes, Failed Prophecies,” he dismisses the possibility for prophetic reasoning because of its other-worldliness and its emphasis on predicting the future. Rorty fails to attend to and recognize the complexity of prophetic reasoning, and this book presents the complexity of the prophetic within Judaism. Toward these ends and more, Brad Elliott Stone and Jacob L. Goodson offer this book to scholars who contribute to the Jewish academy, those within American Philosophy, and those who think Richard Rorty’s voice ought to remain in “conversations” about religion and “conversations” among the religious.

This collection introduces readers to the philosophical interpretation of Scripture, specifically within American Philosophy. The purpose of the collection concerns starting a conversation about the practice and task of the philosophical interpretation of Scripture. Reflections on the philosophical interpretation of Scripture have been treated more as a “conversation-stopper” than a conversation-starter within the American academy. To start such a conversation, this collection offers substantive accounts of the role of Scripture in the philosophical thought of fifteen American philosophers: Jane Addams, Henry Bugbee, Stanley Cavell, John Dewey, Jonathan Edwards, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Margaret Fuller, William James, Martin Luther King, Jr., Charles Sanders Peirce, Josiah Royce, Richard Rorty, George Santayana, Henry David Thoreau, and Cornel West.

Prophetic pragmatism is a gritty philosophical framework that undergirds the intellectual and political work done by those who seek to overcome despair, dogmatism, and oppression. It seeks to unite one’s intellectual vocation and one’s duty to fight for justice. Cognizant of the ways in which political forces affect thought, while also requiring political action to not be so sure of itself that it simply replaces one oppressive structure with another, prophetic pragmatism requires a critical temper through the mode of Socratic questioning. Introducing Prophetic Pragmatism argues that hope lies between critical temper and democratic faith. Socratic questioning, prophetic witness, and tragicomic hope open a space for democratic energies to flourish against the forces of nihilism and poverty. Critical temper keeps democratic faith from becoming too idealistic and Pollyannaish, and democratic faith keeps critical temper from being pessimistic about the ability to change current realities. These twin pillars provide the best and most helpful framework for understanding the nature and purpose of prophetic pragmatism. Through their dialogue, Jacob L. Goodson and Brad Elliott demonstrate why prophetic pragmatism is, in the words of Cornel West, “pragmatism at its best.”

Virtue theory, natural law, deontology, utilitarianism, existentialism: these are the basic moral theories taught in “Ethics,” “History of Philosophy,” and “Introduction to Philosophy” courses throughout the United States. When the American philosopher William James (1842 – 1910) find his way into these conversations, there is uncertainty about where his thinking fits. While utilitarianism has become the default position for teaching James’s pragmatism and radical empiricism, this default position fails to address and explain James’s multiple criticisms of John Stuart Mill’s formulaic approach to questions concerning the moral life. Through close readings of James’s writings, the chapters in William James, Moral Philosophy, and the Ethical Life catalogue the ways in whichJames wants to avoid the following: (a) the hierarchies of Christian natural law theory, (b) the moral calculus of Mill’s utilitarianism, (c) the absolutism and principle-ism of Immanuel Kant’s deontology, and (d) the staticity of the virtues found in Aristotle’s moral theory. Elaborating upon and clarifying James’s differences from these dominant moral theories is a crucial feature of this collection. This collection, is not, however, intended to be wholly negative – that is, only describing to readers what James’s moral theory is not. It seeks to articulate the positive features of James’s ethics and moral reasoning: what does it mean to an ethical life, and how should we theorize about morality?