Oliver Sensen – författare

Respect plays a prominent role in contemporary moral philosophy, as well as our every-day moral thought. Ordinary discussion about morality is often framed in terms of demands for respect or complaints about being disrespected, yet basic questions about the concept and role of respect are frequently overlooked. Here, leading philosophers present their latest ideas and fresh perspectives to point research on the topic in new directions. Following an introduction to the historical rise of respect as a central concept in moral discourse, Part I addresses the fundamental questions of what respect is; its nature and basis. Part II then examines questions in moral theory, for example what exactly ought to be respected, what role respect plays in morality, and which different types of respect are appropriate and morally significant. Part III concludes with the practical application of requirements of respect, with implications for significant moral issues of our time including environmental ethics, social justice, disability, bioethics, and more.

Respect plays a prominent role in contemporary moral philosophy, as well as our every-day moral thought. Ordinary discussion about morality is often framed in terms of demands for respect or complaints about being disrespected, yet basic questions about the concept and role of respect are frequently overlooked. Here, leading philosophers present their latest ideas and fresh perspectives to point research on the topic in new directions. Following an introduction to the historical rise of respect as a central concept in moral discourse, Part I addresses the fundamental questions of what respect is; its nature and basis. Part II then examines questions in moral theory, for example what exactly ought to be respected, what role respect plays in morality, and which different types of respect are appropriate and morally significant. Part III concludes with the practical application of requirements of respect, with implications for significant moral issues of our time including environmental ethics, social justice, disability, bioethics, and more.

Respect plays a prominent role in contemporary moral philosophy, as well as our every-day moral thought. Ordinary discussion about morality is often framed in terms of demands for respect or complaints about being disrespected, yet basic questions about the concept and role of respect are frequently overlooked. Here, leading philosophers present their latest ideas and fresh perspectives to point research on the topic in new directions. Following an introduction to the historical rise of respect as a central concept in moral discourse, Part I addresses the fundamental questions of what respect is; its nature and basis. Part II then examines questions in moral theory, for example what exactly ought to be respected, what role respect plays in morality, and which different types of respect are appropriate and morally significant. Part III concludes with the practical application of requirements of respect, with implications for significant moral issues of our time including environmental ethics, social justice, disability, bioethics, and more.

What is human dignity? Kant's philosophy is a central inspiration for our contemporary conception that all human beings deserve respect - independently of their race, gender, religion, or social status. In this Element, I shall address four topics in Kant's moral philosophy: What specifically does one have to do (or refrain fromdoing) to respect a human being? What is the reason why one should respect human beings? What is dignity, that is, what does the term mean, and what kind of thing is it? Finally, in a short appendix, I shall address the questions: Do only human beings deserve respect; how could one extend it to nonhuman animals as well? In each section, I shall offer a range of different interpretations of how one can read Kant's texts, and I shall address their advantages and disadvantages. This gives readers the option to choose for themselves which reading is the most plausible interpretation of human dignity.

The concept of autonomy is one of Kant's central legacies for contemporary moral thought. We often invoke autonomy as both a moral ideal and a human right, especially a right to determine oneself independently of foreign determinants; indeed, to violate a person's autonomy is considered to be a serious moral offence. Yet while contemporary philosophy claims Kant as the originator of its notion of autonomy, Kant's own conception of the term seems to differ in important respects from our present-day interpretation. Kant on Moral Autonomy brings together a distinguished group of scholars who explore the following questions: what is Kant's conception of autonomy? What is its history and its influence on contemporary conceptions? And what is its moral significance? Their essays will be of interest both to scholars and students working on Kantian moral philosophy and to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.

This is the first book devoted to an examination of Kant's lectures on ethics, which provide a unique and revealing perspective on the development of his views. In fifteen newly commissioned essays, leading Kant scholars discuss four sets of student notes reflecting different periods of Kant's career: those taken by Herder (1762-4), Collins (mid-1770s), Mrongovius (1784-5) and Vigilantius (1793-4). The essays cover a diverse range of topics, from the relation between Kant's lectures and the Baumgarten textbooks, to obligation, virtue, love, the highest good, freedom, the categorical imperative, moral motivation and religion. Together they provide the reader with a deeper and fuller understanding of the evolution of Kant's moral thought. The volume will be of interest to a range of readers in Kant studies, ethics, political philosophy, religious studies and the history of ideas.

Autonomy is one of the central concepts of contemporary moral thought, and Kant is often credited with being the inventor of individual moral autonomy. But how and why did Kant develop this notion? The Emergence of Autonomy in Kant's Moral Philosophy is the first essay collection exclusively devoted to this topic. It traces the emergence of autonomy from Kant's earliest writings to the changes that he made to the concept in his mature works. The essays offer a close historical and philosophical analysis of what prompted Kant to develop his conception of autonomy, charting the historical background which prompted his search, and thoroughly analysing different stages of his writings in order to see which element of autonomy was introduced at which point. The resulting volume will be of interest to both scholars and students of Kantian moral philosophy, as well as to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.

The concept of autonomy is one of Kant's central legacies for contemporary moral thought. We often invoke autonomy as both a moral ideal and a human right, especially a right to determine oneself independently of foreign determinants; indeed, to violate a person's autonomy is considered to be a serious moral offence. Yet while contemporary philosophy claims Kant as the originator of its notion of autonomy, Kant's own conception of the term seems to differ in important respects from our present-day interpretation. Kant on Moral Autonomy brings together a distinguished group of scholars who explore the following questions: what is Kant's conception of autonomy? What is its history and its influence on contemporary conceptions? And what is its moral significance? Their essays will be of interest both to scholars and students working on Kantian moral philosophy and to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.

