Matthew McGrath – författare

This book features original essays on knowledge and rationality as related to the work of Stewart Cohen. This is the first volume dedicated to Cohen, one of the most influential epistemologists of the last several decades.

Stewart Cohen is responsible for introducing the New Evil Demon problem, the problem of easy knowledge, and epistemic contextualism. Any one of these contributions is sufficient by itself to establish a lasting philosophical legacy. The chapters in this book reflect Cohen’s legacy and address a variety of important topics related to his work, including the New Evil Demon problem, epistemic justification, epistemic contextualism, pragmatic and moral encroachment, epistemic obligations, skepticism, and the problem of easy knowledge. The book also includes a complete bibliography of Cohen’s works.

Knowledge and Rationality is an essential resource for scholars and advanced students in epistemology with an interest in engaging with Stewart Cohen’s philosophy.

This book features original essays on knowledge and rationality as related to the work of Stewart Cohen. This is the first volume dedicated to Cohen, one of the most influential epistemologists of the last several decades.

Stewart Cohen is responsible for introducing the New Evil Demon problem, the problem of easy knowledge, and epistemic contextualism. Any one of these contributions is sufficient by itself to establish a lasting philosophical legacy. The chapters in this book reflect Cohen’s legacy and address a variety of important topics related to his work, including the New Evil Demon problem, epistemic justification, epistemic contextualism, pragmatic and moral encroachment, epistemic obligations, skepticism, and the problem of easy knowledge. The book also includes a complete bibliography of Cohen’s works.

Knowledge and Rationality is an essential resource for scholars and advanced students in epistemology with an interest in engaging with Stewart Cohen’s philosophy.

A rigorous, authoritative new anthology which brings together some of the most significant contemporary scholarship on the theory of knowledge

Carefully-calibrated and judiciously-curated, this strong and contemporary new anthology builds upon Epistemology: An Anthology, Second Edition (Wiley Blackwell, 2008) by drawing a concise and well-balanced selection of higher-level readings from a large, diverse, and evolving body of research.

A rigorous, authoritative new anthology which brings together some of the most significant contemporary scholarship on the theory of knowledge

Carefully-calibrated and judiciously-curated, this strong and contemporary new anthology builds upon Epistemology: An Anthology, Second Edition (Wiley Blackwell, 2008) by drawing a concise and well-balanced selection of higher-level readings from a large, diverse, and evolving body of research.

According to philosophical lore, epistemological orthodoxy is a purist epistemology in which epistemic concepts such as belief, evidence, and knowledge are characterized to be pure and free from practical concerns. In recent years, the debate has focused narrowly on the concept of knowledge and a number of challenges have been posed against the orthodox, purist view of knowledge. While the debate about knowledge is still a lively one, the pragmatic exploration in epistemology has just begun.

This collection takes on the task of expanding this exploration into new areas. It discusses how the practical might encroach on all areas of our epistemic lives from the way we think about belief, confidence, probability, and evidence to our ideas about epistemic value and excellence. The contributors also delve into the ramifications of pragmatic views in epistemology for questions about the value of knowledge and its practical role. Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology will be of interest to a broad range of epistemologists, as well as scholars working on virtue theory and practical reason.

According to philosophical lore, epistemological orthodoxy is a purist epistemology in which epistemic concepts such as belief, evidence, and knowledge are characterized to be pure and free from practical concerns. In recent years, the debate has focused narrowly on the concept of knowledge and a number of challenges have been posed against the orthodox, purist view of knowledge. While the debate about knowledge is still a lively one, the pragmatic exploration in epistemology has just begun.

This collection takes on the task of expanding this exploration into new areas. It discusses how the practical might encroach on all areas of our epistemic lives from the way we think about belief, confidence, probability, and evidence to our ideas about epistemic value and excellence. The contributors also delve into the ramifications of pragmatic views in epistemology for questions about the value of knowledge and its practical role. Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology will be of interest to a broad range of epistemologists, as well as scholars working on virtue theory and practical reason.