Martin Paldam – författare

The state and its institutions are crucial for economic development: for better and for worse. This insight informs this important, up-to-date and authoritative survey of new trends in growth economics and the widely divergent economic performance of developing countries - for example, between Latin America and South-east Asia - which seemed to be similarly placed just a generation ago. The decisive role of the political dimension in economic growth seems clear but there are many challenges to be met in getting an analytical handle on the precise determinants and in testing empirically for this. This is the challenge taken up by the international team of contributors.

The culmination of a long-lasting and impressive research program, this book summarizes the relationship between economic development with income on the one hand and the evolution of institutions on the other; the transition of countries from one economic and social system to another. The author considers the transitions of two types of institutions: The first is external; it is legal-administrative systems with staff and buildings. The political system and the economic system are considered. The second consists of traditions and beliefs. Here corruption and religiosity are considered. Contrary to the claim that institutions are causal to development, this book demonstrates that the main direction of causality is from income to institutions. As countries get wealthy, they become secular democracies with low corruption and a mixed economic system. In this impressive coda, Paldam shows that the evolution of institutions is not causal to the economic growth process but rather follows it.

Denmark and Switzerland are small and successful countries with exceptionally content populations. However, they have very different political institutions and economic models. They have followed the general tendency in the West toward economic convergence, but both countries have managed to stay on top. They both have a strong liberal tradition, but otherwise their economic strategies are a welfare state model for Denmark and a safe haven model for Switzerland. The Danish welfare state is tax-based, while the expenditures for social welfare are insurance-based in Switzerland. The political institutions are a multiparty unicameral system in Denmark, and a permanent coalition system with many referenda and strong local government in Switzerland. Both approaches have managed to ensure smoothly working political power-sharing and economic systems that allocate resources in a fairly efficient way. To date, they have also managed to adapt the economies to changes in the external environment with a combination of stability and flexibility.