Jonathan Bailey – författare

Great Power Strategy in Asia, 1905-2005 analyzes the enduring themes underlying the strategic struggles in East Asia, beginning with the crucial event of the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War. Jonathan Bailey clearly shows why military history is highly relevant in understanding today’s strategic problems, and how the most important areas of current affairs have their roots in often forgotten corners of military history. He makes his powerful case in three clear sections: an analysis of the explosive factors that led to war between Russia and Japan in 1904, presenting a ten-year perspective of the War, focusing on its consequences: cultural shock in ‘the West’, re-alignment of Asian imperial geography and the failure to learn vital military lessons, as World War I approached a thirty-five year perspective of the war, showing why Japan repeated the essential strategic, operational and tactical ploys of its war against Russia in 1904 in its strike upon the USA in 1941. Allied victory assured the downfall of Europe’s empires in Asia, with the USA inheriting much of the old imperial legacya centennial view of the Russo-Japanese War, which demonstrates that many of the broader issues identifiable in 1904-05 remain at the heart of today’s strategic discourse: Western apprehension about the economic rise of Japan; the anomalies of an ‘American Empire’; tensions between Occident and Orient; the apparent new relevance of geopolitics; and the importance of demography in perceptions of global power. This book is multidisciplinary, emphasizing the linkages between imperial power-politics, military operations, cultural conflict and commercial rivalry. It is also the story of military innovation, the pathology of learning lessons from the experience of war, and the anticipated rise of Asian, or more specifically Chinese, power a century after the false dawn of the Japanese victory in 1905.This book will be of great interest to all students of the Russo-Japanese War, Asian security, and of military and strategic studies.

Great Power Strategy in Asia, 1905-2005 analyzes the enduring themes underlying the strategic struggles in East Asia, beginning with the crucial event of the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War. Jonathan Bailey clearly shows why military history is highly relevant in understanding today’s strategic problems, and how the most important areas of current affairs have their roots in often forgotten corners of military history. He makes his powerful case in three clear sections: an analysis of the explosive factors that led to war between Russia and Japan in 1904, presenting a ten-year perspective of the War, focusing on its consequences: cultural shock in ‘the West’, re-alignment of Asian imperial geography and the failure to learn vital military lessons, as World War I approached a thirty-five year perspective of the war, showing why Japan repeated the essential strategic, operational and tactical ploys of its war against Russia in 1904 in its strike upon the USA in 1941. Allied victory assured the downfall of Europe’s empires in Asia, with the USA inheriting much of the old imperial legacya centennial view of the Russo-Japanese War, which demonstrates that many of the broader issues identifiable in 1904-05 remain at the heart of today’s strategic discourse: Western apprehension about the economic rise of Japan; the anomalies of an ‘American Empire’; tensions between Occident and Orient; the apparent new relevance of geopolitics; and the importance of demography in perceptions of global power. This book is multidisciplinary, emphasizing the linkages between imperial power-politics, military operations, cultural conflict and commercial rivalry. It is also the story of military innovation, the pathology of learning lessons from the experience of war, and the anticipated rise of Asian, or more specifically Chinese, power a century after the false dawn of the Japanese victory in 1905.This book will be of great interest to all students of the Russo-Japanese War, Asian security, and of military and strategic studies.

British Generals in Blair's Wars is based on a series of high profile seminars held in Oxford in which senior British officers, predominantly from the army, reflect on their experience of campaigning. The chapters embrace all the UK's major operations since the end of the Cold War, but they focus particularly on Iraq and Afghanistan. As personal testimonies, they capture the immediacy of the authors' thoughts at the time, and show how the ideas of a generation of senior British officers developed in a period of rapid change, against a background of intense political controversy and some popular unease. The armed forces were struggling to revise their Cold War concepts and doctrines, and to find the best ways to meet the demands placed upon them by their political leaders in what was seen to be a 'New World Order'. It was a time when relations between the Government of the day and the armed services came under close scrutiny, and when the affection of the British public for its forces seemed to grow with the difficulty of their operational tasks. This is a truly unique and invaluable book. For the first time, we are offered first-hand testimony about Britain's involvement in recent campaigns by senior participants. In addition to touching on themes like civilian-military relations, the operational direction of war and relationships with allies, these eyewitness accounts give a real sense of how the character of a war changes even as it is being fought. It will be essential reading for those in military academies and staff colleges, not only in Britain but throughout NATO, and especially in the USA. It also has profound policy implications, as both the UK and NATO more generally reassess their strategies and the value of intervention operations. It will also become a primary source for historians and students of the wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular.

British Generals in Blair's Wars is based on a series of high profile seminars held in Oxford in which senior British officers, predominantly from the army, reflect on their experience of campaigning. The chapters embrace all the UK's major operations since the end of the Cold War, but they focus particularly on Iraq and Afghanistan. As personal testimonies, they capture the immediacy of the authors' thoughts at the time, and show how the ideas of a generation of senior British officers developed in a period of rapid change, against a background of intense political controversy and some popular unease. The armed forces were struggling to revise their Cold War concepts and doctrines, and to find the best ways to meet the demands placed upon them by their political leaders in what was seen to be a 'New World Order'. It was a time when relations between the Government of the day and the armed services came under close scrutiny, and when the affection of the British public for its forces seemed to grow with the difficulty of their operational tasks. This is a truly unique and invaluable book. For the first time, we are offered first-hand testimony about Britain's involvement in recent campaigns by senior participants. In addition to touching on themes like civilian-military relations, the operational direction of war and relationships with allies, these eyewitness accounts give a real sense of how the character of a war changes even as it is being fought. It will be essential reading for those in military academies and staff colleges, not only in Britain but throughout NATO, and especially in the USA. It also has profound policy implications, as both the UK and NATO more generally reassess their strategies and the value of intervention operations. It will also become a primary source for historians and students of the wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular.