Roland Vaubel – författare

In the 1999 IEA Hayek Memorial Lecture, reprinted in Occasional Paper 111, Otmar Issing, the eminent monetary economist and one of Europe's most influential central bankers, discusses currency competition and European Monetary Union. Professor Issing argues that choosing a '..Hayekian discovery process as a route to monetary union' would have been too risky. However, the introduction of the euro has triggered '..a kind of Hayekian discovery process' which gives more scope for the private sector to 'enhance the quality of the medium-of-exchange and store-of-value functions of money.' This Occasional Paper also includes commentaries by two other distinguished economists - Professors Lawrence H. White and Roland Vaubel - who criticise Professor Issing's views. There is then an Afterword by Issing.

The institutions of the European Union are gaining more and more power at the expense of national and local governments, as well as individuals and private businesses. There would appear to be no reverse gear in this process, while objections from the general public, as expressed in periodic referenda, tend to be brushed aside. This ground-breaking study explains increasing centralization by analyzing the economic incentives at work. The structure of European institutions means they have a vested interest in ever-closer union because this enhances their influence and prestige. Moreover, the bureaucrats themselves are self-selecting. Those that are pro-EU are more likely to seek positions in these organizations and therefore tend to favor policies which give the institutions more responsibilities. The author sets out a series of reforms designed to counteract the centralizing tendency and to ensure that the role of EU bodies is more closely aligned with the preferences of citizens.

The idea for this volume was conceived by Frederick Praeger, founder of Westview Press, who asked Roland Vaubel if he would put together a collection of chapters on the public choice approach to the study of international organizations. Vaubel felt it would be useful to have a coeditor from the United States, and Thomas D. Willett enthusiastically agreed to take on these duties.

This book focuses on the nature of the public choice approach and many of the types of issues it raises. It presents a number of specific applications of public choice theory to the analysis of major international and regional economic organizations.

Organized, readable, technically sound and comprehensive from both theoretical and empirical standpoints, this book summarizes a vast amount of institutional, historical and descriptive detail.Using case studies from the US, Canada, Germany and Switzerland as well as the European Union and the global economy, this is the first book of its kind to examine historical evidence on how competition among states – or the lack of it – affects regulation, especially labour market regulation. Edited by internationally respected scholars of economics and containing contributions from eminent economists, this book reveals important implications as to whether European political integration leads to more regulation and whether globalization restrains regulation. It will be of great interest to both economists and students engaged with political economy, public choice and regulation.

Organized, readable, technically sound and comprehensive from both theoretical and empirical standpoints, this book summarizes a vast amount of institutional, historical and descriptive detail.Using case studies from the US, Canada, Germany and Switzerland as well as the European Union and the global economy, this is the first book of its kind to examine historical evidence on how competition among states – or the lack of it – affects regulation, especially labour market regulation. Edited by internationally respected scholars of economics and containing contributions from eminent economists, this book reveals important implications as to whether European political integration leads to more regulation and whether globalization restrains regulation. It will be of great interest to both economists and students engaged with political economy, public choice and regulation.

Do political decentralisation and inter state competition favour innovation and growth? There has long been a lively debate surrounding this question, going back to David Hume and Immanuel Kant. This book is a new attempt to test its veracity. The existing literature tends to assume that the beneficial effects of inter state competition have been confined to European history. By contrast, China, India and the Islamic Middle East are regarded as inherently imperial and overcentralised. However, these civilisations have not always been unified politically. In their history, there have been long spells of decentralised rule or inter state competition. The same is true for Japan. If the Hume-Kant hypothesis is correct, it should also apply to those periods. This volume analyses the qualitative and quantitative evidence. The authors comprise eminent historians, sociologists, economists and socio-psychologists and the resulting book is a truly interdisciplinary enterprise. Addressing a wide readership, this book will hold strong appeal for scholars and researchers of general, Asian and economic history, political economy, political science and sociology.

This book discusses theories of monetary and financial innovation and applies them to key monetary and financial innovations in history – starting with the use of silver bars in Mesopotamia and ending with the emergence of the Eurodollar market in London. The key monetary innovations are coinage (Asia minor, China, India), the payment of interest on loans, the bill of exchange and deposit banking (Venice, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London). The main financial innovation is the emergence of bond markets (also starting in Venice). Episodes of innovation are contrasted with relatively stagnant environments (the Persian Empire, the Roman Empire, the Spanish Empire). The comparisons suggest that small, open and competing jurisdictions have been more innovative than large empires – as has been suggested by David Hume in 1742.

This book discusses theories of monetary and financial innovation and applies them to key monetary and financial innovations in history – starting with the use of silver bars in Mesopotamia and ending with the emergence of the Eurodollar market in London. The key monetary innovations are coinage (Asia minor, China, India), the payment of interest on loans, the bill of exchange and deposit banking (Venice, Antwerp, Amsterdam, London). The main financial innovation is the emergence of bond markets (also starting in Venice). Episodes of innovation are contrasted with relatively stagnant environments (the Persian Empire, the Roman Empire, the Spanish Empire). The comparisons suggest that small, open and competing jurisdictions have been more innovative than large empires – as has been suggested by David Hume in 1742.

This volume confronts an important historical hypothesis with empirical evidence from selected periods of history. The hypothesis in question states that competition among political and legal organisations in developing rules has been a crucial condition for liberty, innovation and growth in the history of mankind. It is due to Immanuel Kant, Edward Gibbon and Max Weber and has been revived and further developed by Nobel-Laureate Douglass C. North who contributes the first chapter. The volume brings together political economists, historians and legal scholars to discuss the role of political competition in the rise and decline of nations - both in theory and in a large number of case studies.