What is human dignity? Kant's philosophy is a central inspiration for our contemporary conception that all human beings deserve respect - independently of their race, gender, religion, or social status. In this Element, I shall address four topics in Kant's moral philosophy: What specifically does one have to do (or refrain fromdoing) to respect a human being? What is the reason why one should respect human beings? What is dignity, that is, what does the term mean, and what kind of thing is it? Finally, in a short appendix, I shall address the questions: Do only human beings deserve respect; how could one extend it to nonhuman animals as well? In each section, I shall offer a range of different interpretations of how one can read Kant's texts, and I shall address their advantages and disadvantages. This gives readers the option to choose for themselves which reading is the most plausible interpretation of human dignity.

This is the first book devoted to an examination of Kant's lectures on ethics, which provide a unique and revealing perspective on the development of his views. In fifteen newly commissioned essays, leading Kant scholars discuss four sets of student notes reflecting different periods of Kant's career: those taken by Herder (1762-4), Collins (mid-1770s), Mrongovius (1784-5) and Vigilantius (1793-4). The essays cover a diverse range of topics, from the relation between Kant's lectures and the Baumgarten textbooks, to obligation, virtue, love, the highest good, freedom, the categorical imperative, moral motivation and religion. Together they provide the reader with a deeper and fuller understanding of the evolution of Kant's moral thought. The volume will be of interest to a range of readers in Kant studies, ethics, political philosophy, religious studies and the history of ideas.

Autonomy is one of the central concepts of contemporary moral thought, and Kant is often credited with being the inventor of individual moral autonomy. But how and why did Kant develop this notion? The Emergence of Autonomy in Kant's Moral Philosophy is the first essay collection exclusively devoted to this topic. It traces the emergence of autonomy from Kant's earliest writings to the changes that he made to the concept in his mature works. The essays offer a close historical and philosophical analysis of what prompted Kant to develop his conception of autonomy, charting the historical background which prompted his search, and thoroughly analysing different stages of his writings in order to see which element of autonomy was introduced at which point. The resulting volume will be of interest to both scholars and students of Kantian moral philosophy, as well as to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy.

Building on the results of the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant finally published his system of moral philosophy in two volumes in 1797. By then, he had been planning to write a Metaphysics of Morals for three decades; but only the title remained unchanged while the basic principles of his theoretical and practical philosophy changed dramatically. While for many years academic moral philosophy focused mainly on Kant’s earlier ethical treatises, there has recently been much interest in this later and perhaps more mature work on moral philosophy, particularly the ethical part of the Metaphysics of Morals, the “Metaphysical Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue” or “Tugendlehre”.The present volume responds to these demands. Following a series of research workshops, 18 scholars from Germany, Italy, Britain and the United States provide a seamless commentary on the “Doctrine of Virtue”, discussing topics such as suicide, truthfulness, moral perfection, beneficence, gratitude, sympathy, respect and friendship as well as Kant’s moral psychology, philosophy of action and theory of moral education. This book will be an invaluable resource for moral philosophers and Kant scholars alike.

Building on the results of the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant finally published his system of moral philosophy in two volumes in 1797. By then, he had been planning to write a Metaphysics of Morals for three decades; but only the title remained unchanged while the basic principles of his theoretical and practical philosophy changed dramatically. While for many years academic moral philosophy focused mainly on Kant’s earlier ethical treatises, there has recently been much interest in this later and perhaps more mature work on moral philosophy, particularly the ethical part of the Metaphysics of Morals, the “Metaphysical Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue” or “Tugendlehre”.The present volume responds to these demands. Following a series of research workshops, 18 scholars from Germany, Italy, Britain and the United States provide a seamless commentary on the “Doctrine of Virtue”, discussing topics such as suicide, truthfulness, moral perfection, beneficence, gratitude, sympathy, respect and friendship as well as Kant’s moral psychology, philosophy of action and theory of moral education. This book will be an invaluable resource for moral philosophers and Kant scholars alike.

Immanuel Kant is often considered to be the source of the contemporary idea of human dignity, but his conception of human dignity and its relation to human value and to the requirement to respect others have not been widely understood. Kant on Human Dignity offers the first in-depth study in English of this subject. Based on a comprehensive analysis of all the passages in which Kant uses the term ‘dignity’, as well as an analysis of the most prominent arguments for a value of human beings in the Kant literature, the book carefully examines different ways of construing the relationship between dignity, value and respect for others. It takes seriously Kant’s Copernican Revolution in moral philosophy: Kant argues that moral imperatives cannot be based on any values without yielding heteronomy. Instead it is imperatives of reason that determine what is valuable. The requirement to respect all human beings is one such imperative. Respect for human beings does not follow from human dignity—for this would violate autonomy—but is an unconditional command of reason. Following this train of thought yields a unified account of Kant’s moral philosophy.

Immanuel Kant is often considered to be the source of the contemporary idea of human dignity, but his conception of human dignity and its relation to human value and to the requirement to respect others have not been widely understood. Kant on Human Dignity offers the first in-depth study in English of this subject. Based on a comprehensive analysis of all the passages in which Kant uses the term ‘dignity’, as well as an analysis of the most prominent arguments for a value of human beings in the Kant literature, the book carefully examines different ways of construing the relationship between dignity, value and respect for others. It takes seriously Kant’s Copernican Revolution in moral philosophy: Kant argues that moral imperatives cannot be based on any values without yielding heteronomy. Instead it is imperatives of reason that determine what is valuable. The requirement to respect all human beings is one such imperative. Respect for human beings does not follow from human dignity—for this would violate autonomy—but is an unconditional command of reason. Following this train of thought yields a unified account of Kant’s moral philosophy.