This book, first published in 1975, is a comprehensive examination of specialised strategic studies, and deals with the theoretical and policy aspects of the topic. It argues that military power is an intrinsic part of the international system, with strategy being the means by which military power may be used to achieve political objectives. Hence, given the destructiveness of modern weapons it is the prime aim of the strategic doctrines of the major powers not to wage war, but to use their military potential to further their interests by less catastrophic means. However, outside the Cold War superpower confrontation, strategy exhibits many of its traditional aspects. This book analyses both types of strategy variations.

This book, first published in 1975, is a comprehensive examination of specialised strategic studies, and deals with the theoretical and policy aspects of the topic. It argues that military power is an intrinsic part of the international system, with strategy being the means by which military power may be used to achieve political objectives. Hence, given the destructiveness of modern weapons it is the prime aim of the strategic doctrines of the major powers not to wage war, but to use their military potential to further their interests by less catastrophic means. However, outside the Cold War superpower confrontation, strategy exhibits many of its traditional aspects. This book analyses both types of strategy variations.

This book, first published in 1981, is an analysis of the Soviet Union’s military strategy, taking in both sides of the ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ views of the USSR’s intentions. It examines the Soviet approach to nuclear war, defence and deterrence in the nuclear age and the calculation of risk in the use of the military instrument. One of the main themes running through the chapters is that although the Soviet Union clearly does not view military issues in the same way as does the West, their approach is not necessarily aggressive and dangerous in all respects.

This book, first published in 1981, is an analysis of the Soviet Union’s military strategy, taking in both sides of the ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ views of the USSR’s intentions. It examines the Soviet approach to nuclear war, defence and deterrence in the nuclear age and the calculation of risk in the use of the military instrument. One of the main themes running through the chapters is that although the Soviet Union clearly does not view military issues in the same way as does the West, their approach is not necessarily aggressive and dangerous in all respects.

This book, first published in 1975, is a comprehensive examination of specialised strategic studies, and deals with the theoretical and policy aspects of the topic. It argues that military power is an intrinsic part of the international system, with strategy being the means by which military power may be used to achieve political objectives. Hence, given the destructiveness of modern weapons it is the prime aim of the strategic doctrines of the major powers not to wage war, but to use their military potential to further their interests by less catastrophic means. However, outside the Cold War superpower confrontation, strategy exhibits many of its traditional aspects. This book analyses both types of strategy variations.

This book, first published in 1975, is a comprehensive examination of specialised strategic studies, and deals with the theoretical and policy aspects of the topic. It argues that military power is an intrinsic part of the international system, with strategy being the means by which military power may be used to achieve political objectives. Hence, given the destructiveness of modern weapons it is the prime aim of the strategic doctrines of the major powers not to wage war, but to use their military potential to further their interests by less catastrophic means. However, outside the Cold War superpower confrontation, strategy exhibits many of its traditional aspects. This book analyses both types of strategy variations.

This book, first published in 1981, is an analysis of the Soviet Union’s military strategy, taking in both sides of the ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ views of the USSR’s intentions. It examines the Soviet approach to nuclear war, defence and deterrence in the nuclear age and the calculation of risk in the use of the military instrument. One of the main themes running through the chapters is that although the Soviet Union clearly does not view military issues in the same way as does the West, their approach is not necessarily aggressive and dangerous in all respects.

This book, first published in 1981, is an analysis of the Soviet Union’s military strategy, taking in both sides of the ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ views of the USSR’s intentions. It examines the Soviet approach to nuclear war, defence and deterrence in the nuclear age and the calculation of risk in the use of the military instrument. One of the main themes running through the chapters is that although the Soviet Union clearly does not view military issues in the same way as does the West, their approach is not necessarily aggressive and dangerous in all respects.