Sandra B. Rosenthal - Böcker

This book utilizes the vision offered by classical American pragmatism as a conceptual framework for rethinking business ethics.

Unites George Herbert Mead and Maurice Merleau-Ponty in a shared rejection of substance philosophy as well as spectator theory of knowledge, in favor of a focus on the ultimacy of temporal process and the constitutive function of social praxis.This book unites George Herbert Mead and Maurice Merleau-Ponty in a shared rejection of substance philosophy as well as spectator theory of knowledge, in favor of a focus on the ultimacy of temporal process and the constitutive function of social praxis. Both Mead and Merleau-Ponty return to the richness of lived experience within nature, and both lead to radically new, insightful visions of the nature of selfhood, language, freedom, and time itself, as well as of the nature of the relation between the so-called "tensions" of appearance and reality, sensation and object, the individual and the community, freedom and constraint, and continuity and creativity.

This work runs counter to the traditional interpretations of Peirce's philosophy by eliciting an inherent strand of pragmatic pluralism that is embedded in the very core of his thought and that weaves his various doctrines into a systematic pattern of pluralism.Rosenthal gives a new design to the seeming bedrock of Peirce's position: convergence toward the final ultimate opinion of the community of interpreters in the idealized long run. Focusing frequently on passages from Peirce's writings which have been virtually ignored in the more traditional interpretations of his work, this book shows the way in which Peirce's position, far from lying in opposition to the Kuhnian interpretation of science, provides strong and much needed metaphysical and epistemic underpinnings for it in a way which avoids the pitfalls of false alternatives offered by the philosophical tradition. The book examines in depth the various features of Peirce's position that enter into these underpinnings. Among the topics explored are meaning, truth, perception, world, sign relations, realism, categorical inquiry, phenomenology, temporality, and speculative metaphysics.

This work runs counter to the traditional interpretations of Peirce's philosophy by eliciting an inherent strand of pragmatic pluralism that is embedded in the very core of his thought and that weaves his various doctrines into a systematic pattern of pluralism.Rosenthal gives a new design to the seeming bedrock of Peirce's position: convergence toward the final ultimate opinion of the community of interpreters in the idealized long run. Focusing frequently on passages from Peirce's writings which have been virtually ignored in the more traditional interpretations of his work, this book shows the way in which Peirce's position, far from lying in opposition to the Kuhnian interpretation of science, provides strong and much needed metaphysical and epistemic underpinnings for it in a way which avoids the pitfalls of false alternatives offered by the philosophical tradition. The book examines in depth the various features of Peirce's position that enter into these underpinnings. Among the topics explored are meaning, truth, perception, world, sign relations, realism, categorical inquiry, phenomenology, temporality, and speculative metaphysics.

Offers a pragmatically oriented reconstruction of the central issues of time.Focusing on the issue of temporality, this book explores the assumptions guiding the frameworks of philosophers who have shaped the contours of the contemporary philosophical landscape, including Whitehead, Weiss, Derrida, McTaggart, and Heidegger. In the process, it remaps the terrain, often finding similarities where differences-some quite radical-are generally accepted, and finding differences where similarities are generally accepted. Rosenthal exposes the pragmatic perspective of temporality involving a radical rethinking of traditional ways of understanding and interrelating the key issues of time-discreteness and continuity; fixity and indeterminacy; potentiality, actuality, and possibility; past, present, and future.

Due to the unprecedented interest which the announcement of the topic of epistemology evoked from contributors, two annual volumes will be devoted to it. This volume accordingly is entitled Epistemology I, and the next volume will be entitled Epistemology II. The Editor KNOWING IN THE STRONG SENSE PETER M. BURKHOLDER Professor Norman Malcolm has defended what he calls "the strong sense" of "know." 1 It is one of the propositional senses; i.e. what is said to be known, in this sense, is an item of information rather than a person, a poem, a physical object, or a skill. According to· Malcolm, this sense of "know" is important and useful.' Philosophers have had it "in mind when they have spoken of 'perfect,' 'metaphysical,' or 'strict' cer­ tainty" (Ke, 70). Moreover, laymen use it when they profess to know such obvious truths as "2 + 2 = 4" or "This is an ink-bottle" (said while peering at and poking an ink-bottle). Nevertheless, in spite of his opinion that it is important, Malcolm has not given a detailed analysis of the strong sense of "know." Thus we may be justified in studying it, first to determine exactly what it is, and then to evaluate it. I do not, of course, wish to suggest that Malcolm necessarily WQuid accept my account of the strong sense as an accurate expli­ cation of his opinions. However, in its descriptive aspects my analysis seems compatible with his written statements.