Jerzy Filar – författare

This book is intended as a text covering the central concepts and techniques of Competitive Markov Decision Processes. It is an attempt to present a rig­ orous treatment that combines two significant research topics: Stochastic Games and Markov Decision Processes, which have been studied exten­ sively, and at times quite independently, by mathematicians, operations researchers, engineers, and economists. Since Markov decision processes can be viewed as a special noncompeti­ tive case of stochastic games, we introduce the new terminology Competi­ tive Markov Decision Processes that emphasizes the importance of the link between these two topics and of the properties of the underlying Markov processes. The book is designed to be used either in a classroom or for self-study by a mathematically mature reader. In the Introduction (Chapter 1) we outline a number of advanced undergraduate and graduate courses for which this book could usefully serve as a text. A characteristic feature of competitive Markov decision processes - and one that inspired our long-standing interest - is that they can serve as an "orchestra" containing the "instruments" of much of modern applied (and at times even pure) mathematics. They constitute a topic where the instruments of linear algebra, applied probability, mathematical program­ ming, analysis, and even algebraic geometry can be "played" sometimes solo and sometimes in harmony to produce either beautifully simple or equally beautiful, but baroque, melodies, that is, theorems.

This work focuses on the application of dynamic game theory and control theory to analyze a number of important issues in the interaction between economic and environmental problems. The authors provide research results, mathematical models and prescriptions for public policy tools to prevent economic and natural systems from taking unsustainable development paths. The book should be of interest to research workers in industry and university, including engineers, mathematicians, economists and public policy-makers.

Modem game theory has evolved enonnously since its inception in the 1920s in the works ofBorel and von Neumann and since publication in the 1940s of the seminal treatise "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" by von Neumann and Morgenstern. The branch of game theory known as dynamic games is-to a significant extent-descended from the pioneering work on differential games done by Isaacs in the 1950s and 1960s. Since those early decades game theory has branched out in many directions, spanning such diverse disciplines as math- ematics, economics, electrical and electronics engineering, operations research, computer science, theoretical ecology, environmental science, and even political science. The papers in this volume reflect both the maturity and the vitalityofmodem day game theoryin general, andofdynamic games, inparticular. The maturitycan be seen from the sophistication ofthe theorems, proofs, methods, and numerical algorithms contained in these articles.The vitality is manifested by the range of new ideas, new applications, the numberofyoung researchers among the authors, and the expanding worldwide coverage of research centers and institutes where the contributions originated.

This book collects some recent works on the application of dynamic game and control theory to the analysis of environmental problems. This collec­ tion of papers is not the outcome of a conference or of a workshop. It is rather the result of a careful screening from among a number of contribu­ tions that we have solicited across the world. In particular, we have been able to attract the work of some of the most prominent scholars in the field of dynamic analyses of the environment. Engineers, mathematicians and economists provide their views and analytical tools to better interpret the interactions between economic and environmental phenomena, thus achiev­ ing, through this interdisciplinary effort, new and interesting results. The goal of the book is more normative than descriptive. All papers include careful modelling of the dynamics of the main variables involved in the game between nature and economic agents and among economic agents themselves, as well-described in Vrieze''s introductory chapter. Fur­ thermore, all papers use this careful modelling framework to provide policy prescriptions to the public agencies authorized to regulate emission dy­ namics. Several diverse problems are addressed: from global issues, such as the greenhouse effect or deforestation, to international ones, such as the management of fisheries, to local ones, for example, the control of effluent discharges. Moreover, pollution problems are not the only concern of this book.

This book is intended as a text covering the central concepts and techniques of Competitive Markov Decision Processes. It is an attempt to present a rig­ orous treatment that combines two significant research topics: Stochastic Games and Markov Decision Processes, which have been studied exten­ sively, and at times quite independently, by mathematicians, operations researchers, engineers, and economists. Since Markov decision processes can be viewed as a special noncompeti­ tive case of stochastic games, we introduce the new terminology Competi­ tive Markov Decision Processes that emphasizes the importance of the link between these two topics and of the properties of the underlying Markov processes. The book is designed to be used either in a classroom or for self-study by a mathematically mature reader. In the Introduction (Chapter 1) we outline a number of advanced undergraduate and graduate courses for which this book could usefully serve as a text. A characteristic feature of competitive Markov decision processes - and one that inspired our long-standing interest - is that they can serve as an "orchestra" containing the "instruments" of much of modern applied (and at times even pure) mathematics. They constitute a topic where the instruments of linear algebra, applied probability, mathematical program­ ming, analysis, and even algebraic geometry can be "played" sometimes solo and sometimes in harmony to produce either beautifully simple or equally beautiful, but baroque, melodies, that is, theorems.

This book collects some recent works on the application of dynamic game and control theory to the analysis of environmental problems. This collec­ tion of papers is not the outcome of a conference or of a workshop. It is rather the result of a careful screening from among a number of contribu­ tions that we have solicited across the world. In particular, we have been able to attract the work of some of the most prominent scholars in the field of dynamic analyses of the environment. Engineers, mathematicians and economists provide their views and analytical tools to better interpret the interactions between economic and environmental phenomena, thus achiev­ ing, through this interdisciplinary effort, new and interesting results. The goal of the book is more normative than descriptive. All papers include careful modelling of the dynamics of the main variables involved in the game between nature and economic agents and among economic agents themselves, as well-described in Vrieze's introductory chapter. Fur­ thermore, all papers use this careful modelling framework to provide policy prescriptions to the public agencies authorized to regulate emission dy­ namics. Several diverse problems are addressed: from global issues, such as the greenhouse effect or deforestation, to international ones, such as the management of fisheries, to local ones, for example, the control of effluent discharges. Moreover, pollution problems are not the only concern of this book.