Ngo van Long – författare

Optimal control theory is a technique being used increasingly by academic economists to study problems involving optimal decisions in a multi-period framework. This textbook is designed to make the difficult subject of optimal control theory easily accessible to economists while at the same time maintaining rigour. Economic intuitions are emphasized, and examples and problem sets covering a wide range of applications in economics are provided to assist in the learning process. Theorems are clearly stated and their proofs are carefully explained. The development of the text is gradual and fully integrated, beginning with simple formulations and progressing to advanced topics such as control parameters, jumps in state variables, and bounded state space. For greater economy and elegance, optimal control theory is introduced directly, without recourse to the calculus of variations. The connection with the latter and with dynamic programming is explained in a separate chapter. A second purpose of the book is to draw the parallel between optimal control theory and static optimization. Chapter 1 provides an extensive treatment of constrained and unconstrained maximization, with emphasis on economic insight and applications. Starting from basic concepts, it derives and explains important results, including the envelope theorem and the method of comparative statics. This chapter may be used for a course in static optimization. The book is largely self-contained. No previous knowledge of differential equations is required.

Optimal control theory is a technique being used increasingly by academic economists to study problems involving optimal decisions in a multi-period framework. This textbook is designed to make the difficult subject of optimal control theory easily accessible to economists while at the same time maintaining rigour. Economic intuitions are emphasized, and examples and problem sets covering a wide range of applications in economics are provided to assist in the learning process. Theorems are clearly stated and their proofs are carefully explained. The development of the text is gradual and fully integrated, beginning with simple formulations and progressing to advanced topics such as control parameters, jumps in state variables, and bounded state space. For greater economy and elegance, optimal control theory is introduced directly, without recourse to the calculus of variations. The connection with the latter and with dynamic programming is explained in a separate chapter. A second purpose of the book is to draw the parallel between optimal control theory and static optimization. Chapter 1 provides an extensive treatment of constrained and unconstrained maximization, with emphasis on economic insight and applications. Starting from basic concepts, it derives and explains important results, including the envelope theorem and the method of comparative statics. This chapter may be used for a course in static optimization. The book is largely self-contained. No previous knowledge of differential equations is required.

A comprehensive, self-contained survey of the theory and applications of differential games, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing economics and management problems which are characterised by both multiperiod and strategic decision making. Although no prior knowledge of game theory is required, a basic knowledge of linear algebra, ordinary differential equations, mathematical programming and probability theory is necessary. Part One presents the theory of differential games, starting with the basic concepts of game theory and going on to cover control theoretic models, Markovian equilibria with simultaneous play, differential games with hierarchical play, trigger strategy equilibria, differential games with special structures, and stochastic differential games. Part Two offers applications to capital accumulation games, industrial organization and oligopoly games, marketing, resources and environmental economics.

Optimal control theory is a technique being used increasingly by academic economists to study problems involving optimal decisions in a multi-period framework. This textbook is designed to make the difficult subject of optimal control theory easily accessible to economists while at the same time maintaining rigour. Economic intuitions are emphasized, and examples and problem sets covering a wide range of applications in economics are provided to assist in the learning process. Theorems are clearly stated and their proofs are carefully explained. The development of the text is gradual and fully integrated, beginning with simple formulations and progressing to advanced topics such as control parameters, jumps in state variables, and bounded state space. For greater economy and elegance, optimal control theory is introduced directly, without recourse to the calculus of variations. The connection with the latter and with dynamic programming is explained in a separate chapter. A second purpose of the book is to draw the parallel between optimal control theory and static optimization. Chapter 1 provides an extensive treatment of constrained and unconstrained maximization, with emphasis on economic insight and applications. Starting from basic concepts, it derives and explains important results, including the envelope theorem and the method of comparative statics. This chapter may be used for a course in static optimization. The book is largely self-contained. No previous knowledge of differential equations is required.

