Lawrence Freedman – författare

For as long as there have been wars there have been fears about the next war. Where are the new dangers? What is the best defence? How might peace come about? This is the history of how over the last 150 years we have tried - rightly and wrongly - to predict war's future. 'Britain's leading academic strategist ... read this book' Economist'Insightful and opinionated ... expertly covers centuries of evolving mayhem' Gary J. Bass, The New York Times'A bonfire of predictions ... Freedman's purpose in this wise book is to discern patterns in the way we have thought about war's future' Shashank Joshi, Financial Times'It reflects the author's immense knowledge and wisdom. It should feed our humility, because it reminds us of mankind's unlimited capacity for folly' Max Hastings, The Times

Selected as a Financial Times Best Book of 2013In Strategy: A History, Sir Lawrence Freedman, one of the world's leading authorities on war and international politics, captures the vast history of strategic thinking, in a consistently engaging and insightful account of how strategy came to pervade every aspect of our lives. The range of Freedman's narrative is extraordinary, moving from the surprisingly advanced strategy practiced in primate groups, to the opposing strategies of Achilles and Odysseus in The Iliad, the strategic advice of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, the great military innovations of Baron Henri de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, the grounding of revolutionary strategy in class struggles by Marx, the insights into corporate strategy found in Peter Drucker and Alfred Sloan, and the contributions of the leading social scientists working on strategy today. The core issue at the heart of strategy, the author notes, is whether it is possible to manipulate and shape our environment rather than simply become the victim of forces beyond one's control. Time and again, Freedman demonstrates that the inherent unpredictability of this environment-subject to chance events, the efforts of opponents, the missteps of friends-provides strategy with its challenge and its drama. Armies or corporations or nations rarely move from one predictable state of affairs to another, but instead feel their way through a series of states, each one not quite what was anticipated, requiring a reappraisal of the original strategy, including its ultimate objective. Thus the picture of strategy that emerges in this book is one that is fluid and flexible, governed by the starting point, not the end point. A brilliant overview of the most prominent strategic theories in history, from David's use of deception against Goliath, to the modern use of game theory in economics, this masterful volume sums up a lifetime of reflection on strategy.

“The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy quickly established itself as a classic when it first appeared in 1981. This edition makes it even better, incorporating as it does new material about the Cold War and up-dating to include subsequent developments. Filled with insights and penetrating analysis, this volume is truly indispensable.”—Robert Jervis, Author of How Statesmen Think"Freedman and Michaels have written a thorough and thought-provoking guide to nuclear strategy. The authors analyze the causes of both wise and unwise strategic decisions in the past and thereby shine a bright light on dilemmas we face in our common nuclear future."—Scott Sagan, Stanford University, USA “With its comprehensive coverage, clear and direct language, and judicious summaries of a vast literature, this new and wholly revised edition of The Evolution of Nuclear Strategywill be essential reading for any student of nuclear history, strategic studies, or contemporary international relations.”—Matthew Jones, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK“Sir Lawrence Freedman’s The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy has been the first port of call for three generations of academics and policy-makers wanting to familiarize themselves with the subject matter. The success of this book could have led Professor Freedman to satisfy himself with regular updates or afterwords. But the tireless author is now gracing us with an entirely revised edition of his masterpiece nearly forty years after its initial publication, taking into account findings from archives and declassified documents. At the same time, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy remains true to its original purpose and spirit: an easy to read manual, light with footnotes, focusing on policy rather than on theory, and thus the best possible introduction to an arcane subject. In an era when nuclear strategy issues seem to be becoming relevant again, its historical scope and breadth will make its reading or re-reading even more useful – if only because knowing about the absurdity of the Cold war arms race is a prerequisite if one does not want to repeat its mistakes.”—Bruno Tertrais, Deputy Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, France“This updated and improved edition of the classic text on the evolution of nuclear strategy is a must read for anyone attempting to understand the nuclear predicament and where it is heading. Impressive in every respect!”—T.V. Paul, James McGill Professor of International Relations, McGill University, Canada, and the author of The Traditon of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons“After the end of the Cold War, we hoped for a world in which nuclear weapons would have ‘low salience’, or might even disappear into virtual, non-assembled arsenals.  Alas, they are coming to the fore again.  With changes in political context and technology, it is thus pressing that ‘the Bible’ on the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy should be updated.  Lawrence Freedman’s great classic has been admirably updated with the help of Jeff Michaels.  The work, just as its previous editions, thus remains the definitive and authoritative point of reference on nuclear strategy in the twenty-first century.”—Beatrice Heuser, Chair of International Relations, University of Glasgow, ScotlandFirst published in 1981, Lawrence Freedman's The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy was immediately acclaimed as the standard work on the history of attempts to cope militarily and politically with the terrible destructive power of nuclear weapons. It has now been completely rewritten, drawing on a wide range of new research, and updated to take account of the period following the end of the cold war, and covering all nuclear powers.

