Seana Valentine Shiffrin – författare

In this book, based on her 2017 Berkeley Tanner Lectures, Seana Valentine Shiffrin offers an original, deontological account of democracy, law, and their interrelation. Her central thesis is that democracy and democratic law have intrinsically valuable, interconnected communicative functions. Democracy and democratic law together allow us to fulfill our fundamental duties to convey to each another messages of equal respect by fashioning the sorts of public joint commitments to act that a sincere message of equal respect requires. Law and democracy are essential to each other: the aspirations of democracy cannot be realized except through a legal system, and, conversely, law can fulfill its primary function only in a democratic context. After defending these theses, Shiffrin explores two doctrinal examples to illustrate how a communicative conception of democratic law would yield concrete implications. First, articulating the special democratic character of judicially articulated common law, she resists instrumental, outcome-oriented conceptions of law and defends the essential importance of the common law duty of good faith in contracts. Second, appealing to the need for law to articulate a coherent set of moral commitments, she criticizes the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to constitutional balancing. In a set of commentaries, Niko Kolodny, Richard Brooks, and Anna Stilz offer illuminating and sometimes provocative discussion of both the philosophical and the legal aspects of Shiffrin's discussion. Shiffrin's responses expand upon themes concerning legal compliance, commitments, communication, dissent, political participation, and the permissible range of state interests.

In this book, based on her 2017 Berkeley Tanner Lectures, Seana Valentine Shiffrin offers an original, deontological account of democracy, law, and their interrelation. Her central thesis is that democracy and democratic law have intrinsically valuable, interconnected communicative functions. Democracy and democratic law together allow us to fulfill our fundamental duties to convey to each another messages of equal respect by fashioning the sorts of public joint commitments to act that a sincere message of equal respect requires. Law and democracy are essential to each other: the aspirations of democracy cannot be realized except through a legal system, and, conversely, law can fulfill its primary function only in a democratic context.After defending these theses, Shiffrin explores two doctrinal examples to illustrate how a communicative conception of democratic law would yield concrete implications. First, articulating the special democratic character of judicially articulated common law, she resists instrumental, outcome-oriented conceptions of law and defends the essential importance of the common law duty of good faith in contracts. Second, appealing to the need for law to articulate a coherent set of moral commitments, she criticizes the U.S. Supreme Court''s approach to constitutional balancing. In a set of commentaries, Niko Kolodny, Richard Brooks, and Anna Stilz offer illuminating and sometimes provocative discussion of both the philosophical and the legal aspects of Shiffrin''s discussion. Shiffrin''s responses expand upon themes concerning legal compliance, commitments, communication, dissent, political participation, and the permissible range of state interests.

In this book, based on her 2017 Berkeley Tanner Lectures, Seana Valentine Shiffrin offers an original, deontological account of democracy, law, and their interrelation. Her central thesis is that democracy and democratic law have intrinsically valuable, interconnected communicative functions. Democracy and democratic law together allow us to fulfill our fundamental duties to convey to each another messages of equal respect by fashioning the sorts of public joint commitments to act that a sincere message of equal respect requires. Law and democracy are essential to each other: the aspirations of democracy cannot be realized except through a legal system, and, conversely, law can fulfill its primary function only in a democratic context.After defending these theses, Shiffrin explores two doctrinal examples to illustrate how a communicative conception of democratic law would yield concrete implications. First, articulating the special democratic character of judicially articulated common law, she resists instrumental, outcome-oriented conceptions of law and defends the essential importance of the common law duty of good faith in contracts. Second, appealing to the need for law to articulate a coherent set of moral commitments, she criticizes the U.S. Supreme Court''s approach to constitutional balancing. In a set of commentaries, Niko Kolodny, Richard Brooks, and Anna Stilz offer illuminating and sometimes provocative discussion of both the philosophical and the legal aspects of Shiffrin''s discussion. Shiffrin''s responses expand upon themes concerning legal compliance, commitments, communication, dissent, political participation, and the permissible range of state interests.

The Second Edition of this ground-breaking collection gives students all the tools they need to understand and engage with major philosophical issues. Students are presented with clear yet thorough topic introductions, historical context, reading guides for challenging selections and exclusive commissioned essays written by leading contemporary philosophers specifically for undergraduates. The Second Edition features a NEW co-author, a NEW focus on diversity within the field and NEW readings and topics relevant to students’ lives.

To understand one another as individuals and to fulfill the moral duties that require such understanding, we must communicate with each other. We must also maintain protected channels that render reliable communication possible, a demand that, Seana Shiffrin argues, yields a prohibition against lying and requires protection for free speech. This book makes a distinctive philosophical argument for the wrong of the lie and provides an original account of its difference from the wrong of deception. Drawing on legal as well as philosophical arguments, the book defends a series of notable claims--that you may not lie about everything to the "murderer at the door," that you have reasons to keep promises offered under duress, that lies are not protected by free speech, that police subvert their mission when they lie to suspects, and that scholars undermine their goals when they lie to research subjects. Many philosophers start to craft moral exceptions to demands for sincerity and fidelity when they confront wrongdoers, the pressures of non-ideal circumstances, or the achievement of morally substantial ends.But Shiffrin consistently resists this sort of exceptionalism, arguing that maintaining a strong basis for trust and reliable communication through practices of sincerity, fidelity, and respecting free speech is an essential aspect of ensuring the conditions for moral progress, including our rehabilitation of and moral reconciliation with wrongdoers.

To understand one another as individuals and to fulfill the moral duties that require such understanding, we must communicate with each other. We must also maintain protected channels that render reliable communication possible, a demand that, Seana Shiffrin argues, yields a prohibition against lying and requires protection for free speech. This book makes a distinctive philosophical argument for the wrong of the lie and provides an original account of its difference from the wrong of deception. Drawing on legal as well as philosophical arguments, the book defends a series of notable claims--that you may not lie about everything to the "murderer at the door," that you have reasons to keep promises offered under duress, that lies are not protected by free speech, that police subvert their mission when they lie to suspects, and that scholars undermine their goals when they lie to research subjects. Many philosophers start to craft moral exceptions to demands for sincerity and fidelity when they confront wrongdoers, the pressures of non-ideal circumstances, or the achievement of morally substantial ends.But Shiffrin consistently resists this sort of exceptionalism, arguing that maintaining a strong basis for trust and reliable communication through practices of sincerity, fidelity, and respecting free speech is an essential aspect of ensuring the conditions for moral progress, including our rehabilitation of and moral reconciliation with wrongdoers.