Juliette Kennedy – författare

The logician Kurt Gödel (1906-1978) published a paper in 1931 formulating what have come to be known as his 'incompleteness theorems', which prove, among other things, that within any formal system with resources sufficient to code arithmetic, questions exist which are neither provable nor disprovable on the basis of the axioms which define the system. These are among the most celebrated results in logic today. In this volume, leading philosophers and mathematicians assess important aspects of Gödel's work on the foundations and philosophy of mathematics. Their essays explore almost every aspect of Godel's intellectual legacy including his concepts of intuition and analyticity, the Completeness Theorem, the set-theoretic multiverse, and the state of mathematical logic today. This groundbreaking volume will be invaluable to students, historians, logicians and philosophers of mathematics who wish to understand the current thinking on these issues.

This collection of papers from various areas of mathematical logic showcases the remarkable breadth and richness of the field. Leading authors reveal how contemporary technical results touch upon foundational questions about the nature of mathematics. Highlights of the volume include: a history of Tennenbaum's theorem in arithmetic; a number of papers on Tennenbaum phenomena in weak arithmetics as well as on other aspects of arithmetics, such as interpretability; the transcript of Gödel's previously unpublished 1972-1975 conversations with Sue Toledo, along with an appreciation of the same by Curtis Franks; Hugh Woodin's paper arguing against the generic multiverse view; Anne Troelstra's history of intuitionism through 1991; and Aki Kanamori's history of the Suslin problem in set theory. The book provides a historical and philosophical treatment of particular theorems in arithmetic and set theory, and is ideal for researchers and graduate students in mathematical logic and philosophy of mathematics.

Is mathematics 'entangled' with its various formalisations? Or are the central concepts of mathematics largely insensitive to formalisation, or 'formalism free'? What is the semantic point of view and how is it implemented in foundational practice? Does a given semantic framework always have an implicit syntax? Inspired by what she calls the 'natural language moves' of Gödel and Tarski, Juliette Kennedy considers what roles the concepts of 'entanglement' and 'formalism freeness' play in a range of logical settings, from computability and set theory to model theory and second order logic, to logicality, developing an entirely original philosophy of mathematics along the way. The treatment is historically, logically and set-theoretically rich, and topics such as naturalism and foundations receive their due, but now with a new twist.

Is mathematics 'entangled' with its various formalisations? Or are the central concepts of mathematics largely insensitive to formalisation, or 'formalism free'? What is the semantic point of view and how is it implemented in foundational practice? Does a given semantic framework always have an implicit syntax? Inspired by what she calls the 'natural language moves' of Gödel and Tarski, Juliette Kennedy considers what roles the concepts of 'entanglement' and 'formalism freeness' play in a range of logical settings, from computability and set theory to model theory and second order logic, to logicality, developing an entirely original philosophy of mathematics along the way. The treatment is historically, logically and set-theoretically rich, and topics such as naturalism and foundations receive their due, but now with a new twist.

This Element takes a deep dive into Gödel's 1931 paper giving the first presentation of the Incompleteness Theorems, opening up completely passages in it that might possibly puzzle the student, such as the mysterious footnote 48a. It considers the main ingredients of Gödel's proof: arithmetization, strong representability, and the Fixed Point Theorem in a layered fashion, returning to their various aspects: semantic, syntactic, computational, philosophical and mathematical, as the topic arises. It samples some of the most important proofs of the Incompleteness Theorems, e.g. due to Kuratowski, Smullyan and Robinson, as well as newer proofs, also of other independent statements, due to H. Friedman, Weiermann and Paris-Harrington. It examines the question whether the incompleteness of e.g. Peano Arithmetic gives immediately the undecidability of the Entscheidungsproblem, as Kripke has recently argued. It considers set-theoretical incompleteness, and finally considers some of the philosophical consequences considered in the literature.

The logician Kurt Gödel (1906-1978) published a paper in 1931 formulating what have come to be known as his 'incompleteness theorems', which prove, among other things, that within any formal system with resources sufficient to code arithmetic, questions exist which are neither provable nor disprovable on the basis of the axioms which define the system. These are among the most celebrated results in logic today. In this volume, leading philosophers and mathematicians assess important aspects of Gödel's work on the foundations and philosophy of mathematics. Their essays explore almost every aspect of Godel's intellectual legacy including his concepts of intuition and analyticity, the Completeness Theorem, the set-theoretic multiverse, and the state of mathematical logic today. This groundbreaking volume will be invaluable to students, historians, logicians and philosophers of mathematics who wish to understand the current thinking on these issues.

This volume features more than 20 essays that explore the work of one of the most important contemporary philosophers of mathematics. It will help readers to better appreciate this significant and prolific philosopher. Within philosophy of mathematics, Penelope Maddy initially advocated realism. She then went on to advance naturalism. Both of her positions became very influential in the field, along with her other work in the philosophy of logic. The contributors comment on and otherwise engage with Maddy’s work. They also weigh in on the state of set theory and its philosophy, the philosophy and history of logic, naturalism, skepticism, and the myriad other areas to which Maddy left her mark. Overall, coverage traces her influence on these various ideas over the years. It will also help readers to better understand how philosophers working at the forefront of these areas see these concepts today.These essays will be essential reading for the wide group of philosophers working in these different areas as well as graduate students studying philosophy of mathematics and logic and the other related issues to which Maddy has contributed. The volume will also appeal to logicians and set theorists in general, as well as to philosophers working in analytic philosophy more widely, as well as to those working in the history of philosophy.

This volume features more than 20 essays that explore the work of one of the most important contemporary philosophers of mathematics. It will help readers to better appreciate this significant and prolific philosopher. Within philosophy of mathematics, Penelope Maddy initially advocated realism. She then went on to advance naturalism. Both of her positions became very influential in the field, along with her other work in the philosophy of logic. The contributors comment on and otherwise engage with Maddy’s work. They also weigh in on the state of set theory and its philosophy, the philosophy and history of logic, naturalism, skepticism, and the myriad other areas to which Maddy left her mark. Overall, coverage traces her influence on these various ideas over the years. It will also help readers to better understand how philosophers working at the forefront of these areas see these concepts today.These essays will be essential reading for the wide group of philosophers working in these different areas as well as graduate students studying philosophy of mathematics and logic and the other related issues to which Maddy has contributed. The volume will also appeal to logicians and set theorists in general, as well as to philosophers working in analytic philosophy more widely, as well as to those working in the history of philosophy.