Jürgen Mittelstraß – författare

Leibniz und Kant gehören zu den großen Begründern der neuzeitlichen Philosophie. In ihrem Werk erfindet sich die Philosophie neu und spiegelt sich die neuzeitliche wissenschaftliche Entwicklung nicht nur in ihren inhaltlichen Einsichten, sondern auch in ihrem methodischen und erkenntnistheoretischen Bewusstsein. Zudem haben ihre Konzeptionen im Denken der Philosophie ihre Aktualität nicht verloren. Leibniz steht für eine historisch beispiellose Verbindung zwischen (methodischer und spekulativer) Philosophie und (exakter) Wissenschaft, Kant für eine beispiellose erkenntnistheoretische Analyse philosophischer und wissenschaftlicher Fundamente. In dieser Hinsicht sind beide Teil auch moderner wissenschaftstheoretischer und erkenntnistheoretischer Reflexionen. Der Band enthält Analysen zentraler Teile der Werke beider Philosophen und setzt sie in theoretischer Weise miteinander in Beziehung. Er fasst zum Teil ältere, zum Teil neuere Arbeiten unter einer systematischen Perspektive zusammen.

Science is knowledge gained and justified methodically. It is achieved by research and theory formation. But what is a methodical procedure and what are methodically established justifications? What kind of principles must be observed in order to obtain the degree of objectivity that is generally claimed by science? What is the relation between science in the research mode and science in presentation mode, i.e., in its theoretical form? Do the same principles hold here? And how are they justified? Is it even possible to speak of justification in a theoretical sense? Or do we have to be content with less – with corroboration and confirmation? Is the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification the last word in methodical and theoretical matters? And how does this distinction relate to that between research and presentation – the constitution of (scientific) objects on the one hand and (theoretical) propositions about them on the other?

The analyses and constructions in this book take up these questions. They are explicitly intended as philosophical contributions, not only in the sense implied by the disciplinary use of the term philosophy of science, but also in the sense of a reflection on science that, alongside more technical aspects of methodologies and elements of theories, also has an eye for anthropological and cultural aspects.

Science is knowledge gained and justified methodically. It is achieved by research and theory formation. But what is a methodical procedure and what are methodically established justifications? What kind of principles must be observed in order to obtain the degree of objectivity that is generally claimed by science? What is the relation between science in the research mode and science in presentation mode, i.e., in its theoretical form? Do the same principles hold here? And how are they justified? Is it even possible to speak of justification in a theoretical sense? Or do we have to be content with less – with corroboration and confirmation? Is the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification the last word in methodical and theoretical matters? And how does this distinction relate to that between research and presentation – the constitution of (scientific) objects on the one hand and (theoretical) propositions about them on the other?

The analyses and constructions in this book take up these questions. They are explicitly intended as philosophical contributions, not only in the sense implied by the disciplinary use of the term philosophy of science, but also in the sense of a reflection on science that, alongside more technical aspects of methodologies and elements of theories, also has an eye for anthropological and cultural aspects.