Kjell Hausken – författare

This volume empirically analyzes the effects of quantitative easing (QE) on interest rates and the economy in the US, Japan, UK and Europe. Using an event-study methodology, the authors find that the measures undertaken by the Federal Reserve and Bank of England, which focus primarily on bond purchases, are much more effective in lowering interest rates than those undertaken by the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank, which have relied more heavily on lending to private financial institutions. Using large Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) models they also analyze the impact of QE on the wider economy. They produce no-QE counterfactual forecasts that are compared with their corresponding baseline forecasts, incorporating the effects of QE on government bond spreads. Despite the failure of stimulating economic activities as a whole, the simulation results suggest that the unconventional monetary policies have a positive influence on industrial production in the US, UK and Japan. The authors’ analysis finds that QE contributes to the reduction in unemployment in the US and Japan, and a rise in inflation-expectations in the US, UK and Euro zone. However, evidence on QE’s effect on house prices, stock prices, consumer confidence, and exchange rate, is mixed and thus inconclusive.

Maximizing reader insights into the interactions between game theory, excessive crowding and safety and security elements, this book establishes a new research angle by illustrating linkages between different research approaches and through laying the foundations for subsequent analysis. Congestion (excessive crowding) is defined in this work as all kinds of flows; e.g., road/sea/air traffic, people, data, information, water, electricity, and organisms. Analysing systems where congestion occurs  – which may be in parallel, series, interlinked, or interdependent, with flows one way or both ways – this book puts forward new congestion models, breaking new ground by introducing game theory and safety/security into proceedings.Addressing  the multiple actors who may hold different concerns regarding system reliability; e.g. one or several terrorists, a government, various local or regional government agencies, or others with stakes for or against system reliability, this book describes how governments and authorities may have the tools to handle congestion, but that these  tools need to be improved whilst additionally ensuring safety and security against various threats.This game-theoretic analysis sets this book apart from the current congestion literature and ensures that the book will be of use to postgraduates, researchers, 3rd/4th-year undergraduates, policy makers, and practitioners.

Maximizing reader insights into the roles of intelligent agents in networks, air traffic and emergency departments, this volume focuses on congestion in systems where safety and security are at stake, devoting special attention to applying game theoretic analysis of congestion to: protocols in wired and wireless networks; power generation, air transportation and emergency department overcrowding.Reviewing exhaustively the key recent research into the interactions between game theory, excessive crowding, and safety and security elements, this book establishes a new research angle by illustrating linkages between the different research approaches and serves to lay the foundations for subsequent analysis. Congestion (excessive crowding) is defined in this work as all kinds of flows; e.g., road/sea/air traffic, people, data, information, water, electricity, and organisms. Analysing systems where congestion occurs  – which may be in parallel, series, interlinked, or interdependent, with flows one way or both ways – this book puts forward new congestion models, breaking new ground by introducing game theory and safety/security into proceedings.Addressing  the multiple actors who may hold different concerns regarding system reliability; e.g. one or several terrorists, a government, various local or regional government agencies, or others with stakes for or against system reliability, this book describes how governments and authorities may have the tools to handle congestion, but that these  tools need to be improved whilst additionally ensuring safety and security against various threats.This game-theoretic analysis sets this two volume book apart from the current congestion literature and ensures that the work will be of use to postgraduates, researchers, 3rd/4th-year undergraduates, policy makers, and practitioners.