Michael J Nelson – författare

Downsized from his day job with a publisher of obscure journals, Pontius Foeb, the aging author of inaccessible non-fiction books, is desperate for a commercial hit and comes up with a horror tale about a giant rat that terrorized a Minnesota hamlet in the nineteenth century.

Why do some people retain cute baby-talk names for their relatives (like "Num-Num" and "Pee-Paw") well into middle age? How should a reasonable person respond when Olivia Newton-John sings, "Have you never been mellow?" Who''s responsible for the sorry state of men''s fashion, and is it the same guy who invented the jerkin? Is there any future in being a Midwesterner? Can you really enjoy your lunch when the restaurant is decorated to look like an African plain? How come women keep dozens of bottles and jars of moisturizers, unguents, and lotions around -- all of them half empty?In more than 50 hilarious all-new essays, one of America''s brightest young humorists -- the head writer and on-air host of the legendary TV series Mystery Science Theater 3000 -- finds the fun in all aspects of the human condition, no matter how absurd. Join Mike Nelson on an angst-filled visit to a health spa; shopping sessions at Home Depot and Radio Shack; adventures in the very amateur musical theater; a gut-busting discourse on the history of television; ruminations on his roles as husband, father, and citizen; and much, much more.

Federal prosecutors have immense power and discretion to decide when to bring criminal charges, what plea bargains to offer, and how to implement the federal government's legal priorities in their districts. While U.S. Attorneys take pains to emphasize their independence, we know relatively little about the extent to which politics colors federal prosecutorial staffing and decision making. The Politics of Federal Prosecution draws upon a wealth of data from 1990s to the present to examine the interplay of political factors and federal prosecution. First, the authors find that congressional and presidential politics affect who becomes federal prosecutors and how long those individuals serve. Second, the book demonstrates that signals of presidential and congressional preferences, along with local priorities, affect key prosecutorial decisions: whether to bring prosecutions, how to approach plea bargaining negotiations, and when to utilize criminal asset forfeiture to cripple criminal activities. In short, the book demonstrates that politics affects the behavior of U.S. Attorneys at nearly every stage of their service.

Federal prosecutors have immense power and discretion to decide when to bring criminal charges, what plea bargains to offer, and how to implement the federal government''s legal priorities in their districts. While U.S. Attorneys take pains to emphasize their independence, we know relatively little about the extent to which politics colors federal prosecutorial staffing and decision making. The Politics of Federal Prosecution draws upon a wealth of data from 1990s to the present to examine the interplay of political factors and federal prosecution. First, the authors find that congressional and presidential politics affect who becomes federal prosecutors and how long those individuals serve. Second, the book demonstrates that signals of presidential and congressional preferences, along with local priorities, affect key prosecutorial decisions: whether to bring prosecutions, how to approach plea bargaining negotiations, and when to utilize criminal asset forfeiture to cripple criminal activities. In short, the book demonstrates that politics affects the behavior of U.S. Attorneys at nearly every stage of their service.

Federal prosecutors have immense power and discretion to decide when to bring criminal charges, what plea bargains to offer, and how to implement the federal government''s legal priorities in their districts. While U.S. Attorneys take pains to emphasize their independence, we know relatively little about the extent to which politics colors federal prosecutorial staffing and decision making. The Politics of Federal Prosecution draws upon a wealth of data from 1990s to the present to examine the interplay of political factors and federal prosecution. First, the authors find that congressional and presidential politics affect who becomes federal prosecutors and how long those individuals serve. Second, the book demonstrates that signals of presidential and congressional preferences, along with local priorities, affect key prosecutorial decisions: whether to bring prosecutions, how to approach plea bargaining negotiations, and when to utilize criminal asset forfeiture to cripple criminal activities. In short, the book demonstrates that politics affects the behavior of U.S. Attorneys at nearly every stage of their service.

