J.J. Kockelmans - Böcker

I have always had a great interest in the philosophy of science. At first this interest led to reflections on the mathematical sciences;l later my focus shifted to the natural sciences;2 during the past twenty years or so my interest has also included the behavioral, social, and historical sciences) From the very start my interest was always combined with a concern for the history of the sciences. In philosophy of science proper, my main interest was not in logical, methodological, or even epistemological issues, although I obviously studied and taught the most important insights proposed in the leading publications in this large field of study. My concern has always been predominantly ontological; and in that area I have approached the relevant issues from a 4 phenomenological perspective. For what follows it is perhaps of some importance to mention here that I came to phenomenology in a rather indirect way, through the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. Yet it was mainly the influence of Herman Van Breda and Alphonse De Waelhens which led me directly to Husserl's phenomenology. At first I fo- cused almost exclusively on Husserl's phenomenology.Later I moved in the direction of the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and, 1Cf. Joseph J. Kockelmans, Philosophy of Mathematics in the Middle Ages (in Dutch) (Langemark: Vonksteen, 1953); "On the Mode of Being of Mathematical Entities" (in Dutch), in Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, 16(1954), pp. 289-33l. 2Joseph J. Kockelmans, On Time and Space.

This volume comprises systematic as well as historical essays, including contributions intended to give comprehensive overviews of such areas as genetic phenomenology, transcendental phenomenology, philosophy and history of logic and mathematics, Kant, hermeneutics, Hegel, and philosophy of language. The book is addressed to phenomenologists, particularly those who are interested in some or all of the areas mentioned. In his introduction Joseph J. Kockelmans indicates that these diverse areas enter into dialogue in the work of Thomas M. Seebohm, whom the editors and authors wish to honour, and the systematic papers mirror the state of the art of research in the above-mentioned disciplines.

This companion volume to "Ideas for Hermeneutic Phenomenology of Natural Sciences" focuses on methodological issues in the natural sciences. Its first part elucidates the methodical hermeneutics developed in the 19th century by Boeckh, Birt, Dilthey and others. Its second part, through the use of concrete examples drawn from modern physics as it unfolded from Copernicus to Maxell, clarifies and "proves" the main points of the ontologico-hermeneutical conception of the sciences elaborated in the earlier volume. It thereby both illuminates the most important problems confronting an ontologico-phenomenological approach to the natural sciences and offers an alternative to Kuhn's conception of the historical development of the natural sciences.

This book grew from a series of lectures presented in 1983 in the context of the Summer Program in Phenomenology at The Pennsylvania State University. For these lectures I made use of notes and short essays which I had written between 1978 and 1982 during interdisciplinary seminars on Heidegger's later philosophy in general, and on his philosophy of language and art in particular. The participants in these seminars consisted of faculty members and graduate students concerned with the sciences, the arts, literature, literary criticism, art history, art education, and philosophy. On both occasions I made a special effort to introduce those who did not yet have a specialized knowledge of Heidegger's philosophy, to his later way of thinking. In this effort I was guided by the conviction that we, as a group, had to aim for accuracy, precision, clarity, faithfulness, and depth, while at the same time taking distance, comparing Heidegger's views with ideas of other philosophers and thinkers, and cultivat­ ing a proper sense of criticism. Over the years it has become clear to me that among professional philoso­ phers, literary critics, scholars concerned with art history and art education, and scientists from various disciplines, there are many who are particularly interested in "Heidegger's philosophy of art". I have also become convinced that many of these dedicated scholars often have difficulty in understanding Heidegger's lectures on art and art works. This is understandable.

This book grew from a series of lectures presented in 1983 in the context of the Summer Program in Phenomenology at The Pennsylvania State University. For these lectures I made use of notes and short essays which I had written between 1978 and 1982 during interdisciplinary seminars on Heidegger's later philosophy in general, and on his philosophy of language and art in particular. The participants in these seminars consisted of faculty members and graduate students concerned with the sciences, the arts, literature, literary criticism, art history, art education, and philosophy. On both occasions I made a special effort to introduce those who did not yet have a specialized knowledge of Heidegger's philosophy, to his later way of thinking. In this effort I was guided by the conviction that we, as a group, had to aim for accuracy, precision, clarity, faithfulness, and depth, while at the same time taking distance, comparing Heidegger's views with ideas of other philosophers and thinkers, and cultivat­ ing a proper sense of criticism. Over the years it has become clear to me that among professional philoso­ phers, literary critics, scholars concerned with art history and art education, and scientists from various disciplines, there are many who are particularly interested in "Heidegger's philosophy of art". I have also become convinced that many of these dedicated scholars often have difficulty in understanding Heidegger's lectures on art and art works. This is understandable.

Over the past decades many books and essays have been written on phenomeno­ logical psychology. Some of these publications are historical in character and were designed to give the reader an idea of the origin, meaning, and function of phenom­ enological psychology and its most important trends. Others are theoretical in nature and were written to give the reader an insight into the ways in which various authors conceive of phenomenological psychology and how they attempt. to justify their views in light of the philosophical assumptions underlying their conceptions. Finally, there are a great number of publications in which the authors do not talk about phenomenological psychology, but rather try to do what was described as possible and necessary in the first two kinds of publications. Some of these at­ tempts to do the latter have been quite successful; in other cases the results have 1 been disappointing. This anthology contains a number of essays which I have brought together for the explicit purpose of introducing the reader to the Dutch school in phenomenological psychology. The Dutch school occupies an important place in the phenomenological move­ ment as a whole. Buytendijk was one of the first Dutch scholars to contribute to the field, and for several decades he remained the central figure of the school.

This volume comprises systematic as well as historical essays, including contributions intended to give comprehensive overviews of such areas as genetic phenomenology, transcendental phenomenology, philosophy and history of logic and mathematics, Kant, hermeneutics, Hegel, and philosophy of language. The book is addressed to phenomenologists, particularly those who are interested in some or all of the areas mentioned. In his introduction Joseph J. Kockelmans indicates that these diverse areas enter into dialogue in the work of Thomas M. Seebohm, whom the editors and authors wish to honor, and the systematic papers mirror the state of the art of research in the above-mentioned disciplines.

Ideas for Hermeneutic Phenomenology of Natural Sciences (published in 1993 as volume 15 of this series) comprised mainly ontological reflections on the natural sciences.

I have always had a great interest in the philosophy of science. At first this interest led to reflections on the mathematical sciences;l later my focus shifted to the natural sciences;2 during the past twenty years or so my interest has also included the behavioral, social, and historical sciences) From the very start my interest was always combined with a concern for the history of the sciences. In philosophy of science proper, my main interest was not in logical, methodological, or even epistemological issues, although I obviously studied and taught the most important insights proposed in the leading publications in this large field of study. My concern has always been predominantly ontological; and in that area I have approached the relevant issues from a 4 phenomenological perspective. For what follows it is perhaps of some importance to mention here that I came to phenomenology in a rather indirect way, through the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. Yet it was mainly the influence of Herman Van Breda and Alphonse De Waelhens which led me directly to Husserl's phenomenology. At first I fo- cused almost exclusively on Husserl's phenomenology.Later I moved in the direction of the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and, 1Cf. Joseph J. Kockelmans, Philosophy of Mathematics in the Middle Ages (in Dutch) (Langemark: Vonksteen, 1953); "On the Mode of Being of Mathematical Entities" (in Dutch), in Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, 16(1954), pp. 289-33l. 2Joseph J. Kockelmans, On Time and Space.