Paul Bloomfield – författare

“Moral realism” is a family of theories of morality united by the idea that there are moral facts--facts about what is right or wrong or good or bad--and that morality is not simply a matter of personal preferences, emotions, attitudes, or sociological conventions. The fundamental thought underlying moral realism can be expressed as a parity thesis. There are many kinds of facts, including physical, psychological, mathematical, temporal, and moral facts. So understood, moral realism can be distinguished from a variety of anti-realist theories including expressivism, non-cognitivism, and error theory.The Handbook is divided into four parts, the first of which contains essays about the basic concepts and distinctions which characterize moral realism. The subsequent parts contain essays first defending the idea that morality is a naturalistic phenomenon like other subject matters studied by the empirical sciences; second, that morality is a non-natural phenomenon like logic or “pure rationality”; and the final section is dedicated to those theories which deny the usefulness of the natural/non-natural distinction. The twenty-five commissioned essays cover the field of moral realism in a comprehensive and highly accessible way.

“Moral realism” is a family of theories of morality united by the idea that there are moral facts--facts about what is right or wrong or good or bad--and that morality is not simply a matter of personal preferences, emotions, attitudes, or sociological conventions. The fundamental thought underlying moral realism can be expressed as a parity thesis. There are many kinds of facts, including physical, psychological, mathematical, temporal, and moral facts. So understood, moral realism can be distinguished from a variety of anti-realist theories including expressivism, non-cognitivism, and error theory.The Handbook is divided into four parts, the first of which contains essays about the basic concepts and distinctions which characterize moral realism. The subsequent parts contain essays first defending the idea that morality is a naturalistic phenomenon like other subject matters studied by the empirical sciences; second, that morality is a non-natural phenomenon like logic or “pure rationality”; and the final section is dedicated to those theories which deny the usefulness of the natural/non-natural distinction. The twenty-five commissioned essays cover the field of moral realism in a comprehensive and highly accessible way.

“Moral realism” is a family of theories of morality united by the idea that there are moral facts--facts about what is right or wrong or good or bad--and that morality is not simply a matter of personal preferences, emotions, attitudes, or sociological conventions. The fundamental thought underlying moral realism can be expressed as a parity thesis. There are many kinds of facts, including physical, psychological, mathematical, temporal, and moral facts. So understood, moral realism can be distinguished from a variety of anti-realist theories including expressivism, non-cognitivism, and error theory.The Handbook is divided into four parts, the first of which contains essays about the basic concepts and distinctions which characterize moral realism. The subsequent parts contain essays first defending the idea that morality is a naturalistic phenomenon like other subject matters studied by the empirical sciences; second, that morality is a non-natural phenomenon like logic or “pure rationality”; and the final section is dedicated to those theories which deny the usefulness of the natural/non-natural distinction. The twenty-five commissioned essays cover the field of moral realism in a comprehensive and highly accessible way.

We typically assume that the standard for what is beautiful lies in the eye of the beholder. Yet this is not the case when we consider morality; what we deem morally good is not usually a matter of opinion. Such thoughts push us toward being realists about moral properties, but a cogent theory of moral realism has long been an elusive philosophical goal. Paul Bloomfield here offers a rigorous defense of moral realism, developing an ontology for morality that models the property of being morally good on the property of being physically healthy. The model is assembled systematically; it first presents the metaphysics of healthiness and goodness, then explains our epistemic access to properties such as these, adds a complementary analysis of the semantics and syntax of moral discourse, and finishes with a discussion of how we become motivated to act morally. Bloomfield closely attends to the traditional challenges facing moral realism, and the discussion nimbly ranges from modern medical theory to ancient theories of virtue, and from animal navigation to the nature of normativity. Maintaining a highly readable style throughout, Moral Reality yields one of the most compelling theories of moral realism to date and will appeal to philosophers working on issues in metaphysics or moral philosophy.

