J.G. Hart - Böcker

The Husserl-based social ethics claims that the properly philosophical life - ie one lived within the noetic-noematic field - is not cut off from action. Indeed, the ethical and political dimensions of the person are disclosed through various reductions. At the passive-synthetic level as well as at the higher founded levels of personal constitution a basic sense of will emerges, the "telos" of which is a godly intersubjective self-ideal. This "truth of will" is inseparably an "ought" and an "is" involving moral categoriality as a way of letting the good of others be part of one's own. Both moral categoriality and the "polis" actuate the latent first-person plural dative of manifestation which emerges with a common world. Thereby they actuate also senses of the common life which can develop to community as a higher-order person. This leads to a eutopian anti-statist theory of the "polis" and common good which has affinity with some communitarian-anarchist and Green views.

This collection of essays honors Robert Sokolowski on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday. Sokolowski, one of phenomenology's most accomplished practitioners for over thirty-five years, has addressed a broad range of issues central to philosophical reflection. His writings embody a passion for 'the truthful' and 'the good', the two themes to which most of the present essays address their concern. These essays consider Sokolowski's work directly, explicitly taking up themes he has addressed over the entirety of his career. The essays cover nearly the full range of Sokolowski's interests: his view of philosophy; his phenomenology of language and his account of the relation between language and being; his phenomenology of moral action; and his phenomenological theology of disclosure.

Although a key aspect of the phenomenological movement is its contribution to value theory (axiology) and value perception (almost all the major figures devoted a great part of their labors to these topics), there has been relatively little attention paid to these themes. This volume is an anthology on value-theory in the phenomenological movement. It indicates the scope of the issues by discussing: the distinctive acts of valuing, openness to value, the objectivity of values, the summation and combination of values, the deconstruction of values, the value of absence, and the value of nature. It also contains discussions of most of the major representative figures not only in their own right but also in relationship to one another: Von Ehrenfels, Brentano, Scheler, Hartmann, Husserl, Heidegger, Schutz, and Derrida.

Both volumes of this work have as their central concern to sort out who one is from what one is. In this Book 1, the focus is on transcendental-phenomenological ontology. When we refer to ourselves we refer both non-ascriptively in regard to non-propertied as well as ascriptively in regard to propertied aspects of ourselves. The latter is the richness of our personal being; the former is the essentially elusive central concern of this Book 1: I can be aware of myself and refer to myself without it being necessary to think of any third-personal characteristic; indeed one may be aware of oneself without having to be aware of anything except oneself. This consideration opens the door to basic issues in phenomenological ontology, such as identity, individuation, and substance. In our knowledge and love of Others we find symmetry with the first-person self-knowledge, both in its non-ascriptive forms as well as in its property-ascribing forms. Love properly has for its referent the Other as present through but beyond her properties.Transcendental-phenomenological reflections move us to consider paradoxes of the “transcendental person”. For example, we contend with the unpresentability in the transcendental first-person of our beginning or ending and the undeniable evidence for the beginning and ending of persons in our third-person experience. The basic distinction between oneself as non-sortal and as a person pervaded by properties serves as a hinge for reflecting on “the afterlife”. This transcendental-phenomenological ontology of necessity deals with some themes of the philosophy of religion.

If I am asked in the framework of Book 1, “Who are you?” I, in answering, might say “I don’t know who in the world I am.” Nevertheless there is a sense in which I always know what “I” refers to and can never not know, even if I have become, e.g., amnesiac. Yet in Book 2, “Who are you?” has other senses of oneself in mind than the non-sortal “myself”. For example, it might be the pragmatic context, as in a bureaucratic setting; but “Who are you?” or “Who am I?” might be more anguished and be rendered by “What sort of person are you?” or “What sort am I?” Such a question often surfaces in the face of a “limit-situation”, such as one’s death or in the wake of a shameful deed where we are compelled to find our “centers”, what we also will call “Existenz”. “Existenz” here refers to the center of the person. In the face of the limit-situation one is called upon to act unconditionally in the determination of oneself and one’s being in the world.In this Book 2 we discuss chiefly one’s normative personal-moral identity which stands in contrast to the transcendental I where one’s non-sortal unique identity is given from the start. This moral identity requires a unique self-determination and normative self-constitution which may be thought of with the help of the metaphor of “vocation”. We will see that it has especial ties to one’s Existenz as well as to love. This Book 2 claims that the moral-personal ideal sense of who one is is linked to the transcendental who through a notion of entelechy. The person strives to embody the I-ness that one both ineluctably is and which, however, points to who one is not yet and who one ought to be. The final two chapters tell a philosophical-theological likely story of a basic theme of Plotinus: We must learn to honor ourselves because of our honorable kinship and lineage “Yonder”.