A timely history of the interplay between politics and military operations, 'Command is the history of our time' (Guardian)Military command has been reconstructed and revolutionized since the Second World War by nuclear warfare, small-scale guerrilla land operations and cyber interference. Freedman takes a global perspective, systematically investigating its practice and politics since 1945 through a wide range of conflicts from the French Colonial Wars, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bangladesh Liberation War to North Vietnam's Easter Offensive of 1972, the Falklands War, the Iraq War and Russia's wars in Chechnya and Ukraine. By highlighting the political nature of strategy, Freedman shows that military decision-making cannot be separated from civilian priorities and that commanders must now have the sensibility to navigate politics as well as warfare.

One of the most serious crises since the end of the Cold War began with Russia's seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and subsequent 'secret' war in Eastern Ukraine. As more territory was taken from Eastern Ukraine, Western countries countered with economic sanctions directed against Russia. While the conflict did not escalate to the levels originally feared, over time, it became apparent that President Putin had failed to affect the regime change intended in Ukraine, and Russia's economy had been damaged. In Ukraine and the Art of Strategy, Sir Lawrence Freedman provides an account of the origins and course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict through the lens of the theory and practice of strategy. That is, he explores Putin's near, medium, and long-term strategies when he decided to initiate the conflict. How successful has he been? In contrast to many who see Putin as a master operator who has resuscitated a supine Russia against all odds, Freedman is less impressed with his strategic acumen in terms of the long-term fallout. By exploring concepts such as coercive diplomacy, limited war, escalation and information operations, Freedman brings the story up to the present, where a low-level conflict between Ukrainian and breakaway rebel forces in the east grinds on, and illuminates the external challenges faced by the governments' involved. Freedman's application of his unique strategic perspective to this supremely important conflict has the potential to reshape our understanding of it, and his analysis of the likely outcomes will force readers to reconsider the idea that Vladimir Putin is unmatched as a strategic mastermind.

War has shaped the international system, prompted social change, and inspired the arts. The ubiquitous and multi-faceted character of war is fully reflected in this new Oxford Reader. It addresses the causes of war, the experience of war, and the moral and strategic principles behind war through a variety of academic viewpoints, and first-hand accounts by generals, soldiers, historians, strategists, and poets.

A distinctive collection of essays capturing Lawrence Freedman's insightful analysis across war, strategy, and foreign policy and providing a unique view of the key thinkers that shaped history.One of the world's foremost scholars of warfare, both historical and contemporary, Lawrence Freedman has also played an important role in policymaking, serving as an official historian of both the Falklands War and on the UK inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War. Since the publication of his best-selling Strategy in 2013, Freedman has continued to explore many of the themes he raised in the book while commenting on ongoing conflicts.On Strategists and Strategy combines the best of Freedman's many essays from the past ten years on warfare and foreign policy, alongside more personal pieces on the scholars who influenced him and his own life trajectory. The range of his interests is demonstrated in this lively and engaging collection of essays. They cover a wide range of topics, including Vladimir Putin's strategic fanaticism; arguments on why we don't take tactics seriously enough and why "stalemate" is used incorrectly as a metaphor for deadlock in war; considerations of the dilemmas of nuclear deterrence; and what Covid tells us about crisis management. The material on his own life is richly contextual, attuned to the broader historical trends and social forces in 1960s and 1970s Britain that shaped his experiences.This volume not only provides a broad-ranging sampling of Freedman's most representative work, but also offers a unique window into a half century of world history.

