Paul A. Kowert – författare

Examines postwar debates within Germany and Japan over how to promote domestic and regional order.Cultures of Order explores how Germany and Japan each struggled to define an appropriate role for themselves in the postwar international order. In Germany, proponents of institutional constraint fought and generally prevailed over those who stressed national rights. This pattern continued even as Germany achieved unification at the end of the Cold War. In Japan, however, the national rights strategy was more successful, and Japanese leaders have been less willing than their German counterparts to predicate international order on commitment to an emergent institutional framework. In both cases, the choices made by leaders were critical, despite the constraints under which they operated. In this book the authors utilize a constructivist theory of order, emphasizing the distinctive ways language works to normative effect, to explain these debates and how they have contributed to two very different "cultures of order."

An innovative model for understanding how emotion shapes perceptions of Japan and influences its diplomacyFor countries, national image matters. Although Japan is often ranked among the most popular countries in the world, its negative image in China and South Korea bedevils its diplomacy with these two close neighbors. If Japan wishes to improve its image in these two countries—one, its largest trading partner; the other, a key strategic ally—it must gain a better understanding of how this image is formed.Japan and the Emotional Politics of National Image examines the way emotion shapes perceptions of Japan and influences its diplomacy. Kowert traces how the emotional dynamics of international relations delineate shifts in national image that cannot be explained solely by geopolitics, domestic politics, or historical memory. With evidence drawn from case histories, statements by leading politicians, and text analyses of newspapers, the book reveals that Chinese and Korean attitudes toward Japan are more variable than is commonly appreciated and vary in ways that can be predicted by improved models of political emotion.With this book, scholars of international relations and of Japanese and Asian politics will gain new insights into Japan's anxieties about its own image abroad.

An innovative model for understanding how emotion shapes perceptions of Japan and influences its diplomacyFor countries, national image matters. Although Japan is often ranked among the most popular countries in the world, its negative image in China and South Korea bedevils its diplomacy with these two close neighbors. If Japan wishes to improve its image in these two countries—one, its largest trading partner; the other, a key strategic ally—it must gain a better understanding of how this image is formed.Japan and the Emotional Politics of National Image examines the way emotion shapes perceptions of Japan and influences its diplomacy. Kowert traces how the emotional dynamics of international relations delineate shifts in national image that cannot be explained solely by geopolitics, domestic politics, or historical memory. With evidence drawn from case histories, statements by leading politicians, and text analyses of newspapers, the book reveals that Chinese and Korean attitudes toward Japan are more variable than is commonly appreciated and vary in ways that can be predicted by improved models of political emotion.With this book, scholars of international relations and of Japanese and Asian politics will gain new insights into Japan's anxieties about its own image abroad.

Argues that too much advice can lead to policy deadlock depending on leadership style.The danger of groupthink is now standard fare in leadership training programs and a widely accepted explanation, among political scientists, for policy-making fiascoes. Efforts to avoid groupthink, however, can lead to an even more serious problem-deadlock. Groupthink or Deadlock explores these dual problems in the Eisenhower and Reagan administrations and demonstrates how both presidents were capable of learning and consequently changing their policies, sometimes dramatically, but at the same time doing so in characteristically different ways. Kowert points to the need for leaders to organize their staff in a way that fits their learning and leadership style and allows them to negotiate a path between groupthink and deadlock.

Argues that too much advice can lead to policy deadlock depending on leadership style.The danger of groupthink is now standard fare in leadership training programs and a widely accepted explanation, among political scientists, for policy-making fiascoes. Efforts to avoid groupthink, however, can lead to an even more serious problem-deadlock. Groupthink or Deadlock explores these dual problems in the Eisenhower and Reagan administrations and demonstrates how both presidents were capable of learning and consequently changing their policies, sometimes dramatically, but at the same time doing so in characteristically different ways. Kowert points to the need for leaders to organize their staff in a way that fits their learning and leadership style and allows them to negotiate a path between groupthink and deadlock.