Patrick Suppes – författare

This clear and well-developed approach to axiomatic set theory is geared toward upper-level undergraduates and graduate students. It examines the basic paradoxes and history of set theory and advanced topics such as relations and functions, equipollence, finite sets and cardinal numbers, rational and real numbers, and other subjects. 1960 edition.

This is an important collection of essays dealing with the foundations of probability that will be of value to philosophers of science, mathematicians, statisticians, psychologists and educationalists. The collection falls into three parts. Part I comprises five essays on the axiomatic foundations of probability. Part II contains seven articles on probabilistic causality and quantum mechanics, with an emphasis on the existence of hidden variables. The third part consists of a single extended essay applying probabilistic theories of learning to practical questions of education: it incorporates extensive data analysis. Patrick Suppes is one of the world's foremost philosophers in the area of probability, and has made many contributions to both the theoretical and practical side of education. The statistician Mario Zanotti is a long-time collaborator.

This is an important collection of essays dealing with the foundations of probability that will be of value to philosophers of science, mathematicians, statisticians, psychologists and educationalists. The collection falls into three parts. Part I comprises five essays on the axiomatic foundations of probability. Part II contains seven articles on probabilistic causality and quantum mechanics, with an emphasis on the existence of hidden variables. The third part consists of a single extended essay applying probabilistic theories of learning to practical questions of education: it incorporates extensive data analysis. Patrick Suppes is one of the world's foremost philosophers in the area of probability, and has made many contributions to both the theoretical and practical side of education. The statistician Mario Zanotti is a long-time collaborator.

The thirty-one papers collected in this volume represent most of the arti­ cles that I have published in the philosophy of science and related founda­ tional areas of science since 1970. The present volume is a natural succes­ sor to Studies in the Methodology and Foundations of Science, a collection of my articles published in 1969 by Reidel (now a part of Kluwer). The articles are arranged under five main headings. Part I contains six articles on general methodology. The topics range from formal methods to the plurality of science. Part II contains six articles on causality and explanation. The emphasis is almost entirely on probabilistic approaches. Part III contains six articles on probability and measurement. The impor­ tance of representation theorems for both probability and measurement is stressed. Part IV contains five articles on the foundations of physics. The first three articles are concerned with action at a distance and space and time, the last two with quantum mechanics. Part V contains eight articles on the foundations of psychology. This is the longest part and the articles reflect my continuing strong interest in the nature of learning and perception. Within each part the articles are arranged chronologically. I turn now to a more detailed overview of the content. The first article of Part I concerns the role of formal methods in the philosophy of science. Here I discuss what is the new role for formal methods now that the imperialism of logical positivism has disappeared.

The papers collected here focus on probabilistic causality, addressing topics such as the search for causal mechanisms, epistemic and metaphysical views of causality, Bayesian nets and causal dependence, and causation in the special sciences. Some papers stress the statistical analysis of probabilistic data; others address causal issues in physics, with an emphasis on physical processes that are also probabilistic—i.e., stochastic processes.

This volume broadens our concept of reasoning and rationality to allow for a more pluralistic and situational view of human thinking as a practical activity. Drawing on contributors across disciplines including philosophy, economics, psychology, statistics, computer science, engineering, and physics, "Reasoning, Rationality, and Probability" argues that the search for strong theories should leave room for the construction of context-sensitive conceptual tools. Both science and everyday life, the authors argue, are too complex and multifaceted to be forced into ready-made schemata.

Described by the New York Times as a visionary "pioneer in computerized learning," Patrick Suppes (1922?2014) and his many collaborators at Stanford University conducted research on the development, commercialization, and use of computers in education from 1963 to 2013. Computers in Education synthesizes this wealth of scholarship into a single succinct volume that highlights the profound interconnections of technology in education. By capturing the great breadth and depth of this research, this book offers an accessible introduction to Suppes's striking work.

The twenty-three papers collected in tbis volume represent an important part of my published work up to the date of this volume. I have not arranged the paper chronologically, but under four main headings. Part I contains five papers on methodology concerned with models and measurement in the sciences. This part also contains the first paper I published, 'A Set of Independent Axioms for Extensive Quantities', in Portugaliae Mathematica in 1951. Part 11 also is concerned with methodology and ineludes six papers on probability and utility. It is not always easy to separate papers on probability and utility from papers on measurement, because of the elose connection between the two subjects, but Artieles 6 and 8, even though they have elose relations to measurement, seem more properly to belong in Part 11, because they are concerned with substantive questions about probability and utility. The last two parts are concerned with the foundations of physics and the foundations of psychology. I have used the term foundations rather than philosophy, because the papers are mainly concerned with specific axiomatic formulations for particular parts of physics or of psychology, and it seems to me that the termfoundations more appropriately describes such constructive axiomatic ventures. Part 111 contains four papers on the foundations of physics. The first paper deals with foundations of special relativity and the last three with the role ofprobability in quantum mechanics.

