Lawrence Freedman – författare

In Strategy: A History, Sir Lawrence Freedman, one of the world's leading authorities on war and international politics, captures the vast history of strategic thinking, in a consistently engaging and insightful account of how strategy came to pervade every aspect of our lives. The range of Freedman's narrative is extraordinary, moving from the surprisingly advanced strategy practiced in primate groups, to the opposing strategies of Achilles and Odysseus in The Iliad, the strategic advice of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, the great military innovations of Baron Henri de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, the grounding of revolutionary strategy in class struggles by Marx, the insights into corporate strategy found in Peter Drucker and Alfred Sloan, and the contributions of the leading social scientists working on strategy today. The core issue at the heart of strategy, the author notes, is whether it is possible to manipulate and shape our environment rather than simply become the victim of forces beyond one's control. Time and again, Freedman demonstrates that the inherent unpredictability of this environment-subject to chance events, the efforts of opponents, the missteps of friends-provides strategy with its challenge and its drama. Armies or corporations or nations rarely move from one predictable state of affairs to another, but instead feel their way through a series of states, each one not quite what was anticipated, requiring a reappraisal of the original strategy, including its ultimate objective. Thus the picture of strategy that emerges in this book is one that is fluid and flexible, governed by the starting point, not the end point. A brilliant overview of the most prominent strategic theories in history, from David's use of deception against Goliath, to the modern use of game theory in economics, this masterful volume sums up a lifetime of reflection on strategy.

For as long as there have been wars there have been fears about the next war. Where are the new dangers? What is the best defence? How might peace come about? This is the history of how over the last 150 years we have tried - rightly and wrongly - to predict war's future. 'Britain's leading academic strategist ... read this book' Economist'Insightful and opinionated ... expertly covers centuries of evolving mayhem' Gary J. Bass, The New York Times'A bonfire of predictions ... Freedman's purpose in this wise book is to discern patterns in the way we have thought about war's future' Shashank Joshi, Financial Times'It reflects the author's immense knowledge and wisdom. It should feed our humility, because it reminds us of mankind's unlimited capacity for folly' Max Hastings, The Times

Selected as a Financial Times Best Book of 2013In Strategy: A History, Sir Lawrence Freedman, one of the world's leading authorities on war and international politics, captures the vast history of strategic thinking, in a consistently engaging and insightful account of how strategy came to pervade every aspect of our lives. The range of Freedman's narrative is extraordinary, moving from the surprisingly advanced strategy practiced in primate groups, to the opposing strategies of Achilles and Odysseus in The Iliad, the strategic advice of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, the great military innovations of Baron Henri de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, the grounding of revolutionary strategy in class struggles by Marx, the insights into corporate strategy found in Peter Drucker and Alfred Sloan, and the contributions of the leading social scientists working on strategy today. The core issue at the heart of strategy, the author notes, is whether it is possible to manipulate and shape our environment rather than simply become the victim of forces beyond one's control. Time and again, Freedman demonstrates that the inherent unpredictability of this environment-subject to chance events, the efforts of opponents, the missteps of friends-provides strategy with its challenge and its drama. Armies or corporations or nations rarely move from one predictable state of affairs to another, but instead feel their way through a series of states, each one not quite what was anticipated, requiring a reappraisal of the original strategy, including its ultimate objective. Thus the picture of strategy that emerges in this book is one that is fluid and flexible, governed by the starting point, not the end point. A brilliant overview of the most prominent strategic theories in history, from David's use of deception against Goliath, to the modern use of game theory in economics, this masterful volume sums up a lifetime of reflection on strategy.