Ever since "Know Thyself" was inscribed at Delphi, Western philosophers have struggled to understand the relations between morality and self-interest. This edited volume of essays pushes forward one of the oldest and most important debates in philosophy. Is morality a check on self-interest or is it in one''s self interest to be moral? Can morality and self-interest be understood independently of each other? Christopher Morris, The Trouble With Justice Mathias Risse, Nietzsche on Selfishness, Justice, and the Duties of the Higher Men Richard Joyce, Morality, Schmorality David Schmidtz, Because It''s Right Thomas Nagel, The Value of Inviolability Samuel Scheffler, Potential Congruence Stephen Finlay, Too Much Morality Terence Irwin Scotus and the Possibility of Moral Motivation Ralph Wedgwood, Butler on Virtue, Self Interest, and Human Nature Julia Annas, Virtue Ethics and the Charge of EgoismW.D. Falk, Morality, Self, and Others Paul Bloomfield, Why It''s Bad To Be Bad Joel Kupperman, Classical and Sour Forms of Virtue Michael Stocker, Shame and Guilt; Self Interest and Morality

As children, we learn life is unfair: bad things happen to good people and good things happen to bad people. So, it is natural to ask, "Why play fairly in an unfair world? If being immoral will get you what you want and you know you can't get caught, why not do it?" The answers, as argued herein, begin by rejecting the idea that morality and happiness are at odds with one another. From this point of view, we can see how immorality undermines its perpetrator's happiness: self-respect is necessary for happiness, and immorality undermines self-respect. As we see how our self-respect is conditional upon how we respect others, we learn to evaluate and value ourselves, and others, appropriately. The central thesis is the result of combining the ancient Greek conception of happiness (eudaimonia) with a modern conception of self-respect. We become happy, we live the best life we can, only by becoming virtuous: by being as courageous, just, temperate, and wise as can be. These are the virtues of happiness. This book explains why it is bad to be bad and good to be good, and what happens to people's values as their practical rationality develops.

Over the course of this short, accessible book, Paul Bloomfield offers a rigorous defense of moral realism by developing an ontology for morality which models being morally good on being physically healthy. He develops this model by explaining the metaphysics of moral properties, our epistemic access to them, the structure of moral discourse, and how we become motivated to act morally.

We typically assume that the standard for what is beautiful lies in the eye of the beholder. Yet this is not the case when we consider morality; what we deem morally good is not usually a matter of opinion. Such thoughts push us toward being realists about moral properties, but a cogent theory of moral realism has long been an elusive philosophical goal. Paul Bloomfield here offers a rigorous defense of moral realism, developing an ontology for morality that models the property of being morally good on the property of being physically healthy. The model is assembled systematically; it first presents the metaphysics of healthiness and goodness, then explains our epistemic access to properties such as these, adds a complementary analysis of the semantics and syntax of moral discourse, and finishes with a discussion of how we become motivated to act morally. Bloomfield closely attends to the traditional challenges facing moral realism, and the discussion nimbly ranges from modern medical theory to ancient theories of virtue, and from animal navigation to the nature of normativity.^l Maintaining a highly readable style throughout, Moral Reality yields one of the most compelling theories of moral realism to date and will appeal to philosophers working on issues in metaphysics or moral philosophy.

The relationship between morality and self-interest is a perennial one in philosophy, at the center of moral theory. It goes back to Plato's Republic, which debated whether living morally was in a person's best interest or simply for dupes. Hobbes also claimed that morality was not in the best interests of the individual; Kant, however, thought that morality ought to be followed anyway even if it was not in a person's interest. Aristotle, Hume, Machiavelli, and Nietzsche all had much to say on the subject, and contemporary philosophers like Thomas Nagel and David Gauthier discuss it a good deal as well. Little of the contemporary work has been published in book format however. Bloomfield's edited volume is the first such book truly devoted to this important topic, presenting brand new, commissioned articles on this subject by some of the top philosophers working today.Bloomfield provides an introduction to the topic and its place in philosophical history in his introduction. The volume will then be divided into three sections. The first will lay out the two sides of the debate; the second will cover views on morality as external to the self and thus not in our self-interest; and the third will focus on morality as intrinsic to the self and thus in our self-interest. Contributions includes newly published work by 13 top-notch philosophers, among them Thomas Nagel, Julia Annas, Samuel Scheffler, David Schmidtz, and Terence Irwin, as well as a previously published piece by W. D. Falk. The volume will act as a useful collection of scholarship by top figures, and as a resource and course book on an important topic.