Optimal control theory is a technique being used increasingly by academic economists to study problems involving optimal decisions in a multi-period framework. This textbook is designed to make the difficult subject of optimal control theory easily accessible to economists while at the same time maintaining rigour. Economic intuitions are emphasized, and examples and problem sets covering a wide range of applications in economics are provided to assist in the learning process. Theorems are clearly stated and their proofs are carefully explained. The development of the text is gradual and fully integrated, beginning with simple formulations and progressing to advanced topics such as control parameters, jumps in state variables, and bounded state space. For greater economy and elegance, optimal control theory is introduced directly, without recourse to the calculus of variations. The connection with the latter and with dynamic programming is explained in a separate chapter. A second purpose of the book is to draw the parallel between optimal control theory and static optimization. Chapter 1 provides an extensive treatment of constrained and unconstrained maximization, with emphasis on economic insight and applications. Starting from basic concepts, it derives and explains important results, including the envelope theorem and the method of comparative statics. This chapter may be used for a course in static optimization. The book is largely self-contained. No previous knowledge of differential equations is required.

A comprehensive, self-contained survey of the theory and applications of differential games, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing economics and management problems which are characterised by both multiperiod and strategic decision making. Although no prior knowledge of game theory is required, a basic knowledge of linear algebra, ordinary differential equations, mathematical programming and probability theory is necessary. Part One presents the theory of differential games, starting with the basic concepts of game theory and going on to cover control theoretic models, Markovian equilibria with simultaneous play, differential games with hierarchical play, trigger strategy equilibria, differential games with special structures, and stochastic differential games. Part Two offers applications to capital accumulation games, industrial organization and oligopoly games, marketing, resources and environmental economics.

This edited volume is a collection of latest research findings on topical issues in international trade theory and policy. The chapters are contributed by well known academic economists around the globe as a tribute to Professor Murray Kemp's 80th birthday. They cover three broad areas of globalization and emerging issues in international trade. The first part of the volume, containing five chapters, deals with trade liberalization and outsourcing. These chapters examine the role of the WTO, trade liberalization as a game under uncertainty, a Chamberlinian-Ricardian model, liberalization of government procurements, and outsourcing and import restriction policies. The second part of the volume, also containing five chapters, examines trading clubs and preferential trading agreements. These chapters extend the original Kemp-Wan proposition concerning customs unions in various directions. The final part of this book consists of six chapters on various aspects of trade and aid. These include a review of Kemp's contributions to trade and welfare economics, gains from trade and refusal to trade, increasing returns and oligopoly, tariff policy and foreign economic aid, infrastructure aid and deindustrialization, and environmental regulation and tourism.

This edited volume is a collection of latest research findings on topical issues in international trade theory and policy. The chapters are contributed by well known academic economists around the globe as a tribute to Professor Murray Kemp''s 80th birthday. They cover three broad areas of globalization and emerging issues in international trade. The first part of the volume, containing five chapters, deals with trade liberalization and outsourcing. These chapters examine the role of the WTO, trade liberalization as a game under uncertainty, a Chamberlinian-Ricardian model, liberalization of government procurements, and outsourcing and import restriction policies. The second part of the volume, also containing five chapters, examines trading clubs and preferential trading agreements. These chapters extend the original Kemp-Wan proposition concerning customs unions in various directions. The final part of this book consists of six chapters on various aspects of trade and aid. These include a review of Kemp''s contributions to trade and welfare economics, gains from trade and refusal to trade, increasing returns and oligopoly, tariff policy and foreign economic aid, infrastructure aid and deindustrialization, and environmental regulation and tourism.

This book provides readers with a comprehensive survey of models of dynamic games in economics, including an extensive coverage of numerous fields of applications. It will also discuss and explain main concepts and techniques used in dynamic games, and inform readers of its major developments while equipping them with tools and ideas that will aid in the formulation of solutions for problems. A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics will interest those who wish to study more about the conceptions, approaches and models that are applied in the domain of dynamic games.