Rami Ginat – författare

The Paradox of Peace offers the first comprehensive, interdisciplinary examination of Egyptian–Israeli relations from Anwar Sadat's historic 1977 peace initiative through the end of Husni Mubarak's rule in 2011. It explores the central paradox of Egypt's sustained strategic cooperation with Israel at the state level, alongside deep and persistent opposition to normalization at the societal level. Despite major regional crises and internal challenges, genuine normalization has remained elusive, yet the strategic peace proved to be stable for over four decades.At the heart of the book is an inquiry into why Egypt's peace with Israel matured into a stable strategic partnership without progressing towards warmer, more integrated relations. Combining political and intellectual history with peace and conflict studies, the book charts the evolution of peace across different historical phases and distinguishes between "cold," "strategic," and "warm" peace. It introduces a new conceptual framework that differentiates between utilitarian and cultural normalization, offering a novel lens through which to assess the Egyptian–Israeli relationship. Anchored in a wide array of primary sources in Arabic, Hebrew, and English, the book brings new evidence and interpretations to the fore. The analysis includes materials from journals and newspapers associated with left-wing, Islamist, liberal, nationalist, and unaffiliated currents, as well as cultural products and public debates that reveal the broader societal context. It focuses on the Egyptian discourse on Israel, examining how leaders, intellectual elites, and the public engaged with the peace process over time; the writings and views of Egyptian intellectuals from across the political spectrum, whose voices reflected both the diversity and the intensity of opposition to normalization; and the role of civil society and various opposition groups in resisting the Egyptian–Israeli peace and shaping its trajectory. It emphasizes the interplay between Egypt's strategic interests and its Arab and Palestinian commitments, as well as the psychological and ideological barriers that have prevented deeper reconciliation with Israel, but not the establishment of a stable peace.

The importance of Lutfi al-Khuli and the intellectual circle associated with the Nasserist regime is examined here. Rami Ginat looks at al-Khuli's contribution to the short-lived yet formidable success of Arab socialism.

The importance of Lutfi al-Khuli and the intellectual circle associated with the Nasserist regime is examined here. Rami Ginat looks at al-Khuli's contribution to the short-lived yet formidable success of Arab socialism.

The Soviet Union and Egypt, first published in 1993, sheds new light on Soviet policy towards the Middle East after 1945. It seeks to uncover and analyse the events leading to the eventual domination of Egypt and other Arab countries by the Soviet Union. Soviet penetration into the region can only be understood by tracing the roots and motives of Soviet policy after the Second World War. The strengthening of Soviet influence resulted from a process of gradual political and ideological development in Egypt. Special attention is drawn to domestic and foreign developments in both countries, and the book makes extensive use of recently declassified documents and primary sources.

The Soviet Union and Egypt, first published in 1993, sheds new light on Soviet policy towards the Middle East after 1945. It seeks to uncover and analyse the events leading to the eventual domination of Egypt and other Arab countries by the Soviet Union. Soviet penetration into the region can only be understood by tracing the roots and motives of Soviet policy after the Second World War. The strengthening of Soviet influence resulted from a process of gradual political and ideological development in Egypt. Special attention is drawn to domestic and foreign developments in both countries, and the book makes extensive use of recently declassified documents and primary sources.

For decades, the doctrine of the 'Unity of the Nile Valley' united Egyptians of a variety of political and nationalist backgrounds. Many Egyptians regarded Sudan as an integral part of their homeland, and therefore battled to rid the entire Nile Valley of British imperialism and unite its inhabitants under the Egyptian crown. Here, Rami Ginat provides a vital and important revised account of the history of Egypt's colonialist struggle and their efforts to prove categorically that the Nile Valley constituted a single territorial unit. These were clustered around several dominant theoretical layers: history, geography, economy, culture and ethnography. This book, for both Middle Eastern and African historians, uses a mixture of Arabic and English sources to critically examine the central stages in the historical development of Egypt's doctrine, concentrating on the defining decade (1943-1953) that first witnessed both the pinnacle of the doctrine's struggle and the subsequent shattering of a consensual nationalist dream.

For decades, the doctrine of the 'Unity of the Nile Valley' united Egyptians of a variety of political and nationalist backgrounds. Many Egyptians regarded Sudan as an integral part of their homeland, and therefore battled to rid the entire Nile Valley of British imperialism and unite its inhabitants under the Egyptian crown. Here, Rami Ginat provides a vital and important revised account of the history of Egypt's colonialist struggle and their efforts to prove categorically that the Nile Valley constituted a single territorial unit. These were clustered around several dominant theoretical layers: history, geography, economy, culture and ethnography. This book, for both Middle Eastern and African historians, uses a mixture of Arabic and English sources to critically examine the central stages in the historical development of Egypt's doctrine, concentrating on the defining decade (1943-1953) that first witnessed both the pinnacle of the doctrine's struggle and the subsequent shattering of a consensual nationalist dream.

With the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifadat al-Aqsa in September 2000 that followed the failure of the Camp David II summit, the chain of belligerent events took Egypt by surprise. Facing a dilemma in its search for an appropriate policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli escalation, this study argues that Egypt's policy towards the second Intifada may best be understood by scrutinising several circles of reference that directly affected its policymaking process throughout the long years of the bloody Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These circles of reference comprise interests and calculations derived from Egyptian internal issues; regional factors -- Egypt's role and position in the Arab world in general, and its relations with the Palestinians in particular; Egypt's relations with Israel; and its strategic ties with the United States. The growing strength and the expansion of the global Islamic terrorist network that challenges the stability of the present Arab regimes constitutes a lynchpin at every layer. Egypt's foreign policy is based on Realpolitik, that is, on pragmatic and material factors rather than on ideological or moral considerations. Safeguarding its national interests is Egypt's prime goal. In this regard, Egypt considers the peace with Israel as a strategic national asset. For Mubarak's regime, the abrogation of the peace treaty with Israel has never been an option, even during the worst days of the Intifada. Mubarak has shown exemplary restraint throughout the conflict. Despite occasional harsh anti-Israeli statements aimed mainly at easing internal and external pressures, Mubarak's regime can, on the whole, be seen as a responsible and stabilising factor vehemently striving to prevent regional escalation. This study is based primarily on Egyptian sources as well as interviews and conversations with senior members of the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies. It also draws on other primary and secondary sources in Arabic, Hebrew and English. The book is essential reading for all scholars involved and engaged with the Israel-Arab conflict.