Michael J. Oliver – författare

First published in 1997, this volume responds to the Conservative intention of conducting economic policy along monetarist lines after winning the General Election in May 1979. Michael J. Oliver argues that the monetarist strategy was rejected for several reasons during the 1980s, including the recession of the early 1980s, the change in attitude to the role of the exchange rate and disagreements between politicians and policy-makers. It is shown that the disputes between Chancellor Nigel Lawson, Lady Thatcher and her economic adviser, Sir Alan Walters, are central to explaining why macroeconomic policy-making evolved considerably from the mid-1980s.

This book is the first attempt by an economic historian to apply a social learning model to the post-1979 period. By adopting an inter-disciplinary approach, Oliver has made both an accessible addition to the debate on the conduct of economic policy since 1979 and a major contribution to the growing interest in social learning amongst social scientists.

First published in 1997, this volume responds to the Conservative intention of conducting economic policy along monetarist lines after winning the General Election in May 1979. Michael J. Oliver argues that the monetarist strategy was rejected for several reasons during the 1980s, including the recession of the early 1980s, the change in attitude to the role of the exchange rate and disagreements between politicians and policy-makers. It is shown that the disputes between Chancellor Nigel Lawson, Lady Thatcher and her economic adviser, Sir Alan Walters, are central to explaining why macroeconomic policy-making evolved considerably from the mid-1980s.

This book is the first attempt by an economic historian to apply a social learning model to the post-1979 period. By adopting an inter-disciplinary approach, Oliver has made both an accessible addition to the debate on the conduct of economic policy since 1979 and a major contribution to the growing interest in social learning amongst social scientists.

How do we define an economic disaster? A difficult question. Most centuries would claim that they have had their share of disasters, but the twentieth century certainly seems to have been more prone to them than the previous one. A number of leading economists and economic historians assemble here to examine nine key disasters with international or global implications.

The First and Second World Wars, the great depression, oil shocks, inflation, financial crises, stock market crashes, the collapse of the Soviet command economy and Third World disasters are discussed in this comprehensive book. The contributors subject these disasters to in-depth assessment, carefully considering their costs and impact on specific countries and regions, as well as assessing them in a global context. The book examines the legacy of economic disasters and asks whether economic disasters are avoidable or whether policymakers can learn from their mistakes.

The book will appeal to a wide variety of social scientists, including those working in economic history, international relations, international political economy and geopolitics.