Shreya Atrey – författare

This thoughtfully edited volume explores the operation of equality and discrimination law in times of crisis. It aims to understand how existing inequalities are exacerbated in crises and whether equality law has the tools to understand and address this contingency. Experience during the COVID-19 crisis shows that the pandemic has acted as a catalyst for 'exponential inequalities' related to racism, xenophobia, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, ageism, and ableism. Yet, the field of equality law (which is meant to be addressing such discrimination or inequality) has had little immediate relevance in mitigating these exponential inequalities. This is despite the fact that countries like the UK have a rather recent and state-of-the-art legislation in the field, namely the Equality Act 2010. Exponential Inequalities offers readers an understanding of how these inequalities came to be and how crises such as the global pandemic, the climate emergency, or the economic downturn, can exacerbate an already untenable situation. It illuminates both the structural and the conceptual, as well as the practical and doctrinal difficulties currently experienced in equality law, and discusses whether or not equality law even has the tools to both understand and then address this contingency. Written by a team of internationally recognized experts, Exponential Inequalities provides a comparative perspective on the functioning of equality laws across a range of contexts and jurisdictions and represents an essential read for scholars and policy makers alike.

This book examines the concept of intersectional discrimination and why it has been difficult for jurisdictions around the world to redress it in discrimination law. 'Intersectionality' was coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989. Thirty years since its conception, the term has become a buzzword in sociology, anthropology, feminist studies, psychology, literature, and politics. But it remains marginal in the discourse of discrimination law, where it was first conceived. Traversing its long and rich history of development, the book explains what intersectionality is as a theory and as a category of discrimination. It then explains what it takes for discrimination law to be reimagined from the perspective of intersectionality in reference to comparative laws in the US, UK, South Africa, Canada, India, and the jurisprudence of the European Courts (CJEU and ECtHR) and international human rights treaty bodies.

Is there anything like a principle of anti-racism in law? Anti-Racism as a Legal Principle shows that while racial discrimination law is often perceived to be anti-racist, it is only so in a liberal or cultural, but not transformative, sense. Racial discrimination law is effective only against a narrow range of interpersonal or individual racism, thus leaving intact structural racism and the drivers of racial disadvantage. This book argues that anti-racism must be recognized as a legal principle in order to effectively confront and address the full extent of structural racism.Shreya Atrey presents a theoretical account of anti-racism as a legal principle and locates it within the legal doctrine of British, comparative (Canadian, Indian and South African), and international law. It shows how the personal, material, evidential, and remedial scope of racial discrimination law across these contexts is limited in the absence of anti-racism as a legal principle. It also shows how, occasionally, anti-racism is genuinely embraced when structural racism (how state and state-like entities racialize to instate a framework of racial disadvantage) is addressed in a broad-based and intersectional way (as opposed to individual, incremental or piecemeal way). Ultimately, Anti-Racism as a Legal Principle shows that law, especially racial discrimination law, can and indeed should be anti-racist by committing to address structural racism in a transformative sense.

This book examines the concept of intersectional discrimination and why it has been difficult for jurisdictions around the world to redress it in discrimination law. 'Intersectionality' was coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989. Thirty years since its conception, the term has become a buzzword in sociology, anthropology, feminist studies, psychology, literature, and politics. But it remains marginal in the discourse of discrimination law, where it was first conceived. Traversing its long and rich history of development, the book explains what intersectionality is as a theory and as a category of discrimination. It then explains what it takes for discrimination law to be reimagined from the perspective of intersectionality in reference to comparative laws in the US, UK, South Africa, Canada, India, and the jurisprudence of the European Courts (CJEU and ECtHR) and international human rights treaty bodies.

This collection of essays analyses how diversity in human identity and disadvantage affects the articulation, realisation, violation and enforcement of human rights. The question arises from the realisation that people, who are severally and severely disadvantaged because of their race, religion, gender, age, disability, sexual orientation, class etc, often find themselves at the margins of human rights; their condition seldom improved and sometimes even worsened by the rights discourse. How does one make sense of this relationship between the complexity of people’s disadvantage and violation of their human rights? Does the human rights discourse, based on its universal and common values, have tools, methods or theories to capture and respond to the difference in people’s lived experience of rights? Can intersectionality help in that quest? This book seeks to inaugurate this line of inquiry.

This collection of essays analyses how diversity in human identity and disadvantage affects the articulation, realisation, violation and enforcement of human rights. The question arises from the realisation that people, who are severally and severely disadvantaged because of their race, religion, gender, age, disability, sexual orientation, class etc, often find themselves at the margins of human rights; their condition seldom improved and sometimes even worsened by the rights discourse. How does one make sense of this relationship between the complexity of people’s disadvantage and violation of their human rights? Does the human rights discourse, based on its universal and common values, have tools, methods or theories to capture and respond to the difference in people’s lived experience of rights? Can intersectionality help in that quest? This book seeks to inaugurate this line of inquiry.