This wide-ranging collection covers many topics of interest in the related fields of military history and strategic studies. The contributors are all distinguished scholars, whose depth of research and variety of approach combine to produce a rewarding book and a substantive contribution to knowledge. Their common theme is the exploration of the relationships between strategic planning, the conduct of war, and high politics.The volume is dedicated to Sir Michael Howard, formerly Regius Professor of History in the University of Oxford. The broad scope of the work reflects the nature of Sir Michael's scholarship over a long and distinguished career.

For three decades the analysis of strategic coercion has been dominated by two landmark books: Tom Schelling's Arms and Influence and Alex George's Strategic Diplomacy, both of which addressed the requirements of American foreign policy during the cold war. This book argues for a reappraisal of the role of strategic coercion - defined as the deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another's strategic choices. It emphasizes the importance of drawing on the experiences of countries other than the United States, and of considering the new circumstances of the post cold war world. An international team of scholars, led by Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at King's College, London, provides critical commentaries on the work of Schelling and George and a series of fascinating case studies. These cover most regions of the world, a variety of different actors - including terrorist groups - and different forms of coercion - including the use of economic sanctions.

In Strategy: A History, Sir Lawrence Freedman, one of the world's leading authorities on war and international politics, captures the vast history of strategic thinking, in a consistently engaging and insightful account of how strategy came to pervade every aspect of our lives. The range of Freedman's narrative is extraordinary, moving from the surprisingly advanced strategy practiced in primate groups, to the opposing strategies of Achilles and Odysseus in The Iliad, the strategic advice of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, the great military innovations of Baron Henri de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, the grounding of revolutionary strategy in class struggles by Marx, the insights into corporate strategy found in Peter Drucker and Alfred Sloan, and the contributions of the leading social scientists working on strategy today. The core issue at the heart of strategy, the author notes, is whether it is possible to manipulate and shape our environment rather than simply become the victim of forces beyond one's control. Time and again, Freedman demonstrates that the inherent unpredictability of this environment-subject to chance events, the efforts of opponents, the missteps of friends-provides strategy with its challenge and its drama. Armies or corporations or nations rarely move from one predictable state of affairs to another, but instead feel their way through a series of states, each one not quite what was anticipated, requiring a reappraisal of the original strategy, including its ultimate objective. Thus the picture of strategy that emerges in this book is one that is fluid and flexible, governed by the starting point, not the end point. A brilliant overview of the most prominent strategic theories in history, from David's use of deception against Goliath, to the modern use of game theory in economics, this masterful volume sums up a lifetime of reflection on strategy.

'...Lawrence Freedman has provided a masterly account of the evolution of nuclear strategic thought which is steeped in scholarship, elegantly written, and comprehensive in scope.' Edward M.Spiers, Times Higher Education Supplement

This study attempts to bring the debate about nuclear weapons and arms control up to date by assessing the reasons for the recent superpower agreement, the decline of the peace movements, the new threats to international stability and the prospects for further detente. The optimism of the first edition about an eventual return to arms control has been vindicated by events, but its pessimism about the deeply-rooted nature of superpower confrontation remains and the assessment is retained that the nuclear knot remains firmly tied.

Originally published in 1986, although the pace of arms control negotiations has been stepped up, there is still little sign of agreement. In this paper the author examines the current negotiating effort, with particular emphasis on its implications for European security. He provides an up-to-date analysis of the superpower discussions on nuclear arms control, including the impact of ‘star wars’, and also of the talks at Vienna on conventional force reductions and at Stockholm on confidence-building measures. He notes a shift in emphasis from ‘parity’ to ‘transparency’ in Western proposals, and questions whether this promises greater results than were achieved from earlier approaches. He also warns of the risks of arms control arrangements obstructing possibilities for reforming the European security system.

Originally published in 1986, although the pace of arms control negotiations has been stepped up, there is still little sign of agreement. In this paper the author examines the current negotiating effort, with particular emphasis on its implications for European security. He provides an up-to-date analysis of the superpower discussions on nuclear arms control, including the impact of ‘star wars’, and also of the talks at Vienna on conventional force reductions and at Stockholm on confidence-building measures. He notes a shift in emphasis from ‘parity’ to ‘transparency’ in Western proposals, and questions whether this promises greater results than were achieved from earlier approaches. He also warns of the risks of arms control arrangements obstructing possibilities for reforming the European security system.