“The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy quickly established itself as a classic when it first appeared in 1981. This edition makes it even better, incorporating as it does new material about the Cold War and up-dating to include subsequent developments. Filled with insights and penetrating analysis, this volume is truly indispensable.”—Robert Jervis, Author of How Statesmen Think"Freedman and Michaels have written a thorough and thought-provoking guide to nuclear strategy. The authors analyze the causes of both wise and unwise strategic decisions in the past and thereby shine a bright light on dilemmas we face in our common nuclear future."—Scott Sagan, Stanford University, USA “With its comprehensive coverage, clear and direct language, and judicious summaries of a vast literature, this new and wholly revised edition of The Evolution of Nuclear Strategywill be essential reading for any student of nuclear history, strategic studies, or contemporary international relations.”—Matthew Jones, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK“Sir Lawrence Freedman’s The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy has been the first port of call for three generations of academics and policy-makers wanting to familiarize themselves with the subject matter. The success of this book could have led Professor Freedman to satisfy himself with regular updates or afterwords. But the tireless author is now gracing us with an entirely revised edition of his masterpiece nearly forty years after its initial publication, taking into account findings from archives and declassified documents. At the same time, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy remains true to its original purpose and spirit: an easy to read manual, light with footnotes, focusing on policy rather than on theory, and thus the best possible introduction to an arcane subject. In an era when nuclear strategy issues seem to be becoming relevant again, its historical scope and breadth will make its reading or re-reading even more useful – if only because knowing about the absurdity of the Cold war arms race is a prerequisite if one does not want to repeat its mistakes.”—Bruno Tertrais, Deputy Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, France“This updated and improved edition of the classic text on the evolution of nuclear strategy is a must read for anyone attempting to understand the nuclear predicament and where it is heading. Impressive in every respect!”—T.V. Paul, James McGill Professor of International Relations, McGill University, Canada, and the author of The Traditon of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons“After the end of the Cold War, we hoped for a world in which nuclear weapons would have ‘low salience’, or might even disappear into virtual, non-assembled arsenals.  Alas, they are coming to the fore again.  With changes in political context and technology, it is thus pressing that ‘the Bible’ on the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy should be updated.  Lawrence Freedman’s great classic has been admirably updated with the help of Jeff Michaels.  The work, just as its previous editions, thus remains the definitive and authoritative point of reference on nuclear strategy in the twenty-first century.”—Beatrice Heuser, Chair of International Relations, University of Glasgow, ScotlandFirst published in 1981, Lawrence Freedman's The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy was immediately acclaimed as the standard work on the history of attempts to cope militarily and politically with the terrible destructive power of nuclear weapons. It has now been completely rewritten, drawing on a wide range of new research, and updated to take account of the period following the end of the cold war, and covering all nuclear powers.

As a concept, deterrence has launched a thousand books and articles. It has dominated Western strategic thinking for more than four decades. In this important and groundbreaking new book, Lawrence Freedman develops a distinctive approach to the evaluation of deterrence as both a state of mind and a strategic option. This approach is applied to post-cold war crisis management, and the utility and relevance of the concept is addressed in relation to US strategic practice post-9/11, particularly in the light of the apparent preference of the Bush Administration for the alternative concept of pre-emption. The study of deterrence has been hampered by the weight of the intellectual baggage accumulated since the end of the Second World War. Exaggerated notions of what deterrence might achieve were developed, only to be to knocked down by academic critique. In this book, Freedman charts the evolution of the contemporary concept of deterrence, and discusses whether - and how - it still has relevance in today's world. He considers constructivist as well as realist approaches and draws on criminological as well as strategic studies literature to develop a concept of a norms-based, as opposed to an interest-based, deterrence. This book will be essential reading for students of politics and international relations as well as all those interested in contemporary strategic thought.

A new approach to ideas about war, from one of the UK's leading strategic thinkersIn 1912 Sir Arthur Conan Doyle wrote a short story about a war fought from underwater submersibles that included the sinking of passenger ships. It was dismissed by the British admirals of the day, not on the basis of technical feasibility, but because sinking civilian ships was not something that any civilised nation would do. The reality of war often contradicts expectations, less because of some fantastic technical or engineering dimension, but more because of some human, political, or moral threshold that we had never imagined would be crossed. As Lawrence Freedman shows, ideas about the causes of war and strategies for its conduct have rich and varied histories which shape predictions about the future. Freedman shows how looking at how the future of war was conceived about in the past (and why this was more often than not wrong) can put into perspective current thinking about future conflicts. The Future of War - which takes us from preparations for the world wars, through the nuclear age and the civil wars which became the focus for debate after the end of the Cold War, to present preoccupations with hybrid and cyber warfare - is filled with fascinating insights from one of the most brilliant military and strategic historians of his generation.