We typically assume that the standard for what is beautiful lies in the eye of the beholder. Yet this is not the case when we consider morality; what we deem morally good is not usually a matter of opinion. Such thoughts push us toward being realists about moral properties, but a cogent theory of moral realism has long been an elusive philosophical goal. Paul Bloomfield here offers a rigorous defense of moral realism, developing an ontology for morality that models the property of being morally good on the property of being physically healthy. The model is assembled systematically; it first presents the metaphysics of healthiness and goodness, then explains our epistemic access to properties such as these, adds a complementary analysis of the semantics and syntax of moral discourse, and finishes with a discussion of how we become motivated to act morally. Bloomfield closely attends to the traditional challenges facing moral realism, and the discussion nimbly ranges from modern medical theory to ancient theories of virtue, and from animal navigation to the nature of normativity. Maintaining a highly readable style throughout, Moral Reality yields one of the most compelling theories of moral realism to date and will appeal to philosophers working on issues in metaphysics or moral philosophy.

Ever since "Know Thyself" was inscribed at Delphi, Western philosophers have struggled to understand the relations between morality and self-interest. This edited volume of essays pushes forward one of the oldest and most important debates in philosophy. Is morality a check on self-interest or is it in one''s self interest to be moral? Can morality and self-interest be understood independently of each other? Christopher Morris, The Trouble With Justice Mathias Risse, Nietzsche on Selfishness, Justice, and the Duties of the Higher Men Richard Joyce, Morality, Schmorality David Schmidtz, Because It''s Right Thomas Nagel, The Value of Inviolability Samuel Scheffler, Potential Congruence Stephen Finlay, Too Much Morality Terence Irwin Scotus and the Possibility of Moral Motivation Ralph Wedgwood, Butler on Virtue, Self Interest, and Human Nature Julia Annas, Virtue Ethics and the Charge of EgoismW.D. Falk, Morality, Self, and Others Paul Bloomfield, Why It''s Bad To Be Bad Joel Kupperman, Classical and Sour Forms of Virtue Michael Stocker, Shame and Guilt; Self Interest and Morality

As children we learn life is unfair: bad things happen to good people and good things happen to bad people. So, it is natural to ask, "Why play fairly in an unfair world? If being immoral will get you what you want and you know you can't get caught, why not do it?" The answers, as argued herein, begin with the idea that morality and happiness are not in competition. If this is so, then we can see how immorality undermines its perpetrator's happiness: self-respect is necessary for happiness, and immorality undermines self-respect. As we see how our self-respect is conditional upon how we respect others, we learn to evaluate and value ourselves, and others, appropriately. The central thesis is the result of combining the ancient Greek conception of happiness (eudaimonia) with a modern conception of self-respect. We become happy, we life the best life we can, only by becoming virtuous: by being as courageous, fair, temperate, and wise as can be. These are the virtues of happiness. This book explains why it is bad to be bad and good to be good, and what happens to people's values as their practical rationality develops.

As children, we learn life is unfair: bad things happen to good people and good things happen to bad people. So, it is natural to ask, "Why play fairly in an unfair world? If being immoral will get you what you want and you know you can''t get caught, why not do it?" The answers, as argued herein, begin by rejecting the idea that morality and happiness are at odds with one another. From this point of view, we can see how immorality undermines its perpetrator''s happiness: self-respect is necessary for happiness, and immorality undermines self-respect. As we see how our self-respect is conditional upon how we respect others, we learn to evaluate and value ourselves, and others, appropriately. The central thesis is the result of combining the ancient Greek conception of happiness (eudaimonia) with a modern conception of self-respect. We become happy, we live the best life we can, only by becoming virtuous: by being as courageous, just, temperate, and wise as can be. These are the virtues of happiness. This book explains why it is bad to be bad and good to be good, and what happens to people''s values as their practical rationality develops.

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