Michael John Petry – författare

It could certainly be argued that the way in which Hegel criticizes Newton in the Dissertation, the Philosophy of Nature and the lectures on the History of Philosophy, has done more than anything else to prejudice his own reputation. At first sight, what we seem to have here is little more than the contrast between the tested accomplishments of the founding father of modern science, and the random remarks of a confused and somewhat disgruntled philosopher; and if we are persuaded to concede that it may perhaps be something more than this - between the work of a clearsighted mathematician and experimentalist, and the blind assertions of some sort of Kantian logician, blundering about among the facts of the real world. By and large, it was this clear-cut simplistic view of the matter which prevailed among Hegel's contemporaries, and which persisted until fairly recently. The modification and eventual transformation of it have come about gradually, over the past twenty or twenty-five years. The first full-scale commentary on the Philosophy of Nature was published in 1970, and gave rise to the realization that to some extent at least, the Hegelian criticism was directed against Newtonianism rather than the work of Newton himself, and that it tended to draw its inspiration from developments within the natural sciences, rather than from the exigencies imposed upon Hegel's thinking by a priori categorial relationships.

Linnaeus' mature theodicy, his attempt to reconcile the suffering and evil of the world with the omnipotence and goodness of God, is presented in a condensed form in the final editions of his Systema Naturae (1758/68). In this comprehensive compendium of our knowledge of the three great realms of organic nature, he outlines the significance of the sub-conscious, social awareness and theological orientation in the spiritual life of man, and indicates how fate, fortune, and Providence interrelate within his conception of the Deity. In the Nemesis Divina this general undertaking is developed into an `experimental theology', which is exactly analogous to Linnaeus' work in the natural sciences, in that it involves the collecting and classifying of concrete and carefully described case-studies. He never prepared the manuscript for publication, however, and for many years it was regarded as lost, and it is only very recently that any attempt has been made to publish it in its entirety. This is the first English translation of all the relevant manuscript material. It is also the first attempt to analyse the case-studies in the light of what we know of Linnaeus' general taxonomic principles, and to relate each of them to its historical context.

Die Frage, ob die beiden in dieser Ausgabe zweisprachig vorgelegten Texte tatsächlich von Spinoza stammen, ist in der Forschung heftig umstritten. Die in der Einleitung der Herausgeber vorgetragenen Argumente lassen es jedoch als sehr begründet erscheinen, daß beide Texte Spinoza zuzuschreiben sind.

Since the three volume edition ofHegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (1978, 19792) has been so well received, I have been encouraged to select that part of it most suitable for teaching purposes, and to publish it here as a separate work. As a teaching text, the Berlin Phenomenology has several important advan- tages. Unlike so many ofHegel's writings, must notably theJena Phenomeno- logy of 1807, it is concise and to the point, and concemed with issues already familiar to most students of philosophy. Since it consists for the most part of a searching and radical analysis of Kant's epistemology, Fichte's ethics and Schelling's system-building, it provides tirst-rate insight into Hegel's assessment of his immedi~te predecessors. When considered in context, as part of the Encyclopaedia if the Philosophical Sciences, it enables us to distinguish dearly between the systematic, the logical and the psychological aspects of Hegelianism, and is therefore also relevant to some of the central issues in modem phenomenology. It is to be hoped that the introduction and notes prepared for the present edition will prove helpful to both teachers and students.Every effort has been ma de to produce a thoroughly reliable ba sic text and an accurate translation. The text published in 1978 was prepared at the Hegel Archive in Bochum from photocopies, and I am most grateful to the Central Interfaculty of the Erasmus University, Rotterdam, for having made it possible for me to check the printed version against the original manuscripts.

Since the three volume edition ofHegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (1978, 19792) has been so well received, I have been encouraged to select that part of it most suitable for teaching purposes, and to publish it here as a separate work. As a teaching text, the Berlin Phenomenology has several important advan- tages. Unlike so many ofHegel's writings, must notably theJena Phenomeno- logy of 1807, it is concise and to the point, and concemed with issues already familiar to most students of philosophy. Since it consists for the most part of a searching and radical analysis of Kant's epistemology, Fichte's ethics and Schelling's system-building, it provides tirst-rate insight into Hegel's assessment of his immedi~te predecessors. When considered in context, as part of the Encyclopaedia if the Philosophical Sciences, it enables us to distinguish dearly between the systematic, the logical and the psychological aspects of Hegelianism, and is therefore also relevant to some of the central issues in modem phenomenology. It is to be hoped that the introduction and notes prepared for the present edition will prove helpful to both teachers and students.Every effort has been ma de to produce a thoroughly reliable ba sic text and an accurate translation. The text published in 1978 was prepared at the Hegel Archive in Bochum from photocopies, and I am most grateful to the Central Interfaculty of the Erasmus University, Rotterdam, for having made it possible for me to check the printed version against the original manuscripts.