A timely history of the interplay between politics and military operations, 'Command is the history of our time' (Guardian)Military command has been reconstructed and revolutionized since the Second World War by nuclear warfare, small-scale guerrilla land operations and cyber interference. Freedman takes a global perspective, systematically investigating its practice and politics since 1945 through a wide range of conflicts from the French Colonial Wars, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bangladesh Liberation War to North Vietnam's Easter Offensive of 1972, the Falklands War, the Iraq War and Russia's wars in Chechnya and Ukraine. By highlighting the political nature of strategy, Freedman shows that military decision-making cannot be separated from civilian priorities and that commanders must now have the sensibility to navigate politics as well as warfare.

A timely history of the interplay between politics and military operations, 'Command is the history of our time' (Guardian)Military command has been reconstructed and revolutionized since the Second World War by nuclear warfare, small-scale guerrilla land operations and cyber interference. Freedman takes a global perspective, systematically investigating its practice and politics since 1945 through a wide range of conflicts from the French Colonial Wars, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bangladesh Liberation War to North Vietnam's Easter Offensive of 1972, the Falklands War, the Iraq War and Russia's wars in Chechnya and Ukraine. By highlighting the political nature of strategy, Freedman shows that military decision-making cannot be separated from civilian priorities and that commanders must now have the sensibility to navigate politics as well as warfare.

One of the most serious crises since the end of the Cold War began with Russia's seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and subsequent 'secret' war in Eastern Ukraine. As more territory was taken from Eastern Ukraine, Western countries countered with economic sanctions directed against Russia. While the conflict did not escalate to the levels originally feared, over time, it became apparent that President Putin had failed to affect the regime change intended in Ukraine, and Russia's economy had been damaged. In Ukraine and the Art of Strategy, Sir Lawrence Freedman provides an account of the origins and course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict through the lens of the theory and practice of strategy. That is, he explores Putin's near, medium, and long-term strategies when he decided to initiate the conflict. How successful has he been? In contrast to many who see Putin as a master operator who has resuscitated a supine Russia against all odds, Freedman is less impressed with his strategic acumen in terms of the long-term fallout. By exploring concepts such as coercive diplomacy, limited war, escalation and information operations, Freedman brings the story up to the present, where a low-level conflict between Ukrainian and breakaway rebel forces in the east grinds on, and illuminates the external challenges faced by the governments' involved. Freedman's application of his unique strategic perspective to this supremely important conflict has the potential to reshape our understanding of it, and his analysis of the likely outcomes will force readers to reconsider the idea that Vladimir Putin is unmatched as a strategic mastermind.

The Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, subsequent war in Eastern Ukraine and economic sanctions imposed by the West, transformed European politics. These events marked a dramatic shift away from the optimism of the post-Cold War era. The conflict did not escalate to the levels originally feared but nor was either side able to bring it to a definitive conclusion. Ukraine suffered a loss of territory but was not forced into changing its policies away from the Westward course adopted as a result of the EuroMaidan uprising of February 2014. President Putin was left supporting a separatist enclave as Russia''s economy suffered significant damage. In Ukraine and the Art of Strategy, Lawrence Freedman-author of the landmark Strategy: A History-provides an account of the origins and course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict through the lens of strategy. Freedman describes the development of President Putin''s anxieties that former Soviet countries were being drawn towards the European Union, the effective pressure he put on President Yanokvych of Ukraine during 2013 to turn away from the EU and the resulting ''EuroMaidan Revolution'' which led to Yanukovych fleeing. He explores the reluctance of Putin to use Russian forces to do more that consolidate the insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, the failure of the Minsk peace process and the limits of the international response. Putin''s strategic-making is kept in view at all times, including his use of ''information warfare'' and attempts to influence the American election. In contrast to those who see the Russian leader as a master operator who catches out the West with bold moves Freedman sees him as impulsive and so forced to improvise when his gambles fail. Freedman''s application of his strategic perspective to this supremely important conflict challenges our understanding of some of its key features and the idea that Vladimir Putin is unmatched as a strategic mastermind.

The Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, subsequent war in Eastern Ukraine and economic sanctions imposed by the West, transformed European politics. These events marked a dramatic shift away from the optimism of the post-Cold War era. The conflict did not escalate to the levels originally feared but nor was either side able to bring it to a definitive conclusion. Ukraine suffered a loss of territory but was not forced into changing its policies away from the Westward course adopted as a result of the EuroMaidan uprising of February 2014. President Putin was left supporting a separatist enclave as Russia''s economy suffered significant damage. In Ukraine and the Art of Strategy, Lawrence Freedman-author of the landmark Strategy: A History-provides an account of the origins and course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict through the lens of strategy. Freedman describes the development of President Putin''s anxieties that former Soviet countries were being drawn towards the European Union, the effective pressure he put on President Yanokvych of Ukraine during 2013 to turn away from the EU and the resulting ''EuroMaidan Revolution'' which led to Yanukovych fleeing. He explores the reluctance of Putin to use Russian forces to do more that consolidate the insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, the failure of the Minsk peace process and the limits of the international response. Putin''s strategic-making is kept in view at all times, including his use of ''information warfare'' and attempts to influence the American election. In contrast to those who see the Russian leader as a master operator who catches out the West with bold moves Freedman sees him as impulsive and so forced to improvise when his gambles fail. Freedman''s application of his strategic perspective to this supremely important conflict challenges our understanding of some of its key features and the idea that Vladimir Putin is unmatched as a strategic mastermind.

War has shaped the international system, prompted social change, and inspired the arts. The ubiquitous and multi-faceted character of war is fully reflected in this new Oxford Reader. It addresses the causes of war, the experience of war, and the moral and strategic principles behind war through a variety of academic viewpoints, and first-hand accounts by generals, soldiers, historians, strategists, and poets.

A distinctive collection of essays capturing Lawrence Freedman's insightful analysis across war, strategy, and foreign policy and providing a unique view of the key thinkers that shaped history.One of the world's foremost scholars of warfare, both historical and contemporary, Lawrence Freedman has also played an important role in policymaking, serving as an official historian of both the Falklands War and on the UK inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War. Since the publication of his best-selling Strategy in 2013, Freedman has continued to explore many of the themes he raised in the book while commenting on ongoing conflicts.On Strategists and Strategy combines the best of Freedman's many essays from the past ten years on warfare and foreign policy, alongside more personal pieces on the scholars who influenced him and his own life trajectory. The range of his interests is demonstrated in this lively and engaging collection of essays. They cover a wide range of topics, including Vladimir Putin's strategic fanaticism; arguments on why we don't take tactics seriously enough and why "stalemate" is used incorrectly as a metaphor for deadlock in war; considerations of the dilemmas of nuclear deterrence; and what Covid tells us about crisis management. The material on his own life is richly contextual, attuned to the broader historical trends and social forces in 1960s and 1970s Britain that shaped his experiences.This volume not only provides a broad-ranging sampling of Freedman's most representative work, but also offers a unique window into a half century of world history.

A distinctive collection of essays capturing Lawrence Freedman's insightful analysis across war, strategy, and foreign policy and providing a unique view of the key thinkers that shaped history.One of the world's foremost scholars of warfare, both historical and contemporary, Lawrence Freedman has also played an important role in policymaking, serving as an official historian of both the Falklands War and on the UK inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War. Since the publication of his best-selling Strategy in 2013, Freedman has continued to explore many of the themes he raised in the book while commenting on ongoing conflicts. On Strategists and Strategy combines the best of Freedman's many essays from the past ten years on warfare and foreign policy, alongside more personal pieces on the scholars who influenced him and his own life trajectory. The range of his interests is demonstrated in this lively and engaging collection of essays. They cover a wide range of topics, including Vladimir Putin's strategic fanaticism; arguments on why we don't take tactics seriously enough and why "e;stalemate"e; is used incorrectly as a metaphor for deadlock in war; considerations of the dilemmas of nuclear deterrence; and what Covid tells us about crisis management. The material on his own life is richly contextual, attuned to the broader historical trends and social forces in 1960s and 1970s Britain that shaped his experiences. This volume not only provides a broad-ranging sampling of Freedman's most representative work, but also offers a unique window into a half century of world history.

