Jeremy Fantl is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calgary and has published papers and books in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and metaethics. His most recent book is The Limitations of the Open Mind.Matthew McGrath is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and Professorial Fellow at the Arché Institute at the University of St. Andrews. He has published papers in epistemology and metaphysics, including Knowledge in an Uncertain World (2009).Ernest Sosa is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He has published in epistemology and metaphysics, including, most recently, Judgment and Agency (2015) and Epistemology (2017).

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• Preface viiPart I The Ethics of Belief 11 Deontological Desiderata 3William Alston2 Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation 17Richard FeldmanPart II Practical Reasons for Belief ? 293 The Wrong Kind of Reason 31Pamela Hieronymi4 No Exception for Belief 44Susanna Rinard5 Promising Against the Evidence 58Berislav MarušicPart III Reliance 756 Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief 77Dorit Ganson7 Alief and Belief 91Tamar Gendler8 Can It Be Rational to Have Faith? 110Lara Buchak9 Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards? 126Jessica BrownPart IV Epistemic Dysfunctions 14710 Testimonial Injustice 149Miranda Fricker11 Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification 164Susanna SiegelPart V Virtue Epistemology 17912 The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good 181Linda Zagzebski13 Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know 192Jennifer Lackey14 A (Different) Virtue Epistemology 205John Greco15 Knowledge and Justification 220Ernest SosaPart VI Disagreement 22916 Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News 231David Christensen17 The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement 249Thomas KellyPart VII Permissivism About Belief ? 26518 Epistemic Permissiveness 267Roger White19 Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief 277Miriam SchoenfieldIndex 296

Jeremy Fantl is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calgary and has published papers and books in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and metaethics. His most recent book is The Limitations of the Open Mind.Matthew McGrath is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University and Professorial Fellow at the Arché Institute at the University of St. Andrews. He has published papers in epistemology and metaphysics, including Knowledge in an Uncertain World (2009).Ernest Sosa is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. He has published in epistemology and metaphysics, including, most recently, Judgment and Agency (2015) and Epistemology (2017).

Select Guide Rating

• Preface viiPart I The Ethics of Belief 11 Deontological Desiderata 3William Alston2 Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation 17Richard FeldmanPart II Practical Reasons for Belief ? 293 The Wrong Kind of Reason 31Pamela Hieronymi4 No Exception for Belief 44Susanna Rinard5 Promising Against the Evidence 58Berislav MarušicPart III Reliance 756 Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief 77Dorit Ganson7 Alief and Belief 91Tamar Gendler8 Can It Be Rational to Have Faith? 110Lara Buchak9 Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards? 126Jessica BrownPart IV Epistemic Dysfunctions 14710 Testimonial Injustice 149Miranda Fricker11 Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification 164Susanna SiegelPart V Virtue Epistemology 17912 The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good 181Linda Zagzebski13 Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know 192Jennifer Lackey14 A (Different) Virtue Epistemology 205John Greco15 Knowledge and Justification 220Ernest SosaPart VI Disagreement 22916 Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News 231David Christensen17 The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement 249Thomas KellyPart VII Permissivism About Belief ? 26518 Epistemic Permissiveness 267Roger White19 Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief 277Miriam SchoenfieldIndex 296