M.L.R. Smith - Böcker

The counterinsurgency (COIN) paradigm dominates military and political conduct in contemporary Western strategic thought. It assumes future wars will unfold as "low intensity" conflicts within rather than between states, requiring specialized military training and techniques. COIN is understood as a logical, effective, and democratically palatable method for confronting insurgency-a discrete set of practices that, through the actions of knowledgeable soldiers and under the guidance of an expert elite, creates lasting results. Through an extensive investigation into COIN's theories, methods, and outcomes, this book undermines enduring claims about COIN's success while revealing its hidden meanings and effects. Interrogating the relationship between counterinsurgency and war, the authors question the supposed uniqueness of COIN's attributes and try to resolve the puzzle of its intellectual identity. Is COIN a strategy, a doctrine, a theory, a military practice, or something else? Their analysis ultimately exposes a critical paradox within COIN: while it ignores the vital political dimensions of war, it is nevertheless the product of a misplaced ideological faith in modernization.

Fighting for Ireland? is the first in-depth account of the evolution of Irish Republican strategy. It is highly topical in the light of the faltering peace process and the growing speculation over the IRA's next move: further violence or a new non-violent strategy? This new, updated paperback edition is essential reading for those who wish to disentangle the complex issues and motives behind IRA violence.M.L.R. Smith challenges many assumptions about the IRA, pinpointing the organisation's successes as well as its missed opportunities. He demonstrates the tension the movement has experienced between ideology and strategic reality regarding the use of force, illustrating how doctrinal purity has sometimes hampered the IRA in the pursuit of its goals. Contrary to the Irish Republican movement's vigorous and assertive public face Smith uncovers an organisation characterised more by a sense of chronic insecurity than by certainty and continuity.

Fighting for Ireland? is the first in-depth account of the evolution of Irish Republican strategy. It is highly topical in the light of the faltering peace process and the growing speculation over the IRA's next move: further violence or a new non-violent strategy? This new, updated paperback edition is essential reading for those who wish to disentangle the complex issues and motives behind IRA violence.M.L.R. Smith challenges many assumptions about the IRA, pinpointing the organisation's successes as well as its missed opportunities. He demonstrates the tension the movement has experienced between ideology and strategic reality regarding the use of force, illustrating how doctrinal purity has sometimes hampered the IRA in the pursuit of its goals. Contrary to the Irish Republican movement's vigorous and assertive public face Smith uncovers an organisation characterised more by a sense of chronic insecurity than by certainty and continuity.

This is the first book to set out a comprehensive framework by which to understand terrorism as strategy. It contends that even terrorism of the supposedly nihilist variety can be viewed as a bona fide method for distributing means to fulfil the ends of policy, that is, as a strategy. The main purpose of the work is to describe the dynamics of terrorism and evaluate their effectiveness, as well as to theorize upon, and clarify the correlation between, political ends and terrorist means. The text explains the modus operandi of terrorism, and demonstrates how terrorism relies on manipulating the psychological impact of (usually) relatively small-scale attacks. Using a variety of case studies, The Strategy of Terrorism shows how many campaigns of terrorism end in failure when they lose their power to terrify. The authors spell out what a proper understanding of terrorism as a strategy implies for those who want to make terrorism ineffective, and offer a number of policy recommendations derived directly from their critique.This is the first contribution of strategic studies to the study of terrorism, and will be of much interest to students of terrorism, strategy and security studies, as well as military professionals and policy makers.

This is the first book to set out a comprehensive framework by which to understand terrorism as strategy. It contends that even terrorism of the supposedly nihilist variety can be viewed as a bona fide method for distributing means to fulfil the ends of policy, that is, as a strategy. The main purpose of the work is to describe the dynamics of terrorism and evaluate their effectiveness, as well as to theorize upon, and clarify the correlation between, political ends and terrorist means. The text explains the modus operandi of terrorism, and demonstrates how terrorism relies on manipulating the psychological impact of (usually) relatively small-scale attacks. Using a variety of case studies, The Strategy of Terrorism shows how many campaigns of terrorism end in failure when they lose their power to terrify. The authors spell out what a proper understanding of terrorism as a strategy implies for those who want to make terrorism ineffective, and offer a number of policy recommendations derived directly from their critique.This is the first contribution of strategic studies to the study of terrorism, and will be of much interest to students of terrorism, strategy and security studies, as well as military professionals and policy makers.

The notion of counter-insurgency has become a dominant paradigm in American and British thinking about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This volume brings together international academics and practitioners to evaluate the broader theoretical and historical factors that underpin COIN, providing a critical reappraisal of counter-insurgency thinking.

The notion of counter-insurgency has become a dominant paradigm in American and British thinking about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This volume brings together international academics and practitioners to evaluate the broader theoretical and historical factors that underpin COIN, providing a critical reappraisal of counter-insurgency thinking.