A distinctive collection of essays capturing Lawrence Freedman's insightful analysis across war, strategy, and foreign policy and providing a unique view of the key thinkers that shaped history.One of the world's foremost scholars of warfare, both historical and contemporary, Lawrence Freedman has also played an important role in policymaking, serving as an official historian of both the Falklands War and on the UK inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War. Since the publication of his best-selling Strategy in 2013, Freedman has continued to explore many of the themes he raised in the book while commenting on ongoing conflicts. On Strategists and Strategy combines the best of Freedman's many essays from the past ten years on warfare and foreign policy, alongside more personal pieces on the scholars who influenced him and his own life trajectory. The range of his interests is demonstrated in this lively and engaging collection of essays. They cover a wide range of topics, including Vladimir Putin's strategic fanaticism; arguments on why we don't take tactics seriously enough and why "e;stalemate"e; is used incorrectly as a metaphor for deadlock in war; considerations of the dilemmas of nuclear deterrence; and what Covid tells us about crisis management. The material on his own life is richly contextual, attuned to the broader historical trends and social forces in 1960s and 1970s Britain that shaped his experiences. This volume not only provides a broad-ranging sampling of Freedman's most representative work, but also offers a unique window into a half century of world history.

In his thousand-day presidency, John F. Kennedy led America through one of its most difficult and potentially explosive eras. With the Cold War at its height and the threat of communist advances in Europe and the Third World, Kennedy had the unenviable task of maintaining U.S. solidarity without leading the western world into a nuclear catastrophe. In Kennedy''s Wars, noted historian Lawrence Freedman draws on the best of Cold War scholarship and newly released government documents to illuminate Kennedy''s approach to war and his efforts for peace. He recreates insightfully the political and intellectual milieu of the foreign policy establishment during Kennedy''s era with vivid profiles of his top advisors--Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Robert Kennedy--and influential figures such as Dean Acheson and Walt Rostow. Tracing the evolution of traditional liberalism into the Cold War liberalism of Kennedy''s cabinet, Freedman evaluates their responses to the tensions in Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. He gives each conflict individual attention, showing how foreign policy decisions came to be defined for each new crisis in the light of those that had gone before. The book follows Kennedy as he wrestles with the succession of major conflicts--taking advice, weighing the risks of inadvertently escalating the Cold War into outright military confrontation, exploring diplomatic options, and forming strategic judgments that would eventually prevent a major war during his presidency.

This wide-ranging collection covers many topics of interest in the related fields of military history and strategic studies. The contributors are all distinguished scholars, whose depth of research and variety of approach combine to produce a rewarding book and a substantive contribution to knowledge. Their common theme is the exploration of the relationships between strategic planning, the conduct of war, and high politics.The volume is dedicated to Sir Michael Howard, formerly Regius Professor of History in the University of Oxford. The broad scope of the work reflects the nature of Sir Michael's scholarship over a long and distinguished career.

For three decades the analysis of strategic coercion has been dominated by two landmark books: Tom Schelling's Arms and Influence and Alex George's Strategic Diplomacy, both of which addressed the requirements of American foreign policy during the cold war. This book argues for a reappraisal of the role of strategic coercion - defined as the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another's strategic choices. It emphasizes the importance of drawing on the experiences of countries other than the United States, and of considering the new circumstances of the post cold war world. An international team of scholars, led by Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at King's College, London, provides critical commentaries on the work of Schelling and George and a series of fascinating case studies. These cover most regions of the world, a variety of different actors - including terrorist groups - and different forms of coercion - including the use of economic sanctions.

Rapid developments in information technology and precision weaponry are said to herald a 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA), making possible quick and decisive victories with minimal casualties and collateral damage. But has such a revolution taken place? The issues that drive conflict will persist, and many of the technical advances associated with the RMA will not necessarily produce a transformation in the nature of warfare. The end of the Cold War has highlighted another revolution one in political affairs. Major powers appear less likely to go to war with one another than they are to intervene in conflicts involving weak states, with potential opponents including militia groups, drug cartels and terrorists. RMA technology may be less suited to conflicts such as these.