This book analyzes the strategic implications of the shift in focus for the US Armed Forces from regular to irregular war. Lawrence Freedman closely examines the difficulty the US Armed Forces face in shifting their focus from preparing for regular wars, in which combat is separated from civil society, to irregular wars, in which combat is integrated with civil society. He argues that the political context of contemporary irregular wars requires that the purpose and practice of western forces be governed by liberal values, showing that this is also the case with regular wars, to the extent they occur, but it is the integration with civil society that makes the application of liberal values so challenging. The Transformation of Strategic Affairs suggests that this challenge becomes easier to meet when military operations are understood to contribute to the development of a compelling narrative about the likely course and consequence of a conflict, in which these values are shown to be respected. At the same time, however, while it is vital that the employment of armed force remains sensitive at all times to the underlying political context, and sensitive to the role of narratives in shaping this context, the book shows that a key test of success will always be the defeat of the opposing forces. The ‘war on terror’ has highlighted these issues, and this Adelphi Paper concludes with much-needed suggestions for a strategic response.This book will be of great interest to students of the US Armed Forces, politics, strategic studies and military history.

In the second volume of his official history of the Falklands Campaign, Lawrence Freedman provides a detailed and authoritative account of one of the most extraordinary periods in recent British political history and a vivid portrayal of a government at war.After the shock of the Argentine invasion of the Falklands in April 1982, Margaret Thatcher faced the crisis that came to define her premiership as she determined to recover the islands. The book covers all aspects of the campaign - economic and diplomatic as well as military - demonstrating the extent of the gamble that the government took. There are important accounts of the tensions in relations with the United States, concerns among the military commanders about the risks they were expected to take, the problems of dealing with the media and the attempts to reach a negotiated settlement. This definitive account describes in dramatic detail events such as the sinking of the Belgrano, the Battle of Goose Green and the final push to Stanley. Special attention is also paid to the aftermath of the war, including the various enquiries, and the eventual restoration of diplomatic relations with Argentina.This paperback edition has been updated, corrected and contains some new material.

Drawing on a vast range of previously classified government archives as well as interviews with key participants, this first volume of the official history of the Falklands Campaign is the most authoritative account of the origins of the 1982 war. In the first chapters the author analyses the long history of the dispute between Argentina and Britain over the sovereignty of the Islands, the difficulties faced by successive governments in finding a way to reconcile the opposed interests of the Argentines and the islanders, and the constant struggle to keep the Islands viable. He subsequently gives a complete account of how what started as an apparently trivial incident over an illegal landing by scrap-metal merchants on the island of South Georgia turned into a major crisis. Thanks to his access to classified material, Sir Lawrence Freedman has been able to produce a detailed and authoritative analysis which extends the coverage given by the Franks Committee Report of 1983. This volume is ultimately an extremely readable account of these events, charting the growing realisation within the British government of the seriousness of the situation, culminating in the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands at the start of April 1982.

This book, originally published in 1991, discusses how Britain found itself in a radically different world in the 1990s. The events of the closing months of the 1980s in Eastern Europe, and the move towards an economically and politically integrated Western Europe, have heralded a distinct stage in international relations. In this book, leading academics in the fields of political economy, foreign policy analysis, defence studies and political theory offer alternative approaches to the study of British foreign policy. Each contributor surveys relevant literature of his/her topic and then considers the major questions that any analysis of Britain in the world in the 1990s must face. This book examines the study of 1990s Britain in world politics and the academic perspectives that bear upon it. Its multidisciplinary approach will ensure it is read by all students and specialists interested in the recent history of British, European and international politics.

Drawing on a vast range of previously classified government archives as well as interviews with key participants, this first volume of the official history of the Falklands Campaign is the most authoritative account of the origins of the 1982 war. In the first chapters the author analyzes the long history of the dispute between Argentina and Britain over the sovereignty of the Islands, the difficulties faced by successive governments in finding a way to reconcile the opposed interests of the Argentines and the islanders, and the constant struggle to keep the Islands viable. He subsequently gives a complete account of how what started as an apparently trivial incident over an illegal landing by scrap-metal merchants on the island of South Georgia turned into a major crisis. Thanks to his access to classified material, Lawrence Freedman has been able to produce a detailed and authoritative analysis which extends the coverage given by the Franks Committee Report of 1983. This volume is ultimately an extremely readable account of these events, charting the growing realization within the British government of the seriousness of the situation, culminating in the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands at the start of April 1982.