In the last 25 years, the concept of information has played a crucial role in communication theory, so much so that the terms information theory and communication theory are sometimes used almost interchangeably. It seems to us, however, that the notion of information is also destined to render valuable services to the student of induction and probability, of learning and reinforcement, of semantic meaning and deductive inference, as~well as of scientific method in general. The present volume is an attempt to illustrate some of these uses of information concepts. In 'On Semantic Information' Hintikka summarizes some of his and his associates' recent work on information and induction, and comments briefly on its philosophical suggestions. Jamison surveys from the sub­ jectivistic point of view some recent results in 'Bayesian Information Usage'. Rosenkrantz analyzes the information obtained by experimen­ tation from the Bayesian and Neyman-Pearson standpoints, and also from the standpoint of entropy and related concepts. The much-debated principle of total evidence prompts Hilpinen to examine the problem of measuring the information yield of observations in his paper 'On the Information Provided by Observations'. Pietarinen addresses himself to the more general task of evaluating the systematizing ('explanatory') power of hypotheses and theories, a task which quickly leads him to information concepts. Domotor develops a qualitative theory of information and entropy. His paper gives what is probably the first axiomatization of a general qualitative theory of information adequate to guarantee a numerical representation of the standard sort.

The papers and comments published in the present volume represent the proceedings of a research workshop on the grammar and semantics of natural languages held at Stanford University in the fall of 1970. The workshop met first for three days in September and then for a period of two days in November for extended discussion and analysis. The workshop was sponsored by the Committee on Basic Research in Education, which has been funded by the United States Office of Education through a grant to the National Academy of Education and the National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council. We acknowledge with pleasure the sponsorship which made possible a series oflively and stimulating meetings that were both enjoyable and instructive for the three of us, and, we hope, for most of the participants, including a number of local linguists and philosophers who did not contribute papers but actively joined in the discussion. One of the central participants in the workshop was Richard Montague. We record our sense of loss at his tragic death early in 1971, and we dedicate this volume to his memory. None of the papers in the present volume discusses explicitly problems of education. In our view such a discussion is neither necessary nor sufficient for a contribution to basic research in education. There are in fact good reasons why the kind of work reported in the present volume constitutes an important aspect of basic research in education.

The articles in this volume have been stimulated in two different ways. More than two years ago the editor of Synthese, laakko Hintikka, an­ nounced a special issue devoted to space and time, and articles were solicited. Part of the reason for that announcement was also the second source of papers. Several years ago I gave a seminar on special relativity at Stanford, and the papers by Domotor, Harrison, Hudgin, Latzer and myself partially arose out of discussion in that seminar. All of the papers except those of Griinbaum, Fine, the second paper of Friedman, and the paper of Adams appeared in a special double issue of Synthese (24 (1972), Nos. 1-2). I am pleased to have been able to add the four additional papers mentioned in making the special issue a volume in the Synthese Library. Of these four additional articles, only the one by Fine has pre­ viously appeared in print (Synthese 22 (1971),448--481); its relevance to the present volume is apparent. In preparing the papers for publication and in carrying out the various editorIal chores of such a task, I am very much indebted to Mrs. Lillian O'Toole for her extensive assistance. INTRODUCTION The philosophy of space and time has been of permanent importance in philosophy, and most of the major historical figures in philosophy, such as Aristotle, Descartes and Kant, have had a good deal to say about the nature of space and time.

During the academic years 1972-1973 and 1973-1974, an intensive sem­ inar on the foundations of quantum mechanics met at Stanford on a regular basis. The extensive exploration of ideas in the seminar led to the org~ization of a double issue of Synthese concerned with the foundations of quantum mechanics, especially with the role of logic and probability in quantum meChanics. About half of the articles in the volume grew out of this seminar. The remaining articles have been so­ licited explicitly from individuals who are actively working in the foun­ dations of quantum mechanics. Seventeen of the twenty-one articles appeared in Volume 29 of Syn­ these. Four additional articles and a bibliography on -the history and philosophy of quantum mechanics have been added to the present volume. In particular, the articles by Bub, Demopoulos, and Lande, as well as the second article by Zanotti and myself, appear for the first time in the present volume. In preparing the articles for publication I am much indebted to Mrs. Lillian O'Toole, Mrs. Dianne Kanerva, and Mrs. Marguerite Shaw, for their extensive assistance.