Appellate judges wield enormous influence in the United States. Their decisions define the scope of legislative and executive power, adjudicate relationships between the federal government and the states, and determine the breadth of individuals' rights and liberties. But, compared to their colleagues on trial courts, they face a significant constraint on their power: their colleagues.The Elevator Effect: Contact and Collegiality in the American Judiciary presents a comprehensive, first of its kind examination of the importance of interpersonal relationships among judges for judicial decision-making and legal development. Regarding decision-making, the authors demonstrate that more frequent interpersonal contact among judges diminishes the role of ideology in judicial decision-making to the point where it is both substantively and statistically imperceptible. This finding stands in stark contrast to judicial decision-making accounts that present ideology as an unwavering determinant of judicial choice. With regard to legal development, the book shows that collegiality affects both the language that judges use to express their disagreement with one another and the precedents they choose to support their arguments. Thus, the overriding argument of The Elevator Effect is that collegiality affects nearly every aspect of judicial behavior. The authors draw on an impressive and unique original collection of data to untangle the relationship between judges' interpersonal relationships and the law they produce. The Elevator Effect presents a clear and highly readable narrative backed by analysis of judicial behavior throughout the U.S. federal judicial hierarchy to demonstrate that the institutional structure in which judges operate substantially tempers judicial behavior. Written in a broad and accessible style, this book will captivate students across a range of disciplines, such as law, political sciences, and empirical legal studies, and also policymakers and the public.

Appellate judges wield enormous influence in the United States. Their decisions define the scope of legislative and executive power, adjudicate relationships between the federal government and the states, and determine the breadth of individuals'' rights and liberties. But, compared to their colleagues on trial courts, they face a significant constraint on their power: their colleagues.The Elevator Effect: Contact and Collegiality in the American Judiciary presents a comprehensive, first of its kind examination of the importance of interpersonal relationships among judges for judicial decision-making and legal development. Regarding decision-making, the authors demonstrate that more frequent interpersonal contact among judges diminishes the role of ideology in judicial decision-making to the point where it is both substantively and statistically imperceptible. This finding stands in stark contrast to judicial decision-making accounts that present ideology as an unwavering determinant of judicial choice. With regard to legal development, the book shows that collegiality affects both the language that judges use to express their disagreement with one another and the precedents they choose to support their arguments. Thus, the overriding argument of The Elevator Effect is that collegiality affects nearly every aspect of judicial behavior. The authors draw on an impressive and unique original collection of data to untangle the relationship between judges'' interpersonal relationships and the law they produce. The Elevator Effect presents a clear and highly readable narrative backed by analysis of judicial behavior throughout the U.S. federal judicial hierarchy to demonstrate that the institutional structure in which judges operate substantially tempers judicial behavior. Written in a broad and accessible style, this book will captivate students across a range of disciplines, such as law, political sciences, and empirical legal studies, and also policymakers and the public.

Appellate judges wield enormous influence in the United States. Their decisions define the scope of legislative and executive power, adjudicate relationships between the federal government and the states, and determine the breadth of individuals'' rights and liberties. But, compared to their colleagues on trial courts, they face a significant constraint on their power: their colleagues.The Elevator Effect: Contact and Collegiality in the American Judiciary presents a comprehensive, first of its kind examination of the importance of interpersonal relationships among judges for judicial decision-making and legal development. Regarding decision-making, the authors demonstrate that more frequent interpersonal contact among judges diminishes the role of ideology in judicial decision-making to the point where it is both substantively and statistically imperceptible. This finding stands in stark contrast to judicial decision-making accounts that present ideology as an unwavering determinant of judicial choice. With regard to legal development, the book shows that collegiality affects both the language that judges use to express their disagreement with one another and the precedents they choose to support their arguments. Thus, the overriding argument of The Elevator Effect is that collegiality affects nearly every aspect of judicial behavior. The authors draw on an impressive and unique original collection of data to untangle the relationship between judges'' interpersonal relationships and the law they produce. The Elevator Effect presents a clear and highly readable narrative backed by analysis of judicial behavior throughout the U.S. federal judicial hierarchy to demonstrate that the institutional structure in which judges operate substantially tempers judicial behavior. Written in a broad and accessible style, this book will captivate students across a range of disciplines, such as law, political sciences, and empirical legal studies, and also policymakers and the public.

Over the past century, countries around the globe have empowered constitutional courts to safeguard the rule of law. But when can courts effectively perform this vital task? Drawing upon a series of survey experiments fielded in the United States, Germany, Hungary, and Poland, this book demonstrates that judicial independence is critical for judicial efficacy. Independent courts can empower citizens to punish executives who flout the bounds of constitutional rule; weak courts are unable to generate public costs for transgressing the law. Although judicial efficacy is neither universal nor automatic, courts - so long as they are viewed by the public as independent - can provide an effective check on executives and promote the rule of law.