Roderick M. Chisholm – författare

Franz Brentano developed an original theory of intrinsic value which he attempted to base on his philosophical psychology. Roderick Chisholm presents here a critical exposition of this theory and its place in Brentano's general philosophical system. He gives a detailed account of Brentano's ontology, showing how Brentano tried to secure objectivity for ethics not through a theory of practical reason, but through his theory of the intentional objects of emotions and desires. Professor Chisholm goes on to develop certain suggestions about intrinsic value made by Brentano and his students, and discusses their relevance to theodicy and the problem of evil. Brentano, as the teacher of Husserl, Meinong, Twardowski, and others, stands at the origin of the phenomenological tradition and of the Polish school of philosophy that developed after World War I. He has also had considerable influence on Anglo-American philosophy. This book will interest those concerned with the origins of phenomenological value theory and more generally with the connections between ethics and philosophical psychology.

Roderick Chisholm has been for many years one of the most important and influential philosophers contributing to metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. This book can be viewed as a summation of his views on an enormous range of topics in metaphysics and epistemology. Yet it is written in the terse, lucid, unpretentious style that has become a hallmark of Chisholm's work. The book is an original treatise designed to defend an original, non-Aristotelian theory of categories. Chisholm argues that there are necessary things and contingent things; necessary things being things that are not capable of coming into being or passing away. He defends the argument from design, and thus includes the category of necessary substance (God). Further contentions of the essay are that attributes are also necessary beings, but not necessary substances, and that human beings are contingent substances but may not be material substances.

Convinced that both epistemology and philosophy have gone astray in the twentieth century, George Chatalian seeks to restore the classical tradition in both, in part by marshaling a mass of data about philosophical skepticism throughout the history of philosophy, data which taken as a whole are not to be found in any other work. Despite the extensive historical and linguistic investigations, however, the work is essentially a philosophical one. After outlining the theses he sees as central to the epistemology of Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, W. V. Quine and those more or less deeply influenced by them, and after tracing these claims to their deeper source in the analytic conception of philosophy, Chatalian assesses the claims such theses make about the Greek skeptics, sophists, and Plato. Such an assessment, Chatalian argues, exposes the false foundations of analytic epistemology. Epistemology and Skepticism outlines a complete epistemology in what, according to its author, is the classical sense.

Den Plan, seine Untersuchungen zur Deskriptiven Psychologie in einem umfassenden Werk zur Darstellung zu bringen, hat Brentano nicht verwirklicht. Neben kleineren Schriften zu diesem Gedankenkreis sind aber die Kollegmanuskripte der 1887 bis 1891 unter wechselnden Titeln gehaltenen Wiener Vorlesungen zur Deskriptiven Psychologie erhalten.

Die in diesem Band vereinten Aufsätze spiegeln Brentanos späte Ansichten wieder; die Einleitung wurde für den allgemein philosophisch interessierten Leser konzipiert und behandelt Brentanos Theorie des Kontinuums, des Ursprungs des Zeitbewußtseins und -begriffs und seine Theorie des Räumlichen.

Dieser Band präsentiert den Text der Originalausgabe von 1907, drei weitere Arbeiten über ein optisches Paradoxon sowie sieben bisher unveröffentlichte Basisuntersuchungen zum Problem Sinneswahrnehmungen, die Brentano in eine zweite Auflage aufgenommen wissen wollte.