This book publishes 31 of the author's selected papers which have appeared, with one exception, since 1970. The papers cover a wide range of topics in the philosophy of science. Part I is concerned with general methodology, including formal and axiomatic methods in science. Part II is concerned with causality and explanation. The papers extend the author's earlier work on a probabilistic theory of causality. The papers in Part III are concerned with probability and measurement, especially foundational questions about probability. Part IV consists of several papers, including two historical ones, on the foundations of physics, with the main emphasis being on quantum mechanics. Part V, the longest part, is on the foundations of psychology and includes papers mainly on learning and perception. The book is aimed at philosophers of science, scientists concerned with the methodology of the social sciences, and mathematical psychologists interested in theories of learning, perception and measurement.

The twenty-three papers collected in tbis volume represent an important part of my published work up to the date of this volume. I have not arranged the paper chronologically, but under four main headings. Part I contains five papers on methodology concerned with models and measurement in the sciences. This part also contains the first paper I published, 'A Set of Independent Axioms for Extensive Quantities', in Portugaliae Mathematica in 1951. Part 11 also is concerned with methodology and ineludes six papers on probability and utility. It is not always easy to separate papers on probability and utility from papers on measurement, because of the elose connection between the two subjects, but Artieles 6 and 8, even though they have elose relations to measurement, seem more properly to belong in Part 11, because they are concerned with substantive questions about probability and utility. The last two parts are concerned with the foundations of physics and the foundations of psychology. I have used the term foundations rather than philosophy, because the papers are mainly concerned with specific axiomatic formulations for particular parts of physics or of psychology, and it seems to me that the termfoundations more appropriately describes such constructive axiomatic ventures. Part 111 contains four papers on the foundations of physics. The first paper deals with foundations of special relativity and the last three with the role ofprobability in quantum mechanics.

The articles in this volume have been stimulated in two different ways. More than two years ago the editor of Synthese, laakko Hintikka, an­ nounced a special issue devoted to space and time, and articles were solicited. Part of the reason for that announcement was also the second source of papers. Several years ago I gave a seminar on special relativity at Stanford, and the papers by Domotor, Harrison, Hudgin, Latzer and myself partially arose out of discussion in that seminar. All of the papers except those of Griinbaum, Fine, the second paper of Friedman, and the paper of Adams appeared in a special double issue of Synthese (24 (1972), Nos. 1-2). I am pleased to have been able to add the four additional papers mentioned in making the special issue a volume in the Synthese Library. Of these four additional articles, only the one by Fine has pre­ viously appeared in print (Synthese 22 (1971),448--481); its relevance to the present volume is apparent. In preparing the papers for publication and in carrying out the various editorIal chores of such a task, I am very much indebted to Mrs. Lillian O'Toole for her extensive assistance. INTRODUCTION The philosophy of space and time has been of permanent importance in philosophy, and most of the major historical figures in philosophy, such as Aristotle, Descartes and Kant, have had a good deal to say about the nature of space and time.

The articles in this volume have been stimulated in two different ways. More than two years ago the editor of Synthese, laakko Hintikka, an­ nounced a special issue devoted to space and time, and articles were solicited. Part of the reason for that announcement was also the second source of papers. Several years ago I gave a seminar on special relativity at Stanford, and the papers by Domotor, Harrison, Hudgin, Latzer and myself partially arose out of discussion in that seminar. All of the papers except those of Griinbaum, Fine, the second paper of Friedman, and the paper of Adams appeared in a special double issue of Synthese (24 (1972), Nos. 1-2). I am pleased to have been able to add the four additional papers mentioned in making the special issue a volume in the Synthese Library. Of these four additional articles, only the one by Fine has pre­ viously appeared in print (Synthese 22 (1971), 448-481); its relevance to the present volume is apparent. In preparing the papers for publication and in carrying out the various editonal chores of such a task, I am very much indebted to Mrs. Lillian O'Toole for her extensive assistance. INTRODUCTION The philosophy of space and time has been of permanent importance in philosophy, and most of the major historical figures in philosophy, such as Aristotle, Descartes and Kant, have had a good deal to say about the nature of space and time.