Marilyn J. Young – författare

This book traces the development and interaction between the propaganda efforts of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the 1983 Korean airliner downing; conspiracy theories put forward by Western observers are also investigated. The authors conclude that strategic and tactical miscalculations made by ideologically motivated American officials allowed the Soviet government to establish a plausible justification for the actions of its Air Defense Forces. This study concentrates on the political goals and strategies of the U.S. and Soviet governments as these evolved in the rhetoric that was put forth subsequent to the downing of KAL Flight 007. It is the only book that examines in detail the broadcasts of Voice of America and Radio Liberty, and Soviet statements in their domestic press, on radio, or on TV.

Post-Soviet Russia in the 1990s saw a surge in civic participation. The traditional power structure officially relinquished control of political rhetoric and a nascent civil society had begun to emerge. Free elections and political partisanship between reformist and conservative elements of Russian society, spurred on by Russia’s economic troubles, gave a “Wild West” tenor to public rhetoric that was reflected in the election campaigns of 1993, 1995, and 1996. In this volume, the authors examine, through a series of contemporaneously written essays, the arc of government rhetoric during the height of media freedom, the quest for a new national identity, and the struggle for self-government.

The essays in this book examine the arguments and rhetoric used by the United States and the USSR following two catastrophes that impacted both countries, as blame is cast and consequences are debated. In this environment, it was perhaps inevitable that conspiracy theories would arise, especially about the downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 over the Sea of Japan. Those theories are examined, resulting in at least one method for addressing conspiracy arguments. In the case of Chernobyl, the disaster ruptured the “social compact” between the Soviet government and the people; efforts to overcome the resulting disillusionment quickly became the focus of state efforts.

In Volume Three of this four-volume series, we examine the rhetorical development that occurred during the first two terms of Vladimir Putin’s tenure as president of the Russian Federation. Initially, Putin appeared to follow in the path set by his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, vowing that Russia was, at heart, a European nation and would be a westward facing democracy going forward. He even mentioned partnering with the EU and NATO. Eight years later, at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin excoriated the West for, in his words, attempting to create a “unipolar world” in which NATO expansion threatened Russia’s security, the United States acted as the world’s sole “hegemon,” and Europe simply followed orders, relinquishing any sense of agency in its own affairs.