If the cumulative effect of these changes has produced a revolution, it is a revolution in strategic, as much as military, affairs. This paper argues that:

the RMA is the practical expression of a 'Western Way of Warfare', the key features of which are: professional armed forces; intolerance of casualties; and intolerance of collateral damagethe key technological and conceptual components of the RMA were in place by the early 1970s. The trend has therefore been evolutionary, rather than revolutionary. The significant difference is in the new political setting of the end of the Cold War, and the revolution in perceptions of Western particularly US conventional military strength brought about by the Gulf War of 1991the Gulf conflict could mark the start of a true 'revolution' if future battles offer similar opportunities to exploit the RMA's technology. However, since the US and its allies appear unbeatable when fighting on their own terms, future opponents will fight differentlythe West will therefore face opponents who will follow strategies that contradict the Western Way of Warfare. They will avoid pitched battles, will exploit the West's reluctance to inflict civilian suffering, and will target their opponent's domestic political base, as much as its forward troops.

The problem for the West is not how to prevail, but how to do so in an acceptable manner. The more warfare becomes entwined with civilian activity, the more difficult it is to respond with the type of decisive and overwhelming military means embodied in the RMA. The RMA does not create a situation in which information is the only commodity at stake, and so does not offer the prospect of a 'virtual war'. The new circumstances and capabilities do not prescribe one strategy, but extend the range of strategies available. The issue underlying the RMA is the ability of Western countries, in particular the US, to follow a line geared to their own interests and capabilities.

In his thousand-day presidency, John F. Kennedy led America through one of its most difficult and potentially explosive eras. With the Cold War at its height and the threat of communist advances in Europe and the Third World, Kennedy had the unenviable task of maintaining U.S. solidarity without leading the western world into a nuclear catastrophe. In Kennedy''s Wars, noted historian Lawrence Freedman draws on the best of Cold War scholarship and newly released government documents to illuminate Kennedy''s approach to war and his efforts for peace. He recreates insightfully the political and intellectual milieu of the foreign policy establishment during Kennedy''s era with vivid profiles of his top advisors--Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Robert Kennedy--and influential figures such as Dean Acheson and Walt Rostow. Tracing the evolution of traditional liberalism into the Cold War liberalism of Kennedy''s cabinet, Freedman evaluates their responses to the tensions in Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. He gives each conflict individual attention, showing how foreign policy decisions came to be defined for each new crisis in the light of those that had gone before. The book follows Kennedy as he wrestles with the succession of major conflicts--taking advice, weighing the risks of inadvertently escalating the Cold War into outright military confrontation, exploring diplomatic options, and forming strategic judgments that would eventually prevent a major war during his presidency.

'...Lawrence Freedman has provided a masterly account of the evolution of nuclear strategic thought which is steeped in scholarship, elegantly written, and comprehensive in scope.' Edward M.Spiers, Times Higher Education Supplement

This study attempts to bring the debate about nuclear weapons and arms control up to date by assessing the reasons for the recent superpower agreement, the decline of the peace movements, the new threats to international stability and the prospects for further detente. The optimism of the first edition about an eventual return to arms control has been vindicated by events, but its pessimism about the deeply-rooted nature of superpower confrontation remains and the assessment is retained that the nuclear knot remains firmly tied.

Originally published in 1986, although the pace of arms control negotiations has been stepped up, there is still little sign of agreement. In this paper the author examines the current negotiating effort, with particular emphasis on its implications for European security. He provides an up-to-date analysis of the superpower discussions on nuclear arms control, including the impact of ‘star wars’, and also of the talks at Vienna on conventional force reductions and at Stockholm on confidence-building measures. He notes a shift in emphasis from ‘parity’ to ‘transparency’ in Western proposals, and questions whether this promises greater results than were achieved from earlier approaches. He also warns of the risks of arms control arrangements obstructing possibilities for reforming the European security system.

Originally published in 1986, although the pace of arms control negotiations has been stepped up, there is still little sign of agreement. In this paper the author examines the current negotiating effort, with particular emphasis on its implications for European security. He provides an up-to-date analysis of the superpower discussions on nuclear arms control, including the impact of ‘star wars’, and also of the talks at Vienna on conventional force reductions and at Stockholm on confidence-building measures. He notes a shift in emphasis from ‘parity’ to ‘transparency’ in Western proposals, and questions whether this promises greater results than were achieved from earlier approaches. He also warns of the risks of arms control arrangements obstructing possibilities for reforming the European security system.