Linnaeus' mature theodicy, his attempt to reconcile the suffering and evil of the world with the omnipotence and goodness of God, is presented in a condensed form in the final editions of his Systema Naturae (1758/68). In this comprehensive compendium of our knowledge of the three great realms of organic nature, he outlines the significance of the sub-conscious, social awareness and theological orientation in the spiritual life of man, and indicates how fate, fortune, and Providence interrelate within his conception of the Deity. In the Nemesis Divina this general undertaking is developed into an `experimental theology', which is exactly analogous to Linnaeus' work in the natural sciences, in that it involves the collecting and classifying of concrete and carefully described case-studies. He never prepared the manuscript for publication, however, and for many years it was regarded as lost, and it is only very recently that any attempt has been made to publish it in its entirety. This is the first English translation of all the relevant manuscript material. It is also the first attempt to analyse the case-studies in the light of what we know of Linnaeus' general taxonomic principles, and to relate each of them to its historical context.

It could certainly be argued that the way in which Hegel criticizes Newton in the Dissertation, the Philosophy of Nature and the lectures on the History of Philosophy, has done more than anything else to prejudice his own reputation. At first sight, what we seem to have here is little more than the contrast between the tested accomplishments of the founding father of modern science, and the random remarks of a confused and somewhat disgruntled philosopher; and if we are persuaded to concede that it may perhaps be something more than this - between the work of a clearsighted mathematician and experimentalist, and the blind assertions of some sort of Kantian logician, blundering about among the facts of the real world. By and large, it was this clear-cut simplistic view of the matter which prevailed among Hegel's contemporaries, and which persisted until fairly recently. The modification and eventual transformation of it have come about gradually, over the past twenty or twenty-five years. The first full-scale commentary on the Philosophy of Nature was published in 1970, and gave rise to the realization that to some extent at least, the Hegelian criticism was directed against Newtonianism rather than the work of Newton himself, and that it tended to draw its inspiration from developments within the natural sciences, rather than from the exigencies imposed upon Hegel's thinking by a priori categorial relationships.

The foundations of this edition were laid at the University of Bochum. The readiness with which Professor Poggeler and his staff put the full resources of the Hegel Archive at my disposal, and went out of their way in helping me to survey the field and get t9 grips with the editing of the manuscript material, has put me very greatly in their debt. I could never have cleared the ground so effectively anywhere else, and I should like to express my very deep grati­ tude for all the help and encouragement they have given me. It has been completed in the Netherlands, - in a University which is justly proud of both the liberal and humanistic traditions of its country and its close links with the enterprise and accomplishments of a great com­ mercial city, and in a faculty engaged primarily in establishing itself as a centre of inter-disciplinary research. I have found these surroundings thoroughly congenial, and can only hope that the finished work will prove worthy of its setting.

The foundations of this edition were laid at the University of Bochum. The readiness with which Professor Poggeler and his staff put the full resources of the Hegel Archive at my disposal, and went out of their way in helping me to survey the field and get t9 grips with the editing of the manuscript material, has put me very greatly in their debt. I could never have cleared the ground so effectively anywhere else, and I should like to express my very deep grati­ tude for all the help and encouragement they have given me. It has been completed in the Netherlands, - in a University which is justly proud of both the liberal and humanistic traditions of its country and its close links with the enterprise and accomplishments of a great com­ mercial city, and in a faculty engaged primarily in establishing itself as a centre of inter-disciplinary research. I have found these surroundings thoroughly congenial, and can only hope that the finished work will prove worthy of its setting.

It could certainly be argued that the way in which Hegel criticizes Newton in the Dissertation, the Philosophy of Nature and the lectures on the History of Philosophy, has done more than anything else to prejudice his own reputation. At first sight, what we seem to have here is little more than the contrast between the tested accomplishments of the founding father of modern science, and the random remarks of a confused and somewhat disgruntled philosopher; and if we are persuaded to concede that it may perhaps be something more than this - between the work of a clearsighted mathematician and experimentalist, and the blind assertions of some sort of Kantian logician, blundering about among the facts of the real world. By and large, it was this clear-cut simplistic view of the matter which prevailed among Hegel''s contemporaries, and which persisted until fairly recently. The modification and eventual transformation of it have come about gradually, over the past twenty or twenty-five years. The first full-scale commentary on the Philosophy of Nature was published in 1970, and gave rise to the realization that to some extent at least, the Hegelian criticism was directed against Newtonianism rather than the work of Newton himself, and that it tended to draw its inspiration from developments within the natural sciences, rather than from the exigencies imposed upon Hegel''s thinking by a priori categorial relationships.