This Husserl-based social ethics claims that the properly philosophical life -- i.e. one lived within the noetic-noematic field -- is not cut off from action. Indeed, the ethical and political dimensions of the person are disclosed through various reductions. At the passive-synthetic level as well as at the higher founded levels of personal constitution a basic sense of will emerges, the telos of which is a godly intersubjective self-ideal. This 'truth of will' is inseparably an 'ought' and an 'is' involving moral categoriality as a way of letting the good of others be part of one's own. Both moral categoriality and the polis actuate the latent first-person plural dative of manifestation which emerges with a common world. Thereby they actuate also senses of the common life which can develop to community as a higher-order person. This leads to a eutopian anti-statist theory of the polis and common good which has affinity with some communitarian-anarchist and 'Green' views.

It indicates the scope of the issues by discussing, e.g., the distinctive acts of valuing, openness to value, the objectivity of values, the summation and combination of values, the deconstruction of values, the value of absence, and the value of nature.

Both volumes of this work have as their central concern to sort out who one is from what one is. In this Book 1, the focus is on transcendental-phenomenological ontology. When we refer to ourselves we refer both non-ascriptively in regard to non-propertied as well as ascriptively in regard to propertied aspects of ourselves. The latter is the richness of our personal being; the former is the essentially elusive central concern of this Book 1: I can be aware of myself and refer to myself without it being necessary to think of any third-personal characteristic; indeed one may be aware of oneself without having to be aware of anything except oneself. This consideration opens the door to basic issues in phenomenological ontology, such as identity, individuation, and substance. In our knowledge and love of Others we find symmetry with the first-person self-knowledge, both in its non-ascriptive forms as well as in its property-ascribing forms. Love properly has for its referent the Other as present through but beyond her properties.Transcendental-phenomenological reflections move us to consider paradoxes of the “transcendental person”. For example, we contend with the unpresentability in the transcendental first-person of our beginning or ending and the undeniable evidence for the beginning and ending of persons in our third-person experience. The basic distinction between oneself as non-sortal and as a person pervaded by properties serves as a hinge for reflecting on “the afterlife”. This transcendental-phenomenological ontology of necessity deals with some themes of the philosophy of religion.

If I am asked in the framework of Book 1, “Who are you?” I, in answering, might say “I don’t know who in the world I am.” Nevertheless there is a sense in which I always know what “I” refers to and can never not know, even if I have become, e.g., amnesiac. Yet in Book 2, “Who are you?” has other senses of oneself in mind than the non-sortal “myself”. For example, it might be the pragmatic context, as in a bureaucratic setting; but “Who are you?” or “Who am I?” might be more anguished and be rendered by “What sort of person are you?” or “What sort am I?” Such a question often surfaces in the face of a “limit-situation”, such as one’s death or in the wake of a shameful deed where we are compelled to find our “centers”, what we also will call “Existenz”. “Existenz” here refers to the center of the person. In the face of the limit-situation one is called upon to act unconditionally in the determination of oneself and one’s being in the world.In this Book 2 we discuss chiefly one’s normative personal-moral identity which stands in contrast to the transcendental I where one’s non-sortal unique identity is given from the start. This moral identity requires a unique self-determination and normative self-constitution which may be thought of with the help of the metaphor of “vocation”. We will see that it has especial ties to one’s Existenz as well as to love. This Book 2 claims that the moral-personal ideal sense of who one is is linked to the transcendental who through a notion of entelechy. The person strives to embody the I-ness that one both ineluctably is and which, however, points to who one is not yet and who one ought to be. The final two chapters tell a philosophical-theological likely story of a basic theme of Plotinus: We must learn to honor ourselves because of our honorable kinship and lineage “Yonder”.